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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Meagan L. Evans 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
December 2012 
 
Title: Sounding Silence: American Women’s Experimental Poetics 
 
 
Traditional feminist readings have valued women’s writing that voices silenced 
experiences. In contrast, other twentieth-century theoretical formulations regard 
absences, refusals, and silences as constitutive of aesthetic practice rather than as 
imposed upon it. This dissertation attends carefully to how U.S. women writers approach 
the nonlinguistic, accounting for how they have been silenced as well as for the kinds of 
silencing that women poets themselves perform. It argues that U.S. women’s 
experimental poetry is driven by contradictory relationships to language and silence: in 
one strain, gendered cultural repression spurs American women poets to push language 
into new territory, often figured as speaking out. But in another mode, female 
identification with the nonrational or nonlinguistic, whether externally enforced or 
strategically inhabited, impels women to develop poetic silences in order to resist the 
impositions of language on a feminized other. Meeting these simultaneous and opposed 
goals—creating poetic forms capable of greater expressive range while signaling the 
inadequacy of linguistic expression—necessitates formal experimentation. My primary 
claim that an unresolved ambivalence toward the nonlinguistic drives innovation dictates 
an emphasis on formal technique, including syntax, rhyme and meter, sentence and 
stanza structure, and figuration. This attention to poetic particulars grounds my 
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contextualization of the work of each poet I consider—Emily Dickinson, Lorine 
Niedecker, and Gwendolyn Brooks—in relation to her own life, to broader literary and 
cultural histories, and to poststructuralist theories of language.  
The first chapter of my dissertation explores the role that early American, 
particularly Puritan and Transcendental, attitudes toward wilderness shape poetic 
motivations both to extend and limit the reach of language throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. In subsequent chapters, I evaluate how those motivations change in 
the context of Dickinson’s nineteenth-century spirituality, Niedecker’s modernist and 
postmodernist anxieties about the role of the poet, and Brooks’s engagement with the 
politics and aesthetics of black nationalism. Reading U.S. women’s poetic innovation as 
simultaneously breaking and cultivating silences opens a dialogue among historically 
feminist understandings of silence as oppressive, theories that put silence at the heart of 
poetic impulse, and avant-garde theoretical conceptions of linguistic experimentation as a 
feminist project. 
 
 vi 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Meagan L. Evans 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 Texas State University, San Marcos 
 Western Washington University, Bellingham 
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, English, 2012, University of Oregon 
 Master of Fine Arts, Poetry, 2007, Texas State University 
 Bachelor of Arts, English/Spanish, 2004, Western Washington University 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Twentieth-century U.S. Literature 
 American Poetry 
 Women’s Literature 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
 Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2007-2011 
 
 Teaching Assistant, Texas State University, 2004-2006 
 
            Instructional Assistant, Texas State University, 2004-2005 
  
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
 Dissertation Fellowship, Oregon Humanities Center, University of Oregon, 2012 
 
 Jane Grant Dissertation Fellowship, Center for the Study of Women in Society, 
University of Oregon 2011-2012 
 
Luvaas Graduate Scholarship, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Oregon 
2011-2012  
 
 vii 
 
Summer Research Award, Center for the Study of Women in Society, University 
of Oregon, 2010 
 
Graduate Research Support Fellowship, Oregon Humanities Center, University of 
Oregon, 2010 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
 
Evans, Meagan. “‘Itself is All the Like’: Selfsameness in the Poetry of Emily 
Dickinson.” The Emily Dickinson Journal 20.2 (2011): 83-105. 
 
---. “You’re Putting Me On: The Old French Fabliaux as Carnival Cross-
Dressing.” New Medieval Literatures 12 (2010): 69-88. 
 
---. “‘Broke and Entered’: Accessibility, Commitment, and the Challenge of 
Cliché in the Poems of Barbara Kingsolver.” Seeds of Change: Critical 
Essays on Barbara Kingsolver. Ed. Priscilla Leder. Knoxville: U of 
Tennessee P, 2010. 129-43. 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish first to thank Professor Karen Ford, whose unflagging support underpins 
every page of this work. I would also like to thank the Oregon Humanities Center and the 
Center for the Study of Women in Society for their investment in this project and for their 
continuing contributions to the intellectual community at the University of Oregon and 
beyond, particularly through funding graduate research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: VOICE AND THE WILDERNESS ......................................... 1  
 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 57 
II. “ITSELF IS ALL THE LIKE”:  
     SELFSAMENESS IN THE POETRY OF EMILY DICKINSON ......................... 63 
 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 110 
III. SHACKLE AND FLOOD: 
      LORINE NIEDECKER AND CONNECTIVE LANGUAGE .............................. 119 
 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 191 
IV. “SOMEWHAT OF SOMETHING OTHER”: 
      ARTIFICE IN THE POETRY OF GWENDOLYN BROOKS ............................. 202 
 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 280 
V. CONCLUSION: SOMETHING ELSE ................................................................... 290 
 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 297 
REFERENCES CITED ................................................................................................ 299 
 
   
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:  
VOICE AND THE WILDERNESS 
 At a 2003 poetry reading at Western Washington University, Li-Young Lee spoke 
about silence. Poetry, he said, shaped silence like a cathedral shapes empty space, making 
us aware of it and making it perceptible to us; poetry shapes language around great arches 
of silence so that we can hear it and stand in awe. To demonstrate, Lee read slowly, 
pausing often, and left a long silence at the end of each poem he read. The silence that 
Lee’s poems marked was not the absence of all sound but the absence of language; it was 
something other-than-language to which poetry attended. As Lee read, a restless child 
jogged his feet against the metal legs of his chair; two people murmured on the other side 
of double doors. My position here is that we can read twentieth-century American poetry 
as if standing in the cathedral that poetry builds around silence, but we must recognize 
that poetry is, also, the child’s insistent heels and the voices outside the door: it shapes 
our reverent silences, but it also itches to interrupt them, tear them down, to fill cathedrals 
with the noise of language saying a new thing, the noise of irreverent tapping and gossip.
1
 
Thus silence, defined for my purposes as the absence of communicative language, 
necessarily plays an uneasy role in poetry. Silence comes before speech, and it comes 
after it; words are sensible only because a silence surrounds each one, separating it from 
the others. And yet, in our pauses and hesitations, in the places where language falters or 
becomes nonsense or noise, the surrounding silence threatens to do away with language, 
to obliterate the speech it makes possible. Poetry cannot be made in utter silence, 
however much its language may shape itself around it and attempt to approximate it. 
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Silence, then, serves two distinct and contradictory functions in poetry: it can be the 
conditions and even goal of poetic language, or it can be its limiting border, and it is 
often both. Poetry is shaped by the concept of silence as a generative matrix for language 
and meaning and by the concept of silence as a border to be crossed. The poets 
considered here situate themselves in a relationship to silence that is special perhaps not 
in kind but in degree, intensifying a fundamental ambivalence of poetry toward silence: 
poetry’s need to maintain and use certain silences and its simultaneous interest in pushing 
at language’s borders and exploring other silences, translating them into a shared 
language.  
 Twentieth-century literature is especially self-conscious about silence. This is 
partly because the modernist struggle for coherence in the face of fragmentation and 
postmodern pastiche and jouissance share a doubt in the capacity of language, especially 
ordinary or instrumental language, to represent reality. This awareness of the gap 
between representational strategies and lived experience, between the signs humans can 
make and what they are meant to signify—which we have come to call the crisis of 
representation—has led to a heightened awareness of the failures or absences in artistic 
production, perhaps most notably, the absence, even impossibility, of meaningful, 
communicative language. Because it has expressed doubt in the capacity of language to 
communicate, our crisis of representation has also effected a reevaluation of the place of 
silence in literature. Many observers and critics agree that silence is particularly 
important in contemporary literatures, but their reactions diverge: writers like George 
Steiner and Susan Sontag submit that twentieth-century literature is losing a battle with 
silence, that it is failing to defend language from an encroaching and paralyzing nihilism, 
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while writers like Max Picard and Stuart Sim insist that a return to silence is a humanist 
project that will allow human culture a profound and fruitful connection with experience. 
While twentieth-century responses to the tendency toward silence in literature range from 
dire warnings to exuberant hortation, they all take silence to be a complex phenomenon 
central to an understanding of contemporary life and art.  
 One of the most influential narratives of twentieth-century poetics emphasizes 
silence as the fertile and sometimes terrifying engendering matrix of poetry. In fact, the 
turn toward what can’t be said, toward silence as the subject or even substance of writing, 
not its limit, is often considered the mark of modernity. According to some twentieth-
century linguists, even the empirical investigation of how language systems function 
must take silence into consideration. Bernard Dauenhauer explains that language must 
reach outside itself for authenticity and that “at bottom in all utterance there is an appeal 
beyond utterance for an authentication of the utterance [. . .]. Authentication must be 
awaited in silence” (19-20). Thus, language depends on the non-linguistic, on silence, not 
only for its physical existence but in order to make meaning: the propositional content of 
language, what it means to say, depends on the extra-linguistic in order to be considered 
true or meaningful. Language cannot validate itself; it must point outside itself. Every 
utterance implies a silent truth. For Dauenhauer, at least, this silence is a “center of 
significance”: “In performing silence one acknowledges some center of significance of 
which he is not the source, a center to be wondered at, to be in awe of. The very doing of 
silence is the acknowledgement of the agent’s finitude and of the awesomeness of that of 
which he is not the source” (25). To be actively silent, which Dauenhauer claims is 
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intrinsic to using language, one must confront a nonlinguistic “awesomeness,” greater 
than oneself, that grants meaning to speech.  
 This silent center of significance is prominent in twentieth-century philosophy 
and theories positing that language necessarily circles around emptiness or an unsayable 
thing. Though emptiness and the unspeakable are distinct in some respects, in poetry, 
which is a linguistic event, the unspeakable must necessarily be represented by 
emptiness, whether the more literal emptiness of white space and refusal to speak at all or 
the emptying out of meaning in nonsense poetry or other strategies that silence 
communication. The concept of an empty, silent, or unknowable center unifies twentieth-
century thinkers whose concerns are otherwise divergent. Ludwig Wittgenstein claims 
that philosophy, in the end, can only point to the impossibility of philosophy, and 
proposition 4.115 of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus asserts that philosophy will 
“mean the unspeakable by clearly displaying the speakable” (77). The later claims of 
literary deconstructionists in some ways echo Wittgenstein’s fundamental disbelief in the 
capacity of language to express reality and the importance of using language to evoke 
what exceeds it. Jacques Derrida, like Wittgenstein, argues that language must always be 
pointing away from itself toward a vital absence. Thinking of Plato, Derrida names this 
non-linguistic non-place that gives birth to language the “khôra” and argues that language 
is impossible without a matrix of non-language.
2
 Similarly, in a vein more directly 
concerned with the development of literature, Roland Barthes contends that writing 
ultimately ends in silence. He develops a teleology of literary development in which 
writing “has reached in our time the last metamorphosis: absence” (5). Though the strain 
of thought sketched here by surveying only a few influential thinkers is by no means the 
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only attitude toward language extant in the twentieth century, a shared focus on the 
absence of language as inherent to the working of language, as something more than 
failure to communicate, is characteristic of twentieth-century European and American 
conceptions of silence.   
 Twentieth-century art is similarly fascinated by the absence of language or 
meaningful expression. This fascination is perhaps most evident in literature because 
language is its medium; this is especially so in poetry, which can be defined by its 
awareness of language as form.
3
 Twentieth-century poets often value the failure of 
language, and many argue that silence is the condition toward which art aspires, that 
silence is, in fact, constitutive of poetry. Though silence may be implicit in their poems, 
its value to contemporary poets is often made quite explicit in their essays on poetics.
4
 
Louise Glück’s “Disruption, Hesitation, Silence” is one among many such essays that 
argues for the value of silence in poetry, particularly in the work of poets whom Glück 
considers “master[s] of not saying” (379).5 Distinguishing her own attitudes from what 
she sees as her generation’s tendency toward exhaustive conclusiveness, she writes, “I am 
attracted to ellipsis, to the unsaid, to suggestion, to eloquent, deliberate silence. The 
unsaid, for me, exerts great power: often I wish an entire poem could be made in this 
vocabulary” (378). In this formulation, poetic language, that which is said in a poem, is 
especially valuable or attractive inasmuch as it expresses the pull of the unsaid and points 
toward silences. Though Glück recognizes that poems cannot be made entirely silently 
(“often I wish an entire poem could be made in this vocabulary”), she regrets the 
necessity of language and wants a language capable of existing in ellipsis. Silence, here, 
is a desirable but impossible state for poetry. Accordingly, an excess of words and 
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information is considered vain, while reticence is a mark of respect and humility before 
the unspeakable. In praise of George Oppen’s “Street,” Glück claims, “The poem refuses 
to project its informing intelligence. The figures beheld remain themselves, and apart. 
This is not insufficiency of feeling, but absence of vanity” (383). Because the poem 
refuses to say what it knows, or does not know, it avoids the vanity of speech and allows 
for the ineffability of its subject. Glück’s essay espouses attitudes typical of twentieth-
century poetics that view words as a necessary presumption upon the ineffable that 
should be mitigated by attempts to make room for silences within the workings of poetic 
language.   
 But to describe the allure of silence and somehow to make that silence present in 
a poem are different endeavors. The most difficult task of poetry that seeks to make room 
for silence is that it must use language to invoke its own absence. John Cage’s infamous 
4’33’’ calls for a pianist to “play” four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence. By 
surrounding silence with the trappings of musical performance—a player at his piano, a 
stage, an audience—Cage effectively makes it audible as music. But the instruments of 
poetry cannot be so easily set upon a stage as a piano. Cage’s poem “Where Are We 
Going? and What Are We Doing?” borrows some of its four-part structure from music 
but adapts musical techniques to the paradoxical purpose of making the absence of 
language felt in language. It is written in four-line stanzas that interweave four distinct 
voices or strains, differentiated from one another by their placement in the stanza and by 
their typography, which combines regular, bold, and italic type. Stanzas in which all four 
voices speak look like this: 
 there’s still time. We’re getting 
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 did it. Was it in 1913 when  
 simpler if we were expressing 
 there is a great interest in going 
 
 around to the usefulness of science 
 Duchamp wrote his piece of music? 
 ourselves. In that case all you’d 
 and staying at the same time  
Lines that take the same placement in the stanza (line 1, 2, 3, or 4) are typographically the 
same and continue the utterance of the previous similarly placed line. This mimics 
musical notation where all the parts of a song (for instance, the soprano, alto, tenor, and 
bass vocal parts) are written and performed together, but each gets its own distinct 
musical stave. This becomes clearer when one or more of the voices drops out. Instead of 
creating a one-, two-, or three-line stanza, Cage uses bullets to mark the silence of the 
voice that has stopped speaking. When the third voice stops it is noted thus: 
 you were writing a song, would 
 When did competition cease? 
 · 
 keep the traditions and   
When the first three voices drop out, the empty lines are preserved: 
 · 
 · 
 · 
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 so much about tradition, but hang on anyway   
And, perhaps most strikingly, some stanzas have no lines of text at all: 
 · 
 · 
 · 
 ·             (212)   
When two or three of the voices drop out of the poem, it becomes much easier to follow 
what the voices still speaking are saying. The silence of voices 1, 2, and 3 makes voice 4 
more audible. Thus, in Cage’s poem, the less language is present, the more can be heard. 
By subtracting words, Cage makes the sense of other parts of the poem more evident, and 
white spaces and emptiness signal clearer communication. By this token, when the poem 
introduces whole stanzas empty of language, a purity, a clarity, a missing voice is 
invoked: a silent voice can finally be apprehended now that the distraction of language 
has been cleared away. As his 3’44’’ does for musical composition, Cage’s poem works 
to make the silence that is necessary to language perceivable as a phenomenon in its own 
right. It exemplifies the tendency among many of those concerned with language in the 
twentieth century—from linguists to literary critics, theorists, philosophers, and poets—to 
value silence as a matrix for and even the longed-for goal of language and literature. 
Maurice Blanchot neatly aphorizes this strain of thought in The Work of Fire: 
“literature’s ideal has been the following: to say nothing, to speak in order to say 
nothing” (324). 
  American poets, as the work of Louise Glück and John Cage attests, are essential 
participants in the larger literary and cultural valuations of silence that have characterized 
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the twentieth century. However, the multivalent influence of concepts of wordlessness on 
U.S. national and cultural development makes it both exceptionally important and 
particularly difficult for American poets to work out the role of silence in their work. 
Though Frederick Jackson Turner’s 1893 “frontier thesis” famously falls short of 
articulating the complexity of American history, his formulation of American identity as 
shaped by its response to a frontier perceived as empty still resonates in American self-
characterizations from Kennedy’s “New Frontier” to Star Trek’s “space, the final 
frontier.”6 As Perry Miller reminds us in Errand Into the Wilderness, American identity 
cannot be reduced to an inevitable response to geography, political or physical, but the 
metaphor of the frontier—the uncivilized wilderness that threatens and coaxes, whether 
that wilderness is a literal one or the forests of an unsubdued and sinful soul—is 
undeniably compelling (1-2). The myth of the wilderness and its metaphorical resonances 
can make American poetic responses to silence especially charged. When wilderness is 
defined as the absence of human presence, what William Cronon calls “something 
irreducibly nonhuman,” it is also defined as the absence of human language (2).7 
Something entirely other than human cannot be expressed adequately in human terms. 
Thus, at the core of some of the most cherished and long-held ideas about American 
specialness, which depend on the fiction of an untamed land, is a silence about which 
American culture has been conflicted.
8
 The silences of the American wilderness urge 
both preservation and civilization, a contemplative hike and a territorial expedition, a 
mystic’s wonder and a pioneer’s cartographic and domesticating eye.9  
 An unresolvable tension between what I will call mystic and pioneer responses to 
wilderness, between preserving and breaking silences, is apparent in the United States’ 
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Puritan past. Puritan responses to the real and imagined wildernesses they faced have 
sometimes been characterized as overwhelmingly negative; however, Puritan doctrine 
reveals, coexistent with demonization of the wild, a fundamental respect for the 
untranslatable or the inhuman as sacred and holy.
10
 Though the Puritans are popularly 
considered the dour and legalistic parents of the rebelliously mystical Transcendentalists, 
they too sought a kind of holy wilderness: even if they did not go out into the woods or 
up on mountain peaks to find evidence of the divine, their concept of divinity responded 
to the influence of the wilderness metaphor, especially to the inadequacy of human 
speech in the wilderness. As Miller describes it, the development of American Christian 
religious culture—especially as it concerned the doctrine of predestination—involved an 
oscillation between awe before the unknowable will of God and a covenant with that 
God, a covenant that necessarily had to be communicable in human terms. Thus, the 
beginnings of a dominant strain of American culture were marked by ambivalence toward 
the wilderness of divine silence and the language that might or might not be capable of 
translating it. On the one hand, Puritan doctrine posited a divinity that depended on 
unspeakability: God merited worship precisely because he could not be understood in 
human terms. In this sense, God was holy because inhuman, an inhumanity He shared 
with the literal wilderness that surrounded the early colonists in a newly real way. On the 
other hand, Puritan daily life depended on a working understanding of God’s covenant, 
his word, the language in which he made agreements with human beings, just as it 
depended on domesticating the inhuman wilderness and converting it into necessary 
resources.
 
Miller argues that the tension between an unspeakable God and human 
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language was central not only to Puritan theological questions but to the development of 
American civic life. Each was driven by the same paradox: 
 Here, then, was the task which seventeenth-century Calvinists faced: the task of 
 bringing God to time and to reason, of justifying His ways to man in conceptions 
 meaningful to the intellect, of caging and confining the transcendent Force, the 
 inexpressible and unfathomable Being, by the laws of ethics, and of doing this 
 somehow without losing the sense of the hidden God, without reducing the 
 Divinity to a mechanism, without depriving Him of unpredictability, absolute 
 power, fearfulness, and mystery. (56) 
Though God may be unspeakable, the human religious community depends on linguistic 
communication. Though the wilderness might stand in for the “hidden” and 
“unpredictabl[e]” nature of divinity that should not be “cag[ed] and confin[ed],” trees 
must be cut down to make houses, paths cut for commerce. Miller is not explicitly 
addressing the role of language in the attainment of these paradoxical goals, but he 
describes, in the Puritan relationship to an incomprehensible divinity, a phenomenon that 
takes place in language. Further knowledge of God (and, for the Puritans, this also meant 
knowledge of the world more generally since all knowledge was understood as revelatory 
of God’s plan) could mean a move away from language, a silence before an unspeakable 
God, or it could mean the development of more accurate or more compelling language 
for understanding His will, for articulating it in the human terms of ethics, the true, and 
the good. It could mean a mystic preservation of inhuman silences or a pioneering urge to 
explore those silences and convert them into something communally useful. This duality, 
shaped by an encounter with the silences of wilderness, may not directly be the source of 
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American poetry’s desire both to extend and limit language, but it does reflect how 
deeply this doubleness is ingrained in the American relationship to silence. 
 While Puritan mystic and pioneering responses to silence are constructed by 
analogy to theological and civic responses to God’s unknowability, subsequent American 
thinkers respond more directly to the idea of wilderness itself. Though the men and 
women sometimes uneasily grouped under the banner of Transcendentalism are famously 
mystical in their responses to wilderness and its silences, they too evince an ambivalence 
that is not as easily resolved as the simple equation of Transcendentalism with mysticism 
might imply. In their own time, the Transcendentalists were received as mystics and not 
always well received as such. Hawthorne’s notebooks describe Emerson as “the mystic, 
stretching his hand out of cloud-land in vain search of something real [. . .] the great 
searcher after facts; but they seem to melt away and become insubstantial in his grasp” 
(qtd. in Kopley 604). And Lydia Maria Child, “sometimes called a Transcendentalist 
[her]self, perhaps because [she] use[d] the phrase ‘highly gifted,’” explained that the 
Transcendental “doctrine of intuitive perception” was to blame for the “mystical sound” 
of their writing and the difficulty of ascertaining the “deeper significance” of “that which 
is really uttered” by Transcendentalists (Child 94-95). These imputations of vagueness 
are directly related to the sense among the Transcendentalist writers themselves that 
transcendent experiences are difficult to articulate in common language, poetic language, 
or even in language at all. Experiences that exceed human speech are most commonly 
found, for the Transcendentalists, in the wilderness. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s most 
famously mystical moment is recorded in the “transparent eyeball” passage of “Nature,” 
in which he describes an ecstatic oneness with all of existence, experienced through 
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communion with the natural world (8). This mystical union is explicitly attained through 
silence in “The Poet” when Emerson talks of the submission of the poet to nature as a 
silent force that speaks through him: “The path of things is silent. Will they suffer a 
speaker to go with them? A spy they will not suffer; a lover, a poet, is the transcendency 
of their own nature,—him they will suffer. The condition of true naming, on the poet's 
part, is his resigning himself to the divine aura which breathes through forms, and 
accompanying that” (30). Emerson insists that the poet “resign himself to the divine 
aura,” the silent path of things, and “accompany” that aura. The poet is suffered to travel 
alongside the divine down a silent path, but he himself does not blaze that path or break 
its silence. The authority of the poet is indicated by the fact that he accompanies a silent 
force not by his exploring or translating or rendering it significant. Henry David Thoreau 
echoes and expands Emerson’s mystical responses to the silent wilderness in his famous 
claim “In Wildness is the preservation of the World” (“Walking” 672). Because wildness 
is that which is “unsurveyed and unfathomed by us because unfathomable,” it is salvific 
(Walden 419). This mystical attitude leads Thoreau to value the preservation of silence: 
to scriptural exegetes who sought a definitive interpretation of Biblical texts he responds, 
“Do you know the number of God’s family? Can you put mysteries into words? Do you 
presume to fable the ineffable?” (Week 48). Clearly, Thoreau finds it ridiculous to 
“presume” that all things can be known and “put into words.” For Emerson and Thoreau 
some experiences—the divine, the natural, and the divinely natural—are beyond 
expression in language.  
 However, despite the evident mysticism of Transcendentalism, the silences of the 
wilderness also elicit a response perhaps more in line with the prevailing spirit of 
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pragmatism, positivism, and materialism against which the Transcendentalists often 
railed. Though the mystic current of Emerson’s essay “The Poet” is undeniable, it is also 
true that Emerson’s description of the coming American poet insists on the possibility of 
“true naming” and on the poet as one who can fully penetrate the silences of nature, thus 
invoking the sense of the poet as pioneer, as one who can conquer silences with speech 
and domesticate the mysteries of nature with human language. Emerson makes the role of 
the poet that of the “sayer,” he who “expresses” what other men only dimly perceive; he 
leads us into new realms and, with his voice, carves out new territory in the silent 
wilderness on the other side of the borders of ordinary language (“Poet” 12-13). The 
wilderness calls to the poet and in doing so forfeits some of its wildness: “Nature offers 
all her creatures to him as a picture-language,” and the job of the poet is to interpret and 
express that language (18). Emerson imagines nature as seeking out its expression 
through the emissary of the poet. If anything is inexpressible, it is not inherently so but 
only remains silent because of a temporary failure of the poet or his language: “Since 
everything in nature answers to a moral power, if any phenomenon remains brute and 
dark, it is that the corresponding faculty in the observer is not yet active” (20). The phrase 
“not yet active” indicates that the observer has only to hone his faculties to be able further 
to penetrate the mysteries of nature. Though Emerson often suggests poetry approaches 
an unspeakable wilderness, his language reveals that he also sees the true poet as one who 
plots certain silences, for he “puts eyes, and a tongue, into every dumb and inanimate 
object” (25). When Emerson begins to speak directly to the poet he imagines is due on 
the American scene, his exhortations, in a “Go West, young man” spirit, direct the 
pioneer poet to “the Western clearing, Oregon and Texas,” which “are yet unsung” (41). 
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Though the difficulties of language are recognized and silences are confronted, in the end 
the poet is made a poet by conquering silence and bending it to his will: 
 Stand there, balked and dumb, stuttering and stammering, hissed and hooted, 
 stand and strive, until, at last, rage draw out of thee that dream-power which 
 every night shows thee is thine own; a power transcending all limit and privacy, 
 and by  virtue of which a man is the conductor of the whole river of electricity. 
 Nothing walks, or creeps, or grows, or exists, which must not in turn arise and 
 walk before him as exponent of his meaning. (43) 
Emerson evokes the mystical power of the wilderness, but that mystical strength serves to 
emphasize the greater exploratory command of a poetic language, “a power transcending 
all limit and privacy,” that can subdue it into expression and meaning. Thoreau, too, 
though he may be more concerned with maintaining the unfathomableness of the 
wilderness than Emerson, is compelled by pioneer rhetoric and does not fully affirm the 
silence of the wilderness over the incursions of human language. As Bradley Dean 
argues, Thoreau was not only driven by awe and wonder before the unspeakable 
wilderness but by a naturalist’s yearning for clear understanding, for codifying and 
explaining the mysteries of nature in human language. Dean explains the coexistence of 
these modes in Transcendentalism in terms of eternity: “Because the universe is infinite 
(and, Thoreau and Emerson assert, spiritual as well as material), it accommodates both 
humanity’s need for mystery and our earnest wish ‘to explore and learn all things’” 
(85).
11
 For both Emerson and Thoreau, wilderness is simultaneously to be accompanied 
in silence and explored with all the capacity of human language. Thoreau recognizes the 
importance of both of these responses to wilderness in Walden: “At the same time that we 
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are earnest to explore and learn all things, we require that all things be mysterious and 
unexplorable, that land and sea be infinitely wild, unsurveyed and unfathomed by us 
because unfathomable. We can never have enough of Nature” (419).  
 The ambivalence of Puritan and Transcendentalist responses to wilderness and its 
silences is also apparent in American poetry. However, poetic responses to mystical and 
pioneering traditions must be specifically contextualized as distinct from the 
philosophical, religious, or political. Shira Wolosky’s explanation of mysticism reveals 
the importance of language, and the negation of language, to mystical formulations:  
 Almost by definition, mysticisms demote and ultimately attempt to abrogate 
 language. A negative approach to language is almost always central to the 
 mystical desire for ultimacy, seen as a state beyond multiplicity, division, and 
 dispersion—conditions closely associated with language. Exactly because 
 mysticism longs to go beyond sequence and difference to unity, negation is an 
 integral part of its evaluation of language, which is the site and sign of sequential 
 difference. As the inexpressibility topos suggests, the assertion of what language 
 cannot say is a traditional means for designating an ultimate realm beyond 
 formulation. Negation and transcendence are thus closely allied. (3) 
Evoking silence in poetry can be a method for mystical transcendence of the divisions 
inherent in language and for establishing, or reestablishing, a primary oneness with 
something beyond words.  
 However, the role of silence in American poetry is often somewhat divorced from 
its explicitly religious or spiritual context. Instead, it evinces a more general mystical 
attitude that seeks to negate language in favor of a non-linguistic force or potent absence, 
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not necessarily a divine unity. Mystical poetry is poetry in which, as Glück notes of 
Rilke’s “Archaic Torso of Apollo,” “[t]he unknowable is the poem’s first referent, the 
context” (378-79). Though many writers who posit silence as the end (in both senses: 
cessation and culmination) of literary work might characterize themselves as atheist or 
even nihilist, their silences structurally imply an ineffable force, an emptiness, or an 
absence that is quasi-divine by virtue of its unspeakability, its unavailability to human 
knowing through language.
12
 Poetic mysticism, then, allows something (some 
unspeakable thing) to remain other than linguistic and, by extension, it preserves a 
wilderness that is decidedly nonhuman, something outside of the poem’s language and 
other than the speaker or reader of that language. Even when silences are profoundly 
destructive of literary meaning-making, when poetic language seeks to undo itself, the 
result is still positive: ineffable non-linguistic meaning has been made and the silent 
unknowable is gestured toward. American poetic mysticisms are shaped by similar forces 
to those that shape Puritan, Transcendental, and other American mysticisms, but the 
significance of language and the concern with its formal elements necessarily distinguish 
poetic responses to silence.
13
 Thus, unlike religious or philosophical approaches, poetic 
mysticism, as I am using the term, is primarily concerned with evoking, in language, the 
experience of the non-linguistic and is not determined by the kind of non-linguistic 
experience to which it alludes.
14
 
 “Pioneer” can perhaps more straightforwardly be adopted as a specifically poetic 
term than “mystic.” The figure of the pioneer encompasses both the explorer and the 
settler. He blazes trails and sets off into empty plains, but he also makes the wilderness 
hospitable: he plants crops, raises a family, lays down rails that will bring others. The 
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pioneer impulse in American poetry maintains both of these senses. The exploratory poet 
pushes language into silence; he innovates and ranges far afield of the cultivated 
preserves of what has already been said and of what language is already capable of 
saying.
15
 He uses language to explore silences, but he also makes those silences more 
hospitable to those who come after. The goal of language, in a poetic informed by the 
American pioneer mythos, is to explore the wildernesses of silence and, eventually, to 
articulate a path through them, to make a home for language in territory that has been 
inhospitable to it. Moreover, like the early American explorers and settlers, in American 
poetics the pioneer has had to ignore or destroy the voices already present in his 
supposedly silent wilderness. In these senses, then, the mystic and pioneer responses to 
wilderness evident in Puritan and Transcendentalist thought are also extant in American 
poetic responses that conceive of the wilderness in more directly linguistic terms, as 
silence. 
 Though an apophatic or mystical denial of language recalls old-world attitudes, 
both European and Eastern, twentieth-century American writers who seek to create 
silences in language are firmly within their own national tradition.
16
 Melville’s Bartleby 
is perhaps the most iconic American literary figure of silence as mystic negation; 
“Bartleby the Scrivener: a Story of Wall Street” circles around Bartleby’s stubborn 
refusal to explain himself, the reticent finality of his “I prefer not to.” Bartleby’s silence 
may tempt readers to fill in that absence with various kinds of meaning, but ultimately it 
resists meaning and remains unintelligible.
17
 This refusal of meaning, the empty center of 
Melville’s story, is not an isolated incident. Richard Chase argues that American 
literature is distinguished by its stubborn insistence on looking at the aberrant, anti-social, 
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mysterious, and strange and on delving into the unspeakable and hidden.
18
 He calls this a 
romantic tendency and claims that American romances (he uses Hawthorne’s work as a 
prime example) require a fog of “mystery and bewilderment” not only because they take 
such mystery as their subject but because they must obscure their failure to represent 
adequately the social and material (American Novel 23). In Chase’s account, the 
American romance is definitively addressed to the encounter between the individual and 
the unknown and in maintaining a veiling silence around that encounter.  
 Though Chase deals exclusively with the novel, American poetry shows a similar 
concern with evoking the wilderness—the mysterious or unknowable as such—and 
refusing to give it fully over to language. Melville’s poem “The Berg (A Dream)” 
narrates the encounter of “a ship of martial build” and a “stolid iceberg” (401-02). The 
majority of the poem recounts, through an accumulation of detail, that the iceberg is 
entirely unmoved by the event, though the ship is undone by it. The final stanza 
delineates most clearly the awfulness of silence in the poem: 
 Hard Berg (methought), so cold, so vast, 
            With mortal damps self-overcast; 
            Exhaling still thy dankish breath— 
            Adrift dissolving, bound for death; 
            Though lumpish thou, a lumbering one— 
            A lumbering lubbard loitering slow, 
            Impingers rue thee and go down, 
            Sounding thy precipice below, 
            Nor stir the slimy slug that sprawls 
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            Along thy dead indifference of walls. (402) 
Those who seek to “impinge” on the iceberg will “sound” it only through their own 
deaths: “Impingers rue thee and go down, / Sounding thy precipice below.” The pun on 
“sound,” a term for measurement, makes both understanding and voicing contingent on 
losing one’s self to the thing being sounded. Despite its exhalation of “dankish breath,” 
the berg will not speak to a living person; perhaps more importantly, it cannot be 
adequately spoken about. The parenthetical “(methought)” reminds us that even the 
apparently objective adjectives “cold” and “vast” are attributed to the iceberg by the 
speaker of the poem, by his perceptions, and are not its knowable, inherent qualities. As 
if to compensate for the iceberg’s resistance to articulation, the rest of the stanza pulls out 
the poetic stops, piling on repetition, alliteration, and assonance, as in “Though lumpish 
thou, a lumbering one— /A lumbering lubbard loitering slow.” But, in the end, the 
impingement of this language makes no difference, and the iceberg remains, in the final 
line of the poem, “indifferent.”19 The only thing that moves or marks the iceberg is itself; 
it is by its own “damps self-overcast.” Though the poem does not unambiguously 
celebrate silence, it pays homage to it as a blank presence that exceeds and is indifferent 
to language. This kind of valuation of the unspeakable or the unknown, of that which 
remains silent even in the face of all our powers of speech, is an integral part of the story 
of writing in America. 
 And yet, despite the influence of mysticism in American literature, American 
writing has more often defined itself as a pioneering enterprise. This is, of course, not 
exclusively an American attitude, but it is especially pronounced in American poetics 
because of the influence of the frontier rhetoric on American writers and readers.
20
 Walt 
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Whitman, often considered the most representatively American poet in the canon, 
answers Emerson’s call for an American poetry that makes language the tool of the 
explorer and gives voice to, or forces voice upon, the silence of the wilderness. 
Whitman’s “Song of Myself” famously makes the personality of the poet-speaker, “Walt 
Whitman, a kosmos, of Manhattan the son,” a unifying dynamism capable of 
encompassing and expressing all things. Though, like Emerson, Whitman’s speaker-self 
recognizes the power of what is beyond his reach, that force nevertheless serves to 
indicate the authority of the speaker who can, through greatness of effort or being, 
encompass it. This expansive self is explicitly identified with poetic speech in section 42 
of “Song of Myself,” where the speaker begins with “A call in the midst of a the crowd, / 
My own voice, orotund sweeping and final” and claims later in the section that he 
“know[s] perfectly well [his] own egotism, / Know[s his] omnivorous lines and must not 
write any less” (112). Here the poet’s ego is identified with his poetic voice and 
technique (his “omnivorous lines”), and they are both “sweeping and final”: the poet, 
embodied in his lines, is capable of speaking all. No part of experience is exempt from 
the omnivorous poetic voice; no silences are impenetrable. In section 44, the poetic ego is 
pictured as surrounded by the silences of nothingness and the unknown but not overcome 
by those silences or insufficient to express them. Instead, the speaker leaves a primordial 
nothingness behind in an ascent through the unknown toward an ontological 
completeness and finality figured as accomplishment and enclosure. The section opens in 
line three with “I launch all men and women forward with me into the Unknown” but 
quickly asserts that the unknown is not fundamentally unknowable, simply not yet 
known: 
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I am an acme of things accomplish’d, and I an encloser of things to be.  
 
My feet strike an apex of the apices of the stairs, 
On every step bunches of ages, and larger bunches between the steps,  
All below duly travel’d, and still I mount and mount. 
 
Rise after rise bow the phantoms behind me,  
Afar down I see the huge first Nothing, I know I was even there. (115) 
The poet here is a forward- and upward-moving “traveler,” rendering that which he 
encounters on each step of his journey into mere phantoms that bow to him as master. 
The poetic self develops incrementally as it moves away from the silence of “the huge 
first Nothing” and, step by step, conquers the unknown, finally arriving at a completely 
self-sufficient identity, the poetic voice exerting dominance over the previously 
unexplored terrain of experience and knowledge into which it launched. Whitman’s 
garrulous poetic voice, his exhaustive cataloging, and his claims for the ability of poetic 
speech to reach all corners of the universe, no matter how wild, serve as part of a 
compelling pioneer rhetoric that has indelibly marked the character of American poetry. 
 This pioneer rhetoric has persisted in American literature, even after conquest and 
colonization reached the West. Like earlier American poets, twentieth-century American 
writers value newness and promote language as a tool for extending the scope of human 
understanding. In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” T. S. Eliot famously aligns the 
poet with the disinterested scientist/discoverer. He alternately figures the poet’s mind as 
“a filament of platinum” that is the catalyst for a reaction between gasses and as exerting 
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an intense “artistic process, the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion [of the 
components of art] takes place” (41). While his use of scientific language to authorize the 
poet is linked to the larger international foment of modernism, and his rejection of 
personality as the source of poetic authority runs counter to the Whitmanian tradition, 
Eliot’s depersonalized poetic, however international, also has roots in the American 
pioneer tradition.
21
 If we return to Emerson’s “The Poet,” it is evident that, though Eliot 
rejects Emerson’s correlation of personality and poetic authority, he is Emersonian 
insofar as he understands poetic language as something that pushes inventively at the 
boundaries of language: “we love the poet, the inventor, who in any form, whether in an 
ode, or in an action, or in looks and behavior, has yielded us a new thought. He unlocks 
our chains, and admits us to a new scene” (37).22 The poet yields us a new thought 
because he makes language capable of expressing something new. Similarly, Eliot 
conceptualizes his own language as a “venture,” making a “raid on the inarticulate,” 
which suggests that silence is not the eventual goal or the inaccessible and awesome 
center of poetic language but rather, as in Emerson and Whitman, a territory to be 
explored, plundered, and mastered (“East Coker” 30-31). In fact, Eliot makes 
unspeakable or unspoken experience not only into foreign territory but enemy territory, 
casting the poet as a soldier in a battle against the inarticulate.  
 The “East Coker” section of Eliot’s Four Quartets gives us the pioneer poet faced 
with modern (and modernist) doubts about the adequacy of language: 
 So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years— 
 Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l’entre deux guerres— 
 Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt  
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 Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
 Because one has only learnt to get the better of words 
 For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which 
 One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture 
 Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
 With shabby equipment deteriorating 
 In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, 
 Undisciplined squads of emotion. And what there is to conquer 
 By strength, and submission, has already been discovered 
 Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope 
 To emulate— (30-31)  
Though the Four Quartets at times laments the failure of language, in “East Coker” 
language is still the tool of the pioneer, of a man on a “venture” who seeks “to conquer / 
By strength, and submission.” Eliot’s martial language—“l’entre duex guerres,” “raid,” 
“equipment,” “undisciplined squads”—makes the poet a soldier figure whose work is 
framed and figured by war. This conflation of frontier and frontline, of conquering and 
discovering, foregrounds the violence already inherent in the pioneer rhetoric that 
informs work like Emerson’s. However, for Eliot, the poet as soldier-explorer faces a 
problem with which Emerson did not have to contend: the New World “has already been 
discovered / Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope / To 
emulate.” This would appear to rob the poet of his role as the inventor, the conquering 
explorer of the new, and the pioneering mind. But the poem expresses a fear of 
belatedness without abandoning its claim to discovery. Instead of a wilderness that is new 
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to his language, the speaker of “East Coker” seeks a language that is new to the 
wilderness. Eliot retains for the poet the role of the pioneer by claiming that language is 
“shabby equipment” and the poet must “get the better of words” in order successfully to 
“raid the inarticulate.” Thus Eliot reconstitutes the pioneer for an era in which everything 
has been discovered already by making language itself into the inarticulate thing that 
must be raided, conquered, and made to submit. Though he rejects the optimism of 
Whitman’s “acme of things accomplish’d,” he makes the poet one who goes behind 
enemy lines, a pioneer who struggles with his path but presses forward nonetheless.
23
 The 
figure of the pioneer is by no means a relic of a frontier past but a still-vital metaphor for 
the development of new capabilities and contexts in American literature.  
 Though its importance to American identity may not be as obvious as that of the 
pioneer tradition, the mystical attitude did not fade with the modernizing of American 
religion and the recuperation of the Transcendentalists into respectability. The ideas of 
many later American writers, some of whom construct themselves as self-consciously 
and deliberately American, are rooted in mystic attitudes toward silence, especially the 
silence of wilderness. Gary Snyder, like the Beat poets with whom he is often identified, 
is inspired by Eastern, particularly Buddhist, thinking; nevertheless, his mystical poetic 
develops a distinctly American philosophy of the wilderness. “For Americans,” he 
explains, “nature means wilderness, the untamed realm of total freedom—not brutish and 
nasty, but beautiful and terrible” (“Poetry and the Primitive” 54). It is this untamed 
quality that he often seeks to create in his journals and poems by “leaving things out at 
the right spot” (“Journal” 8). As a poet whose goal is to write about an “untamed” realm, 
he values silences and often takes as self-evident the notion that the experience of the 
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wilderness exceeds words. This mystical bent is evident not only in Snyder’s frequent 
philosophical statements in favor of nonrational and nonlinguistic knowing but in his 
formal choices in his journals and poems.  
 Snyder’s most common strategy for writing about wilderness is to create an image 
but to remain silent about its significance. Rather than explain that there is an ineffable 
connection between human experience and the natural world, Snyder will juxtapose 
images of the human with the nonhuman, the civilized with the wild. Rarely do his poems 
speak about what wilderness might mean for the human; instead, he places them in silent 
communion with each other, implying a significance that cannot be articulated in 
language, which would necessarily leave the mark of the human on the wilderness he 
seeks to preserve as other than human and would tame what Snyder wants to inscribe as 
untamed. Snyder’s early “Lookout’s Journal” expresses the importance of form to 
making room for silence in language:  
 How pleasant to squat in the sun 
 Jockstrap & zoris 
 
 form—leaving things out at the right spot 
 ellipse, is emptiness 
    these ice-scoured valleys 
    swarming with plants (8) 
Though this section of the journal begins with subjective human experience in the 
wilderness, the pleasant feeling of squatting in the sun in the barest of clothing, it 
concludes by erasing the human from the scene. “Form” is defined as the process of 
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choosing the correct silences and—almost under the heading of “emptiness,” the 
indentations suggest—there are a few spare notes on the valley, empty of the human 
though it is “swarming” with plants. The valley stands in unrecuperated otherness: if 
there is any connection to the speaker, in his “jockstrap and zoris,” it has been elided, 
passed over in silence, and the white space and the indentation of the lines describing the 
valley reinforce that silence.  
 Snyder’s later poem “Burning the Small Dead” employs a similar aesthetic but 
without the journal entry’s intervening explanation of form that, to some degree, 
interrupts the silence it attempts to explain. Instead, this poem allows quietness full rein: 
 Burning the small dead 
  branches 
 broke from beneath 
     thick spreading  
         whitebark pine. 
 
        a hundred summers 
 snowmelt    rock    and    air  
 
 hiss in a twisted bough. 
 
                sierra granite; 
          mt. Ritter— 
          black rock twice as old. 
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 Deneb, Altair 
 
 windy fire (431) 
The poem echoes the themes of William Carlos Williams’ “Burning the Christmas 
Greens,” a much longer work that interprets the larger human significance of burning 
decorative boughs in the hearth once winter has passed. Compared to Williams’s musing, 
even didactic tone, the absence of interpretation in this poem is stark. Snyder values 
physical properties like sound—as in the onomatopoeia of “hiss in a twisted bough”—
over abstractions like Williams’s “green is a solace / a promise of peace” (64). Unlike 
that of the Christmas greens, the significance of Snyder’s dead branches is not 
exhaustively articulated, and the form of the poem contributes to this restraint.
24
 For 
example, the relationships among the three bare nouns, “snowmelt,” “rock,” and “air,” 
separated by white space, are not fixed. Each noun invokes a natural element, but the 
poem refuses to dictate how they interact or what they might mean, indicating that they 
exceed the capacity of language to articulate and reify interaction. Similarly, the poem 
undermines the comparative function of language: it calls the “black rock” of Mt. Ritter 
“twice as old” but does not offer the other half of the comparison: “twice as old” as what? 
25
 Even the sparse information the poem provides implies something unspoken. The line 
“Deneb, Altair” names two of the stars in the summer triangle, suggesting a setting for 
the poem and invoking the propensity for making natural objects serve human ends. 
However, the conversion of natural phenomena into navigation symbols is short-circuited 
when the third star is not named. And, though “windy fire” may be an attempt at naming 
the third star in a new way, the poem ceases after “windy fire” to make any attempt at 
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naming whatsoever. Snyder, like many other twentieth-century American poets, says 
with Thoreau that we need some part of experience to remain “unfathomed because 
unfathomable.” Even as our wildernesses dwindle and our myths about them are revised 
and reshaped, the mystic mode remains a dynamic part of American poetics.  
 Neither the pioneer nor the mystic is the more valuable or authentic American 
poetic. Instead, American poetry, and American women’s writing in particular, is 
characterized by attempts to occupy both of these positions simultaneously. Not only do 
mystic and pioneer attitudes persist in American poetry, but the fundamental duality of 
the American relationship to language still echoes in contemporary formulations of what 
poetry should be and do. Jorie Graham’s “Some Notes On Silence” is, in some ways, 
mystical. The essay begins: “I think I am probably in love with silence, that other world. 
And that I write, in some way, to negotiate seriously with it. If poems are records of true 
risks (attempts at change) taken by the soul of the speaker, then, as much as possible, my 
steps are toward silence” (163). Graham describes silence as desirable and threatening, as 
“[a]ll forms of death and mystery,” in short, as an otherness that cannot be expressed in 
language but toward which language should aim. However, her rhetoric, like Eliot’s 
raiding, also makes the poet into a soldier on the frontlines of a battle with silence: “one 
can feel the weight of what the language is battling with,” “[Dickinson and Glück] have 
battled with a worthy opponent and been gagged by it,” “it is a victory over silence for 
us,” “an attempt to penetrate the silence,” “put up a fight,” “it’s a draw.” The essay ends 
by placing poetry on “the boundary [. . .] between the words we speak and those that 
unspeak us” and describes the best poems as “active negations at that border, not border-
skirmishes but great last-ditch efforts” (171). Though Graham claims her poems seek the 
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“other world” of silence, she also sees poetry as doing battle with silence and sees speech 
as winning new territory from the unexplored. Graham is clearly aware of her combating 
urges to extend and limit language, and her formulation of that conflict is reminiscent of 
the Puritan negotiations with God’s unknowability: “poems are, after all, dialogues 
between the song of man and the silences of God, aren’t they? And almost every poem 
illustrates one of the two impulses we experience: to be united with the unknown, to 
break out of this separateness, or to wrench a uniqueness, an identity, from the all-
consuming whole” (168). “Almost every poem,” then, serves either mystic or pioneer 
goals, and some, despite their irreconcilability, seek to serve them both. It is the desire to 
have it both ways—to say the unsaid while also signaling language’s limitations—that 
drives the formal innovations of many American women poets.   
 Experimental or innovative poetry, that is, the reforming or deforming of received 
language patterns, is central to achieving this simultaneity. By claiming that innovative 
poetry is suited to both the evocation and exploration of silence, I do not mean to suggest 
that only poetry that advertises itself as novel or that drastically departs from mainstream 
poetic intelligibility is concerned with the tensions between language and silence. Not all 
poetry in unusual forms is necessarily experimental, and poems within accepted norms 
can still be experimental. Opening the definition of innovation to any poem that creates 
or recreates its own form runs some risk of diffusing it; however, poetic experimentation, 
the most salient characteristic of which is uncertainty of outcome, cannot be limited to 
particular rhythms, line-lengths, or narrative perspectives. And without innovation, thus 
broadly defined, it is impossible for a poet simultaneously to restrain and to spur the 
gallop of words. 
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 Experimentation is useful to mystic poetics because, if language is to approach 
silence, it must be twisted away from its common goal of expression and communication. 
If language is inadequate in the face of something that lies outside it, the poet must 
foreground that inadequacy in order to point at that something. We assume that ordinary 
language represents experience directly and transparently: it does not make a spectacle of 
its own failure. But poets who wish to gesture toward the existence of something 
unrepresentable—some extra-linguistic space, or force, or experience—must make 
ordinary language reveal its own lacunae. In order to conjure, in language, the non-, sub-, 
or supralinguistic, poetic language must evidence a difficulty. Therefore, experimental 
forms, which frequently foreground the difficulty of stable signification, are particularly 
useful to poets who wish to dramatize the limits of language. Cage’s “Where Are We 
Going and What Are We Doing?” is a helpful example: its adaptation of the musical staff 
creates a form for acknowledging silence. However, innovation need not be so obvious. 
As Graham explains in “Some Notes on Silence,” devices as simple as breaking off in the 
middle of a sentence or relying on abstract language can indicate the failure of language 
to communicate something larger than itself. Nor does all innovation toward silence 
entail erasing parts of language. Pushing language to excess can, paradoxically, also 
flaunt its insufficiency and, by extension, the unspeakable beyond it. But without altering 
ordinary language in some way, it is all but impossible to approximate silence.  
 Similarly, innovation is intricately tied to the pioneer poetics. In fact, 
“exploratory” and “pioneering” are frequently used as synonyms for experimental or 
innovative work. This assumes that words are tools that need to be better honed in order 
to be capable of further exploration into the territory of silence. When the ordinary way 
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of speaking or writing is incapable of expressing something, that something remains on 
the other side of silence’s borders. Poets must reshape language to make it capable of 
expressing those things that were once inexpressible; they must carve new tools and draw 
new maps to win ground for poetic language. Where mystic innovation seeks to evoke 
silence, pioneer innovation seeks to explore it and domesticate it through the invention of 
newly capable forms. Though Mary Margaret Sloan’s recent anthology Moving Borders: 
Three Decades of Innovative Writing by Women maintains a suspicion of many of the 
master metaphors of American literary culture, its guiding concept of borders still casts 
women’s innovation as exploratory and the border between language and silence as a 
frontier: “Much of the writing in this anthology explores the boundaries of poetry, 
narrative, novels, and plays, the territory where proposition and prosody are 
indistinguishable, and where film, theater, performance, installation and the page are 
mutually informing” (6, emphasis added). Innovation, then, takes place in a linguistic and 
generic no-man’s-land where new roads must be built for new territory to be claimed. 
Innovation is an important, even constitutive, part of poetry for both the mystic and the 
pioneer. This, then, is the situation of American poetry in the twentieth century: it must 
explore the wilderness of silence, conquer it, make it habitable, and subordinate it to 
language, and yet it must also try to become silence, it must invite it in, revere it as that 
which validates language itself. For both of these goals, formal innovation is 
indispensable. To push language toward silence, ordinary language must be undermined 
or reconfigured. To push language past the boundaries that silence marks, language must 
be finely tuned and its quotidian uses transformed.  
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 While innovation extends and limits the territory of language, it is particularly 
crucial in poetry that seeks these ends simultaneously. Further, language that both breaks 
silences and employs them is especially useful for women poets, and it may be that the 
importance of innovation for combining these conflicting goals has gone largely 
unremarked because the work of women has not been given sufficient attention in these 
terms. Formulations of both mystic and pioneer poetics are often tied up in masculinist 
rhetoric that places the poet in an oppositional relationship with a feminine or feminized 
silent wilderness. The influential myth of woman as wilderness obscures the writing of 
women in both the mystic and pioneer strains, or at the very least, dismisses it as 
anomalous, masking the fruitful tension between extending and limiting language in 
innovative poetry by excluding or devaluing poetry in which that conflict is highly 
motivated. The masculinizing of both pioneering and mystic poetics and the attendant 
marginalization of women’s writing not only make it more difficult to see the paradoxical 
role of silence in poetic innovation but also cloud the complex role of silence in the work 
of women writers. 
 The concept of poetry as a pioneering force that pushes into and civilizes silence 
has largely aligned women with the wilderness to be explored and exploited and, 
therefore, has not taken seriously the language of women writers as itself exploratory. 
Though the identification of the landscape as feminine is not uniquely American, Annette 
Kolodny claims that early American writing is distinguished from European writing in its 
literalization of the metaphor of woman as wilderness: 
the move to America was experienced as the daily reality of what has become its 
single dominating metaphor: regression from the cares of adult life and a return to 
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the primal warmth of womb or breast in a feminine landscape. And when America 
finally produced a pastoral literature of her own, that literature hailed the essential 
femininity of the terrain in a way European pastoral had never dared, and, from 
the first, took its metaphors as literal truths. (Lay 6) 
The metaphor of the pioneer, the explorer and settler, is shaped by this feminized 
landscape. The experience of the actual land as virginal—a mysterious, untouched 
landscape that requires exploration and cultivation—becomes doubly metaphorical when 
the territory is linguistic, and the unexplored and fertile ground of silence—the unspoken, 
the taboo, the ineffable—often retains a mythical “essential femininity” that makes it 
difficult for women’s writing to be read as pioneering. Kolodny explains that the myth of 
the feminine wilderness does not allow for female explorers: “the myth of the woodland 
hero necessarily involves a man [. . .] and a quintessentially feminine terrain apparently 
designed to gratify his desires. The myth thereby—like the fantasy—excludes women. In 
the idealized wilderness garden [of Eden] [. . .] an Eve could only be redundant” (Before 
5). Like the “woodland hero” myth, the metaphor of the poet as pioneer excludes women 
as redundant because the feminine is already present: the feminine embodies the very 
silences that are to be explored and civilized by language. 
 In mystic poetics the feminine is similarly coded as non-linguistic, though in this 
case irreducibly other than rather than subjected to the incursions of language. The 
unknowable, or unspeakable, is feminine, and he whose speech gestures toward the 
indescribable must differentiate himself from primal ineffable unity with it: thus, poetic 
language is contingent on separation from the non-linguistic feminine.
26
 Women are part 
of the mysterious natural world, frequently figured as flowering plants or bodies of water, 
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and the language of the poet is counterposed to this feminized wilderness. The poet may 
value the vitality of the wilderness, even seek to approximate it, but the aspiration to 
approach the feminine rhetorically situates the poet as masculine. The poet must begin as 
other; the creative mind is a human, rational, linguistic “he” opposed to a primal, 
irrational, non-linguistic “she” to which his language points and in which his ego and its 
attendant linguistic capacity may be enveloped, silenced, and eventually renewed and 
reauthorized. Snyder’s “Poetry and the Primitive” exemplifies the use of a feminine 
ground against which the male poetic figure is defined. Under the subtitle “Making Love 
with Animals,” Snyder explains that the function of the poet is to commune with the 
nonhuman and thus nourish the social with the natural: “Poets have carried this function 
forward all through civilized times: poets don’t sing about society, they sing about 
nature—even if the closest they ever get to nature is their lady’s queynt” (56). Here the 
poet is definitively, inherently masculine, and the female body is a small subset of the 
natural world that the poet should “sing.” Snyder is aware that this identification is 
culturally constructed and symbolic when he explains that poetry is a reaching out to the 
other that “breaks through the ego-barrier.” “Widely speaking,” he admits, the other can 
be “a mountain range, a band of people, the morning star, or a diesel generator.” “But,” 
he continues, “this touching-deep is a mirror, and man in his sexual nature has found the 
clearest mirror to be his human lover. As the West moved into increasing complexities 
and hierarchies with civilization, Woman as nature, beauty, and the Other came to be an 
all-dominating symbol” (57). For Snyder, the “sexual nature” of man focuses otherness in 
a symbolic “Woman” and constructs interaction with the other as heterosexual 
intercourse. The poet sings about his “lady’s queynt” not only as a part of the natural 
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world but as a representation of nature itself as receptive to his penetrating poet’s mind. 
However, Snyder does not question what the effect of perpetuating this “all-dominating 
symbol” might have on lower-case women who themselves are poets, egos seeking a 
“touching-deep” with an other. Instead, he conjures the poet as the male lookout whose 
gaze takes in the wilderness with “the photograph of a young female torso hung in the 
lookout window, in the foreground. Natural against natural, beauty” (“Lookout’s” 10). 
Both pioneer and mystic poet are masculine, making it difficult not only for women to 
write in these modes but for their writing to be recognized as participating in them.
 
 
 But, perhaps the greatest deterrent to a serious consideration of women writers 
and the place of silence in their work has not been masculinist dismissal but the fact that 
feminist literary criticism has focused on the role of silence in subjugation. The concept 
of speaking out has been fundamental to feminist thinking, perhaps especially so in 
literature, which is inextricably bound to questions about who is allowed to speak and 
about what; a key strain of feminist literary criticism has argued that silence is a negative 
effect of oppression from social and political sources. Influential anthologies like No 
More Masks!, a 1973 collection intended to rescue the work of women poets from 
obscurity and break the silence about the real lives of women, exemplify the tone of 
much feminist poetry and criticism. Later anthologies are even more explicit in valorizing 
speech and casting silence as the enemy, as a survey of titles like Stealing the Language 
(Ostriker), Outspoken Women (Hall), and The Voice that Is Great Within Us (Carruth) 
attests; much feminist literary effort has understandably focused on the recuperation and 
reinstatement of writers whose works have been ignored by the male-dominated canon, 
as well as encouraging writers who have been systematically denied the right to speak, 
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whose lives have been lived in silence. This has indeed been an important goal; writers 
like Adrienne Rich and Audre Lorde demonstrate the power of women writing about 
women, and the invaluable work of critics like Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar discovers 
(or, in some cases, remembers) the contribution of women writers to our literary heritage. 
Rich’s 1976 essay “It Is the Lesbian in Us” describes the limitation of expression—
particularly linguistic representation—as a violent exercise of power: 
 Whatever is unnamed, undepicted in images, whatever is omitted from biography, 
 censored in collections of letters, whatever is misnamed as something else, made 
 difficult-to-come-by, whatever is buried in the memory by the collapse of 
 meaning under an inadequate or lying language—this will become, not merely 
 unspoken, but unspeakable. [. . .] In a world where language and naming are 
 power, silence is oppression, is violence. (199, 204)   
Nevertheless, despite its historical and current political importance, the conception of the 
creative work of women as a means of speaking out against the social and culture forces 
that would silence them can itself become limiting: most significantly, this 
conceptualization cannot apprehend the silences that are endemic to poetic language, 
making it impossible to see the intensely ambivalent relationship to silence that often 
motivates women’s poetic practice.  
 More recent feminist criticism, however, has focused on themes related to silence, 
such as denial, reticence, defense, and refusal, and that criticism has often centered on the 
usefulness of these strategies for women’s writing.27 The 1994 collection Listening to 
Silences gathers contemporary feminist responses to women’s literary silence—responses 
inaugurated, for editors Hedges and Fiskin, by Tillie Olsen—that both contextualize and 
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question the assertion that silence is primarily an extrinsic force on women’s writing. 
And Janis P. Stout begins her Strategies of Reticence by positioning her argument as a 
counterpoint to the tradition of reading silence as oppressive: “My emphasis here [. . .] 
will not be on silences and reticence as effects so much as on silences and reticence as 
consciously or unconsciously chosen strategies for effect” (viii). The feminist 
conversation about silence has certainly become more varied and complex in recent 
years. However, many studies of silence in women’s writing continue to cast silence as 
an extrinsic oppressive limitation, and those who consider it an intrinsic and useful 
strategy for women writers, perhaps in an effort to distance themselves from the still-
potent legacy of silence as violence, do not assess the effects that an unresolved tension 
between these opposing functions of silence can have on women writers.  
 These critical resistances limit feminist scholarship and poetic scholarship more 
generally because they remove the writing of women from a conversation to which it 
should contribute: the basic dynamics of poetry’s relationship to silence, already 
intensified in American poetry because of the importance of the wilderness concept, are 
further intensified in women’s poetic experiments because the cultural position of women 
raises the stakes on both sides. Women’s writing is especially motivated to perform both 
of the paradoxically opposed interactions with silence. On the one hand, women are often 
particularly driven to use language as a tool to break silences, to create innovative forms 
that expand the territory of women’s language. On the other, they are markedly motivated 
to preserve and respect the silences with which they have been identified and that they 
may regard as the source of their poetic authority.   
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 The argument that women writers share a particular relationship to language runs 
the risk of repeating the essentializing that allows both pioneer and mystic poetic models 
to dismiss women as writers. However, by taking the existence of “women writers” as an 
identifiable category, I do not seek to employ it as a natural category or make it 
coterminous with biological sex. Instead, I put questions of whether a person is naturally 
a woman or what femininity is aside in favor of exploring how the category of “woman” 
has been employed in literature and how that category might influence the way writers 
who identify themselves as women write, as well as how it might influence the way 
writers who are identified as women are read. Rather than taking the actuality of the 
categories “male” and “female” as given, I am interested in how the pervasive rhetoric of 
the differences between men and women’s relationships to language has influenced the 
way writers use language. The control of language and its uses and the role of the unsaid 
have figured largely in questions of authority that have significantly affected writers, 
regardless of the empirical validity of gender categories. While it is, in some cases, 
crucially important to undermine the rigid division of gender into male and female, in this 
study I will use the terms “men” and “women,” “masculine” and “feminine” with the 
understanding that, while the meanings of those terms are fluid and by no means essential 
or natural, their sway in the discourses of literary authority and other types of self-
formation is pervasive and not to be denied simply by caveat. I will seek a middle way 
that, while avoiding essentializing a supposedly natural woman’s language, can still 
speak of women writers and the way women write. 
 In this sense, then, women’s writing, because of the way femininity has been 
constructed in relationship to language, is profoundly conflicted about silence. The 
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rhetoric of speaking out certainly helps us to see one side of the story. Because of social 
oppression and cultural and political silencing, women’s writing promotes a pioneer 
concept of silence, making it a boundary that language should cross or a wilderness to be 
explored and cultivated. Though feminist rhetoric has historically encouraged the 
equation of breaking silences with lyric authenticity and, until recently, underestimated 
formal innovation as a tool for feminist intervention, experimental forms are increasingly 
taking a central role in language-focused strains of feminist criticism, not only because 
their themes may give voice to the silenced but because they redefine the possibilities of 
language; poetic experimentation can challenge cultural values imbedded in and enforced 
by received forms and conventional language.
28
 Formal innovation seeks to extend the 
reach of language into the unspeakable, and the experiments of women writers frequently 
are driven by the need to articulate effectively women’s lives, bodies, and minds. Despite 
its marginalization in favor of accessible poetry that represents women’s experiences and 
despite the masculinist history of frontier rhetoric, feminist formal innovation is part of 
an American tradition of pioneering poetry.  
 The importance of this tradition to innovative American women poets is clear in 
the writing of a poet like Susan Howe. Howe’s The Liberties, for instance, expands 
women’s literary territory in that it seeks to open canonical male-authored texts to the 
feminine voices they occlude. There are many voices that speak in The Liberties, but the 
book is largely constructed as a conversation between two erased or silent women: 
Shakespeare’s Cordelia, the silent, faithful daughter of King Lear, and Jonathan Swift’s 
lover Stella, the record of whose life was practically erased by Swift’s destruction of her 
papers and letters. Rachel Blau DuPlessis observes of the women in Howe’s book, “They 
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have in common a female relation to dominant story, muted and trying a voice, storied 
but claiming their telling” (“Whowe” 162). Howe’s formal experiments, then, try out a 
voice for these muted women, rupturing, honing, and reshaping the language—
particularly Shakespeare’s and Swift’s—to make it newly capable of breaking the 
silences of both literature and history, Cordelia and Stella. The following is taken from 
the “White Foolscap: Book of Cordelia” section of The Liberties: 
 Lir was an ocean God whose children turned into swans 
   heard the birds pass overhead 
   Fianoula Oodh Fiacra Conn 
    circle of One 
                   threshing the sun 
  or asleep threshing nor 
     nor blood nor flesh nor bone nor 
 corona 
 chromosphere 
 Cordelia 
   no no no (30) 
Here the “Book of Cordelia” puts language in the silenced woman’s hands, giving her the 
ability to rename the very name of the Father, transforming it from “Lear” to “Lir,” 
which also puts Shakespeare’s King Lear in dialogue with its sources in Celtic myth, 
diffusing the authority of the playwright.
29
 The form of the poem demonstrates Cordelia’s 
mastery of poetic language both by performing it and undermining it: the flexibility of the 
lines establishes a loosely iambic and anapestic rhythm and play with rhyme (“heard the 
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birds pass overhead,” “circle of One,” “threshing the sun”) and then disrupts that 
poeticity with rhythmically jarring doubts (“or asleep threshing nor”) and the insistent 
accents of refusal in “no no no.” As DuPlessis explains, Howe’s work is characterized by 
her use of “[n]ot only ballad, not only epic, not only genres affiliated with heavily 
gendered griefs, but / a feminist appropriation of / every genre large and small” (130). 
DuPlessis’s use of the word “appropriation” is telling: poems like Howe’s are claiming 
territory, even in the “small” genres of meter and the sentence. For many women, there is 
much to be gained in a pioneer poetic: by creating new forms and using poetic language 
in new ways, innovative poets can make language into a tool that is newly capable of 
exploring the silences women writers face. In this sense, women’s formal experiments, 
perhaps even more than accessible woman-centered themes, place silence in the role of 
unexplored territory that can be made communally useful by the linguistic efforts of the 
poet. 
 But a better understanding of the innovative poetics of American women writers 
must acknowledge their writing as more than just a victory over silence. It is also a reach 
toward silence, toward the unspeakable, that affirms the importance of the unknown and 
the unknowable. This is particularly important for women poets because of the ways that 
they themselves, as women, have been identified with silence; again, “woman” is often of 
a piece with the formless, the chaotic, and the unspeakable. As we saw in Snyder’s 
“Poetry and the Primitive,” this symbolic identification of women with the silences of the 
other-than-human wilderness makes human language a masculine tool for an inherently 
insufficient expression of non-linguistic, feminized otherness. Though some women 
writers may wish to distance themselves from identification with the unknowable by 
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asserting the primacy of logos, reason, or the ability of the mind to apprehend and 
communicate experience, the mystical method of bringing silences into language may 
also be attractive to women writers as an affirmation of metaphorically feminine pre-, 
non-, or alinguistic ways of knowing.
30
 Because human language has been coded as 
masculine in opposition to a symbolically feminine unspeakable otherness, women 
writers are often particularly motivated to use innovative forms to allow that feminized 
otherness, the silent and silenced wilderness, to be present in poetry in a way that resists 
translation or appropriation by symbolically male language.  
 Thus, for some women, a mystical poetics is crucial, for they are doubly 
concerned with evoking silences as an authorizing feminine force and with protecting 
those silences from colonization or civilization through language. Poets like Maureen 
Owen demonstrate the importance of preserving silence in American women’s innovative 
poetics. Owen’s “Postscript to the rest of my life . . . . . . . . . . ,” dedicated “for Grendel,” 
appears at first to give voice to the silenced “Beast”: 
 If we were Beauty and the Beast.        I would be 
 the Beast.         Heart smoking        in the dim chamber 
 the candlelit hall       hurling backward from the 
 door.               The Beast        I always loved          I 
 hated that wimp he turns into           when he dies 
 by the pond.        The secret of the matter               is 
 to be real in diguise!                  All the boats 
 in the marina were wearing blue masks.            We 
 passed the same houses        we had passed coming 
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 went by the same unshaven yards.              But now 
 the sea seemed only a big cup of tea for the 
 fishes                & in the gathering fog          the lake 
 simply a part of a distinct figure’s shoe           that 
 had melted         forming a pool.             Slowly 
 an idea began to turn in my brain.           It was the  
 same story             only this time 
 written from the monster’s point of view. (25) 
The speaker aligns herself with “the Beast” before he has been returned to his supposedly 
true form as the Prince, “that wimp he turns into.” She aligns herself, that is, with the 
unrecuperated monstrous or wild and against the process of making it capable of 
participating in sanctioned culture. Both the form and the content (or, more accurately, 
what’s not contained in the poem) belie the idea of breaking the Beast’s silence: the 
speaker does not, in the end, fully give voice to this beastliness. Though there is an idea 
turning in the speaker’s brain of a story she could or might like to tell, the poem does not 
tell that story. We do not get anything “written from the monster’s point of view.” The 
presence of this unwritten story haunts the poem in the blanks that split the otherwise 
fairly conventional syntax and sentence structure, intimating there is something that is not 
being said. The poem cannot tell the story of the Beast precisely because it values that 
story as the untold, as “dim” and “candlelit”; to tell it would be, in a sense, to turn the 
Beast into the Prince, to put the unspeakable into words and thus remove its power. For 
many women writers the evocation of the unspeakable or the unknowable in language is a 
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valuable tool for accessing an extra-linguistic force, a wilderness coded as non-rational 
and feminine, and defending it from the domestication of language.  
 The choice of how to relate to silence is thus fraught. If a woman poet pushes 
language into what has been silent, her poetry may bear a conflicted relationship to the 
silence that her language explores and settles: she may feel the need to experiment and 
extend the reach of her voice, but she may also feel the need to preserve and respect the 
feminized and mysterious unspeakable of which poetry has so often cast itself the 
ravisher. Similarly, if a woman invites or invokes silences in her poetry, she may also be 
ambivalent to such an invitation: she may want to utilize the authority of the unspeakable, 
but she may also feel particularly strongly the need to claim a space for her own voice 
within that silence. Experimental women writers, then, may use language to break the 
silence, but they are also identified with that very silence and may consider it a source of 
power.  
 In this sense, the situation of the experimental American woman poet is the 
situation of poetry writ large. All poetry works to extend the reach of language, at the 
very least to say something new; American women writers are especially motivated to do 
so both because their work participates in an important pioneering tradition and because 
it constitutes resistance to social, political, and personal oppression. All poetry—by virtue 
of its heightened awareness of language—suggests it addresses something that cannot or 
should not be said in quotidian language; American women writers have been identified 
with non-linguistic wilderness and thus may be particularly driven to affirm the power of 
silence, which has been posited as an endangered but vital center of American life and 
identity. It is my purpose to articulate how formal innovation by American women poets 
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manages this fraught and paradoxical relationship to silence. Kathleen Fraser’s formation 
of the literary periodical HOW(ever) in the 1980s recognized that second-wave 
feminism’s lionizing of accessibility marginalized the work of innovative or experimental 
women writers, and contributors to that enterprise have done much to promote serious 
attention to the work of experimental women poets. Poet-critics like DuPlessis and Joan 
Retallack have argued that feminist literary practice must, to some degree, move beyond 
accessibility into forms of silence.
31
 But this kind of critical work does not analyze the 
innovative forms of women writers as working toward a simultaneously pioneering and 
mystic poetics. Reading poems by women writers that simultaneously break and cultivate 
silences will open a dialogue between a historically feminist understanding of silence as 
oppressive, traditionally male-dominated theories that put silence at the heart of poetic 
impulse and human understanding, and women’s avant-garde theoretical conceptions of 
linguistic experimentation as a feminist project. 
 Though the following chapters will treat writers whose work, in one way or 
another, maintains an unresolved tension between extending and limiting language, even 
those writers commonly positioned at the extremes are influenced by the need to 
modulate between ways of relating to silence, particularly in their formal choices. Rich’s 
poems famously break certain silences imposed on women, and her devotion to 
accessibility is part of her intention to make women’s experiences, what she calls “a 
whole new psychic geography to be explored,” legible and visible in literature 
(“Awaken” 35).32 Her goal is to “move out toward what the feminist philosopher Mary 
Daly has described as the ‘new space’ on the boundaries of patriarchy” (49). However, 
even at her most determined to push language past the “boundaries of patriarchy,” Rich 
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allows for the value of silences in both her themes and her form. “Diving Into the Wreck” 
is largely concerned with creating language for women’s experiences (23). The speaker 
of the poem is a diver, exploring a wrecked ship that has been called “the life of one 
woman, the source of successes and failures; it is the history of all women submerged in 
a patriarchal culture; it is that source of myths about male and female sexuality which 
shape our lives and roles today” (McDaniel 16). The speaker investigates new territory 
below the waves, and her actions are explicitly related to language: “I came to explore the 
wreck. / The words are purposes. / The words are maps.” But even in a poem so evidently 
concerned with shining a diver’s lamp on what has been concealed, the language also 
points toward the essential truth of what remains unilluminated. Rich accomplishes this 
imagistically by foregrounding the silence and the blackness of the sea: though the 
speaker claims “words as maps” and trusts in “the beam of [her] lamp,” she finds herself 
“blacking out.” The unspeakable force of the sea, which threatens to dissolve the 
speaker’s consciousness, is presented as an antagonist to her searching and mapping with 
words, but it is also identified with the speaker. Nancy Milford characterizes Rich’s sea 
imagery as explicitly, mysteriously feminine: “these are primal waters, life-giving and 
secretive in the special sense of not being wholly revealed. The female element” (201). 
While one might at first expect a “life-giving [. . .] female element” to be a positive 
atmosphere for the speaker of Rich’s poem, if the sea is an embodiment of something not 
“wholly revealed,” it is a difficult milieu for one whose words are maps. As the speaker 
descends into the ocean, her conventional abilities fail her, and she must “learn alone / to 
turn [her] body without force / in the deep element.” In order to be granted the authority 
to speak, she must, like Emerson’s poet, yield herself to the element in which she is 
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immersed. Articulation of what lies outside the boundaries of language is accomplished 
by surrendering one’s strength. This language of movement without force undermines the 
speaker’s authority as an explorer: she invades the unspeakable but is submerged in and 
surrounded by it and robbed of her power.  
 The final stanza of the poem shows a heightened tension between cultivating and 
curtailing language:  
 We are, I am, you are  
 by cowardice or courage  
 the one who find our way  
 back to this scene  
 carrying a knife, a camera  
 a book of myths  
 in which  
 our names do not appear. (23) 
The pioneer is immediately evident. The speaker exorts one who would “find [the] way” 
and makes a list of tools she or he should carry on the mission. The knife can easily be 
accounted for as a necessary tool for an explorer: she needs it to defend herself in the 
wilderness and to cut a path through it. And the camera is a machine for making a record 
of what will be discovered or revealed. However, the last item on the list signals a hidden 
conflict in the poem. The “book of myths / in which / our names do not appear” could be 
read as an indictment of the inaccurate myths of culture that have gone before. The 
purpose of exploration then, could be to inscribe those names that have been left out, to 
map what is missing from the story and make it newly legible. But the book of myths is 
   
49 
 
listed among the explorer’s tools, which implies that it is useful for her task: apparently, 
in order to understand the “scene” fully, the diver needs a book in which her name does 
not appear. She needs to be unwritten, her name effectively silent, in order to make her 
discovery, uninfluenced by the naming and attendant mythologizing that has gone before. 
Paradoxically, the one who explores silence carries silence, the non-appearance of a 
name, among her tools. Finally, the line breaks isolate “our names do not appear” from its 
prepositional context “in which.” The effect of this is to make it the final result of the 
explorative efforts: though the diver has gone searching, mapping with words, in the end 
“our names do not appear.” The truth, then, remains unworded; it cannot be put in the 
book. Thus the poem, though concerned with speaking out, still preserves a silence.  
 This duality is not only thematically present in the poem but haunts its formal 
choices as well. The punctuation signals an oscillation between mapping with words and 
submersion in silence. The first three stanzas, which describe the machinery of 
exploration, use five commas and nine periods that combine with line breaks to form 
clearly punctuated sentences, employing unmistakably subordinated clauses and clear 
relationships between parts of the utterances. The speaker’s words carefully delineate the 
territory she enters. However, when the speaker begins to descend into the sea in the 
fourth and fifth stanzas, there are only two periods and two colons. Punctuation as 
mapping has been replaced by the “turning without force” that the sea requires. Line 
breaks create semantically weak divisions between clauses, which allow for ambiguity of 
meaning and the flow of semantic connections across line breaks. The commas are absent 
altogether. As if in compensation, the sixth stanza alone includes five periods as it 
reasserts language as something capable of making the unknown intelligible: “I came to 
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explore the wreck. / The words are purposes. / The words are maps.” But these lines do 
not fully reinstate the use of punctuation to clarify and create hierarchical meaning. 
Instead, the disruption of normative punctuation allows Rich to arrive at one of the most 
evocative and attended-to lines in “Diving into the Wreck,” “I am she: I am he.” This line 
begins the final full sentence of the poem: 
 I am she: I am he   
 
 whose drowned face sleeps with open eyes  
 whose breasts still bear the stress  
 whose silver, copper, vermeil cargo lies  
 obscurely inside barrels  
 half-wedged and left to rot  
 we are the half-destroyed instruments  
 that once held to a course  
 the water-eaten log  
 the fouled compass   
 
 We are, I am, you are  
 by cowardice or courage  
 the one who find our way  
 back to this scene  
 carrying a knife, a camera  
 a book of myths  
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 in which  
 our names do not appear.  
The punctuation of this final sentence creates a crucial ambiguity that results in a 
grammatical silence. The rest of the poem uses no periods, making everything that 
follows the colon after “I am she” into an example demonstrating that statement. 
However, the use of a capital letter at the beginning of the final stanza implies the 
beginning of a new utterance, making all that follows “We are, I am, you are” separate 
from the one beginning with “I am she.” In the first reading, the various identities 
articulated in the last stanzas of the poem, male and female, singular and manifold, are all 
grammatically subsumed under the category “she.” In the second reading, however, the 
androgyny and multiplicity of the “we” is grammatically separate from “she.” The 
oscillation in the poem between words as maps—the tools of grammar as capable of 
establishing stable relationships between words and their meanings—and words as 
turnings without force, surrendered to the silencing space of the sea, allows for both of 
these readings to exist simultaneously. If what the poem investigates is the occluded 
meanings of the statement “I am she,” then Rich’s punctuation allows her to make claims 
about what is included in that category while also insisting on its malleability and 
undecidability. That undecidability is so strong that it even dissolves agreement between 
subject and verb, one of the most stable unities in English grammar, leaving us with 
Rich’s most obviously innovative lines: “We are, I am, you are / by cowardice or courage 
/ the one who find our way.” Identity in these lines is simultaneously singular and 
multiple.
33
 Rich pushes at the most basic units of poetic form in order to allow her poem 
to claim an investigative, revelatory relationship to the silences of the submerged while 
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also leaving some things underwater. In Rich’s poetry we can see that even the most 
pioneering woman poet makes use of the mystic mode and that even the most accessible 
poetry modifies its forms in order to make room for the necessary paradox of both 
exploring and evoking silences. 
 On the other end of the spectrum, Joan Retallack’s criticism and poetry, unlike 
Rich’s, are radically and self-consciously experimental and more interested in promoting 
and valuing poetic silences than in breaking them. In “:RE:THINKING:LITERARY: 
FEMINISM:” Retallack rejects feminisms that are dependent on representational poetics, 
claiming that their over-determination and their insistence on speaking out maintain 
women readers as passive. Instead, she valorizes writing by women that does not speak 
about or reveal silenced or suppressed experiences but rather elicits active participation 
from its readers, writing that conspires rather than inspires: “To conspire (to breath 
together) is to participate in the construction of a living aesthetic event. But this requires 
a different kind of form—one not so authoritatively intelligible, one that in other wise 
enacts a continuing articulation of silence” (356). Retallack promotes an “open, multiple, 
juxtapositional, unexpectedly, teemingly noisy silence” that is explicitly constructed as 
feminine and a “woman’s feminine text [. . .] designed to interpolate itself into 
emptiness/silence—to let emptiness/silence in” (362, 357). In Retallack’s rethinking of 
feminist poetics, silence is not something to be broken but something to be cultivated, 
something to be invited into the poem in order for the work to be effectively, actively 
feminine and feminist. Silence, especially as refusal of meaning, is useful for disrupting 
the entire system of authoritative language because it does not merely appropriate the 
intelligibility of authoritative patriarchal forms for expressing women’s experiences. The 
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unspeakable is thus coded as a powerful feminine force valued for its very 
unspeakability. 
 However, despite Retallack’s forceful statements in favor of a mystical 
relationship to silence, her work betrays an exploratory urge. In fact, in her essay “The 
Poethical Wager,” she explicitly characterizes the poet as gaining new territory for 
language: “the realm of the unintelligible is the permanent frontier,” and it is the feminist 
poet who can best push past those boundaries to “articulate silence” (111-12). Retallack’s 
formal choices in many of her poems activate two distinct meanings of this phrase. On 
the one hand, to articulate silence means to make the unspeakable present; on the other, it 
means to explore and express something, putting it into words rather than invoking its 
wordlessness.
34
 While a poem like “A I D /I/ S A P P E A R A N C E” clearly points to 
an emptiness or an indeterminacy with which a reader may actively conspire to create 
meaning, it also demonstrates a desire to speak the unspeakable and destroy certain 
silences with language. “A I D /I/ S A P P E A R A N C E” is dedicated to Stephen 
Fitterman, an artist who died of AIDS five years before the poem’s 1998 publication. The 
poem is divided into seven parts: the first is the only one composed entirely of whole 
words (some of which are taken from Niels Bohr’s “The Atomic Theory and the 
Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature”), while the following 
stanzas contain fewer and fewer words and letters until the last has none at all, only 
numbered blanks corresponding to the seven numbered lines of the foregoing stanzas. An 
author’s note included at the end of the volume in which the poem first appeared explains 
its structure in terms of disappearance: “The disappearance moves through the letters of 
the alphabet (and the source text) in this way: Beginning with letters A I D S, it spreads 
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to adjoining letters B H J C E R T, to F G K Q U, to L P V, to M O W, to N X, to Y” 
(How 156). The poem’s concern with AIDS, a disease that American culture often does 
not wish to acknowledge, and with disappearance, especially the literal erasure of 
language, make silence central to both its subject and its structure.  
 As we might expect based on Retallack’s formulation of silence as necessary to 
feminist poetics, the structure of “A I D /I/ S A P P E A R A N C E” allows for an 
expressive silence: rather than seeking to explain or fill in the blanks in the discourse on a 
subject like AIDS, the poem creates more and more empty space. Though this silencing 
process is difficult and even painful (after all the name of Stephen Fitterman, the only 
recognizable human subject in the poem, is being erased letter by letter), it is crucial in 
the poem that the language already accreted around its subject be silenced. Bruce Walpert 
describes the two major types of discourse represented in stanza one as scientific and 
lyrical (698-700). The presence of text from Bohr’s essay on the process of describing 
nature introduces a scientific tone, which is then abruptly taken over by subjective, 
personal language and natural imagery: lines move without punctuation from “an 
essential / element of discontinuity especially apparent through the discussion of the / 
nature of light” to “she said it’s so odd to be dying and laughed still it’s early / late the 
beauty of nature as the moon waxes turns to terror” (54). The poem next proceeds 
systematically to erase those discourses until, finally, it silences the types of language 
that have been considered valid for dealing with a subject like AIDS—both the 
scientifically objective and the lyrically subjective—clearing away received language to 
create a silent space in which the disappearances the poem records exceed linguistic 
codification of the experience of disease and death.  
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 However, just as the pioneering urge appears in Retallack’s criticism, this poem 
also has its exploratory notions. It is, despite its claims for the importance of silence, a 
poem that pushes poetic language to become capable of articulating what was previously 
silent. Though Retallack avoids explanation or statement in favor of opening the poem to 
silence, in order to make language capable of such an opening, she must reshape it, and, 
much like Cage does with the use of musical staff structure in “Where Are We Going? 
And What Are We Doing?,” extend its ability to evoke absence. The poem is primarily 
concerned with inviting and allowing silence to disrupt other forms of discourse; 
however, in order to do so, it must explore and push past the boundaries of what can be 
said. Rich and Retallack have largely chosen to align themselves most fully with, 
respectively, the pioneer or the mystic mode, but their situation as women writers 
encourages and perhaps even demands that their poems, if only briefly or unwillingly, 
acknowledge the dual role of silence and the paradoxical responses it makes possible. 
 American women’s innovative writing is more than just the silent prayer of the 
pioneer or the map and compass strapped surreptitiously to the side of the mystic. In the 
work of the women that follows, the conflict between the mystic and pioneer is 
fundamentally unresolved, driving innovative forms and techniques that allow their 
poems simultaneously to extend and limit language. In Chapter II, I explore Dickinson’s 
figurative grammar, particularly her self-referential comparisons, as a response to 
conflicting needs to vaunt the expressive capability of the poet and to suggest its 
inadequacy. This is especially important for articulating a longing for union with 
something other than the self while preserving the boundaries that protect individual 
identity from dissolution. Lorine Niedecker shares Dickinson’s respect for the separate 
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identities of her subjects, which, for each of them, pulls against a delight in the 
descriptive and evocative capabilities of language. In the work of both poets, complex 
and contradictory relationships to speech and silence are grammatically figured. But 
while Dickinson’s feelings about linguistic expression are inflected by the religious 
character of her time and place, Niedecker’s are marked by literary movements like 
Surrealism and Objectivism and the kinds of relationships they advocate between poet 
and world. In Chapter III, I investigate Niedecker’s use of connectives, such as 
conjunctions and prepositions, both to expand and undermine language’s ability to create 
relationships among objects. Like Niedecker, Gwendolyn Brooks’s poems show the 
influence of Emily Dickinson; while Niedecker echoes Dickinson’s spare, slippery style, 
Brooks borrows her linguistic extravagance and playful irony. All three poets are 
concerned with stretching language toward new capabilities while preventing the 
extraordinary, idiosyncratic, or singular from being appropriated into shared language, 
but for Brooks the motivation to extend and limit language is intensified by the way ideas 
about race and gender shape her notions of selfhood and representation. In Chapter IV, I 
discuss Brooks’s foregrounding of poetic artifice as a means to figure contradictory 
responses to language as well as a fraught relationship between individual and communal 
identity and expression. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I review the themes and 
techniques explored in the work of Dickinson, Niedecker, and Brooks, and I briefly 
anticipate how these concerns are at play in multilingual literatures in the United States. 
As the twentieth century becomes the twenty-first, the factors that influence the role of 
articulation and reticence in the work of American women writers change. However, 
American women’s formal experimentation continues to be motivated by a deep-seated 
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ambivalence toward both speech and silence that constitutes common cause not only 
amongst the particular poets considered here but amongst their contemporaries and 
competitors. 
 
Notes 
 
1
 The voices outside the door recall Frost’s “The Sound of Sense”: “The best 
place to get the abstract sound of sense is from voices behind a door that cuts off the 
words.” For Frost, this “pure sound” is the “raw material of poetry” (10).  
 
2
 See Derrida’s On the Name, especially the final chapter, “Khora,” for the 
development of these claims, much simplified here. 
 
3
 Critics like Mortley restrict silence largely to the linguistic realm. For instance, 
he claims that the attempt at silence or transcendence in painting is “little more than 
coquetry” that fetishizes the trappings of the mystic without actually seeking for 
ontological knowledge of what lies beyond representation (268). 
 
4
 Some examples are Hejinian’s “The Rejection of Closure,” Merwin’s “On Open 
Form,” Simic’s “Negative Capability and Its Children,” Waldrop’s “Thinking of 
Follows,” and the essays collected in McHugh’s Broken English. 
  
5
 In particular, Glück names Rilke, Berryman, Oppen, and Eliot. 
 
6
 See Billington’s The Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation of American History? 
for a survey of the major responses to Turner’s thesis and a brief history of its reception 
among historians up to the 1960s. See Lewis’s introduction to American Wilderness: A 
New History for more contemporary responses to Turner’s thesis (and other recent 
formulations of wilderness).  
 
7
 The definition of wilderness as untouched by humans was written into law with 
the passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act that defined wilderness “in contrast with those 
areas where man and his works dominate the landscape [. . .] an area where the earth and 
its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does 
not remain” (qtd. in Lewis 4-5). 
 
8
 Though my argument does, to some degree, participate in the narrative of 
American exceptionalism by positing that American poetics is uniquely anxious about 
silence in part because of the importance of the wilderness in the formation of American 
self-conceptions, I do not wish to suggest that the concept of wilderness is determinate or 
that it affects all “American” groups and individuals in the same way. Kolodny’s essay 
“Letting Go Our Grand Obsessions: Notes Toward a New Literary History of the 
American Frontiers” rightly calls for a pluralization of the concept of the frontier, as well 
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as what counts as American. However, I do not seek to theorize the frontier or investigate 
historical responses to wilderness. Instead, I follow Kolodny’s suggestion in both The 
Lay of the Land and The Land Before Her that fantasies about wilderness have their own 
power, to some degree independent of social complexities and material realities. It is the 
ambivalence toward silence present in the dominant fantasies and myths about wilderness 
in America that concerns me here.  
 
9
 Though not explicitly related to silence, the debates over preservation vs. 
conservation and “wise use,” wilderness vs. wildness, wilderness theory vs. activism, and 
other controversies in the discourse around the use of ecological resources are further 
echoes of this conflict.  
 
10
 Chapter 2 of Nash’s Wilderness and the American Mind, “A Wilderness 
Condition,” details the Puritan conception, brought over from the Old World, of the 
wilderness as ungodly. Similarly, Dean summarizes “Pilgrim” responses to the 
wilderness with Nathanial Morton’s phrase “hideous and desolate” as a contrast to 
Thoreau’s characterization of wilderness as “near to good” (73). While there is certainly 
evidence for a negative Puritan view of the wilderness, it does not tell the whole story: 
Calvinist theology does not allow for the mysterious, unknown, and inhuman to be solely 
interpreted as devilish. Kolodny also provides an interesting counterpoint to Puritan 
hatred of the wilderness: she uses John Winthrop’s “land of Canaan” and other Puritan 
Eden imagery to contrast male Puritan fantasies of a welcoming and holy wilderness with 
female fantasies of a threatening and enclosing wilderness (6). 
 
11
 Like “pioneer” and “mystic,” Dean’s terms, “romantic” (or “mysterious” or 
“sublime”) and “scientific” (or “rationalist,” or “naturalist”), distinguish between 
attitudes that preserve and venerate the silence of the unknown and those that explore it. 
 
12
 In “How to Avoid Speaking,” Derrida explains that his work does not fit under 
the rubric of “negative theology” because it does not posit a hyper-essential being beyond 
being (3-12). Deconstruction and related ways of reading are, however, mystical in a 
poetic sense: that is, Derrida’s writing may not claim there is being beyond being, but it 
does argue for a being beyond language, or perhaps a non-being beyond language, that 
requires a mystical avoiding or voiding of language and cannot, ultimately, be expressed. 
 
13
 I am concerned here with drawing out self-consciously American mysticisms 
that are responding more or less directly to the concept of wilderness. See Bridges’s 
American Mysticism: From William James to Zen for a wider treatment of American 
mysticism, especially as it relates to Eastern mystic philosophies and traditions.  
 
14
 Mortley argues in Appendix II of his series From Word to Silence that 
contemporary discussions of negativity in the arts and literature confuse a negation of 
particular modes of artistic practice with the Ancient Greek via negativa and with 
mystical silence. He claims that silence in the literary and the plastic arts is impossible, 
and the investment of contemporary art in silence is not in silence itself but in a self-
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referential silencing of particular art forms. While I agree that silence cannot be achieved 
in art, I do not agree with his assertion that it cannot be suggested (266). It is this 
suggestion of silence, especially as an indicator of supralinguistic meaning, that 
characterizes what I am calling mystical poetics.  
 
15
 I use the male pronoun advisedly here. Though my argument will reject the 
notion that the pioneering poet must be a male figure, the myth of the pioneer, discussed 
below, is unavoidably gendered. I preserve this gendering because I wish to recognize the 
effect it may have on women writers who are themselves pioneering poets. Similarly, 
though the politics of grammar do not force the issue here, the archetypical pioneer is 
white, and Chapter IV will address the effect of this racial positioning of authority in 
Brooks’s work. 
 
16
 Many of the most well-known theorists and writers of mystic or apophatic 
language and literature are European: Valery, Beckett, Lyotard, Celan, and Jabés, for 
instance. In addition, mystical attitudes in general have Old World Catholic connotations, 
as opposed to materialist New World Protestantism, perhaps in part because narratives of 
American exceptionalism have stressed the pioneer mode as native and either ignored 
American mysticisms or discussed them as outgrowths of foreign influence. 
Transcendentalism is a major exception, but perhaps the mysticism of Transcendental 
thought is more easily recuperated as an authentically American phenomenon because it 
is so firmly based in positivist individualism. 
 
17
 McCall’s The Silence of Bartleby explains why so many of the theoretical 
readings that proffer interpretations of Bartleby’s silence fall short and argues for a 
critical negative capability that respects the refusal of meaning at the center of Melville’s 
story. 
 
18
 Chase claims that the American romance can be understood in relation to the 
British novel, in that the British novel concerns itself with the resolution of social 
schisms into unity, while the American romance aims for neither an accurate picture of 
the social nor resolution. Instead, American literature seeks to express what is outside the 
bounds of the social and thus, I would argue, outside the realm of shared and socially 
communicative language.   
 
19
 The foregrounding of artifice in order to demonstrate both linguistic virtuosity 
and the limits of that skill will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV in the context of 
Brooks’s work. 
 
20
 French Surrealism and Italian Futurism are two notable movements that 
valorized language as a tool for dissolving or exceeding boundaries. 
 
21
 Steinman’s Made In America reads American modernist attitudes toward 
science and technology as responding to a particularly American pragmatism, 
commercialism, utilitarianism, and populism. However, Eliot’s identification of poetry 
   
60 
 
 
with experimental science also takes part in a broader international modernist 
involvement with science and appropriation of scientific metaphors, driven, in part, by a 
devotion to the new and the need to argue for the relevance of the arts in a newly 
scientific and technological world. See Pound’s “The Serious Artist” for a classic 
example of modernist poetic authorization through alignment with technology and the 
scientific method. 
 
22
 Where Emerson lists “action, [. . .] looks and behavior” among the things that 
are loved about the poet, Eliot seeks to depose the personality. He argues in direct 
opposition to Emerson, “The point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps 
related to the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, 
that the poet has, not a ‘personality’ to express, but a particular medium, which is only a 
medium and not a personality” (115). 
 
23
 Wolosky argues that Eliot’s treatment of language participates in a Christian 
ascetic/mystic tradition. While I agree that Eliot’s “positive claims for language come to 
undermine themselves, against the [Christian] tradition’s (and Eliot’s) expressed 
intentions,” I focus here on the force of Eliot’s “expressed intention” to reshape language 
in order to penetrate and explore what lies outside of it (11). 
 
24
 Though the branches signify “a hundred summers,” they do so largely as a 
function of their physical properties—for instance, their longevity and the sounds they 
make as they burn—rather than as a function of the poet’s meaning making. 
 
25
 The suppression of connective language, such as prepositions and conjunctions, 
to undermine the reification of natural objects in language will be discussed at length in 
Chapter III on Niedecker.  
 
26
 Perhaps because of this rhetorical separation from the feminine, major critical 
revaluations of silence as central to contemporary literary practice have almost 
completely ignored the writing of women in a surprisingly conservative attachment to 
canonical (male) writers perhaps meant to demonstrate that silence is not merely a fringe 
concern but at the heart of modern discourse. For instance, Budick and Iser’s near 400-
page collection of essays on negativity in literature does not significantly discuss a single 
woman author; Hassan’s The Literature of Silence considers only Henry Miller and 
Beckett; and Wolosky’s Language Mysticism takes on male authors exclusively, as does 
Waldrop’s otherwise wide-ranging Against Language. 
 
27
 From the mid-1980s, studies of silence as a literary phenomenon in its own 
right (and not simply evidence of oppression or repression of a writer) have become more 
and more common. Upton’s Defensive Measures, though not explicitly feminist, focuses 
exclusively on the defensive strategies of female poets. Toker’s Eloquent Reticence does 
not primarily discuss writing by women, but her interest in narrative gaps as strategies for 
eloquence and her treatment of such gaps in Jane Austen’s work show the rising 
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acceptability in the last few decades of discussing silence as a function of something 
other than oppression or repression in women’s writing.  
 
28
 Works like Frost’s 2003 The Feminist Avant-Garde in American Poetry, 
Rankine and Spahr’s 2003 edited collection American Women Poets in the 21st Century: 
Where Lyric Meets Language, Kinnahan’s 2004 Lyric Interventions: Feminism, 
Experimental Poetry, and Contemporary Discourse, and Keller’s 2010 Thinking Poetry: 
Readings in Contemporary Women’s Exploratory Poetics enrich and expand a tradition 
of “criticism of modern and contemporary literature [that] has often ignored experimental 
poetry by American women” in favor of a “focus on a poetics of personal experience, 
frequently grounded in identity politics” (Frost xii). 
 
29
 It is, of course, not coincidental to Howe’s revision that King Lear makes 
silence the sign of Cordelia’s daughterly devotion. While Howe, in a sense, explodes the 
play’s claim that the truest affection is unspeakable, the silence of Shakespeare’s 
Cordelia points to a larger poetic problem that is compelling for many feminist writers, 
that is, the desire to capture the authenticity of silence in language. 
 
30
 The French feminist elaboration of ecriture feminine makes just such an 
identification of the feminine with disruptive silences and promotes the interruption of 
supposedly patriarchal language with a feminine or feminized non-language that is 
aligned with primary maternal unity. Though Kristeva and other theorists of ecriture 
feminine often appear to be suggesting that male writers are better equipped to wield such 
a dangerous tool as feminine language, women writers have long seen the benefits of 
aligning their word-work with the mystical, terrifying formlessness and divine alogical 
multiplicity of which they are accused. 
 
31
 See especially DuPlessis’s “Language Acquisition” and Retallack’s 
“RE:THINKING:LITERARY:FEMINISM.” 
 
32
 Rich’s conflation of pushing past patriarchal boundaries and accessible writing 
is evident in her characterization of feminist writing as that which represents, especially 
in images, women’s experience. For instance, “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-
vision” traces Rich’s development as a feminist writer in terms of how “directly” she is 
able to write “about experiencing [herself] as a woman” (44). In contrast, Retallack, 
discussed in more detail below, argues that experimentation is feminist, and she explicitly 
rejects the notion that feminist writing must create recognizable images of women 
(“RE:THINKING” 348-58). 
 
33
 Rich’s transgression of subject-verb agreement to advance a larger rhetorical 
and thematic concern echoes Dickinson’s grammatical figuration, explored in depth in 
Chapter II.   
 
34
 Both of these interpretations refer to articulation as expression rather than the 
other meaning of “articulate,” to attach with joints. This meaning may also be at play 
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obliquely in Retallack’s double relationship to silence in that it suggests giving shape or 
more precise detail to silence, which, again, could mean evoking or undoing it. 
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CHAPTER II 
“ITSELF IS ALL THE LIKE”: 
SELFSAMENESS IN THE POETRY OF EMILY DICKINSON 
When T. W. Higginson, the editor Emily Dickinson called her preceptor, 
describes for the Atlantic Monthly one of his rare meetings with the poet, she appears 
more the object of a naturalist’s study than a human being:  
She was much too enigmatical a being for me to solve in an hour’s interview, and 
an instinct told me that the slightest attempt at direct cross-examination would 
make her withdraw into her shell; I could only sit still and watch, as one does in 
the woods; I must name my bird without a gun, as recommended by Emerson. 
(qtd. in Sewall, Life 5-6) 
Higginson’s instinct to step lightly among nature’s mysteries aligns him with the 
Transcendentalists, as he is well aware. In his metaphor, interviewing Dickinson is a field 
trip during which he must observe but not disturb the natural flora and fauna. But the 
naturalist’s respect for nature’s mysteriousness battles his desire to name and know it: the 
language of “direct cross-examination” is the gun that would startle or kill the 
“enigmatical being,” the bird he is attempting to name. Of course, Higginson is not 
talking about a bird. He is talking about a woman, one of the great talents of his age. She 
is portrayed in his estimation as a kind of baffling creature, and his own strange 
imagery—confounding shy turtle and elusive bird—echoes this inscrutability. 
 Yet, Emily Dickinson shares Higginson’s need to name his bird, and she also 
shares his anxieties about the effectiveness and ethics of putting a name to the 
“enigmatical.” Her development of finely tuned linguistic instruments for shaping her 
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observations of the world around her and her simultaneous insistence on the 
unspeakableness of certain experiences are inflected by her position as a poet and a 
woman, as both an explorer of nature and a natural mystery herself. Unlike Higginson, 
she is not only the naming voice of the woodsman; she is also the silent bird.
1
  
This dual identity often precipitates both rhetorical and formal ambiguities in 
poems that dramatize the human relationship to nature. “‘Nature’ is what We see –,” for 
instance, is equivocal in that, on one hand, it uses the language of sensory experience to 
define what nature is, and, on the other, it claims that nature is ultimately defined by its 
very transcendence of the artifice of language: 
“Nature” is what We see –  
The Hill – the Afternoon – 
Squirrel – Eclipse – the Bumblebee – 
Nay – Nature is Heaven –  
 
“Nature” is what We hear –  
The Bobolink – the Sea –  
Thunder – the Cricket –  
Nay – Nature is Harmony –  
 
“Nature” is what We know –  
But have no Art to say –  
So impotent our Wisdom is  
To Her Sincerity – (P721)2 
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The poem is apparently didactic; it teaches what nature is. Nature is, in the first two 
stanzas, defined by human perception: in the first stanza, sight, in the second, hearing. In 
each case, the information gathered by the senses allows the speaker to name nature, both 
with a predicate nominative construction and by labeling it with a series of isolated 
nouns. But these declarations are problematic for the speaker, as evident from the first 
“Nay,” which belies the confidence of the preceding lines. Each of the first two stanzas 
ends with a renaming or revision that ostensibly opposes the abstract or even the 
superhuman to more concrete perception by substituting “Heaven” and “Harmony” for 
“what We see” and “what We hear.” This pattern of assurance followed by revision 
establishes a speaker who simultaneously relies on language to name and define what she 
experiences and is mistrustful of its ability to do so accurately, perhaps even mistrustful 
of sense perception itself.
3
 But the final stanza, as if a corrective to this uncertainty, is 
more decidedly didactic than those preceding it. It offers what could be read as an 
apology for the poem’s earlier waverings, claiming that human art and wisdom, and by 
extension the words of the poem itself, are “impotent” in the face of nature’s sincerity. 
The irony of writing a poem about the difficulty of putting things into words is a common 
one in Dickinson’s work, but the proposition that nature is what we “have no Art to say” 
raises the stakes of that irony by absolutely and explicitly contradicting the professed 
purpose of the poem to say what nature is.  
The formal contours of the poem destabilize its apparent rejection of the art of 
words. The interior lines of the first two stanzas elide all syntactic connection and rely 
instead on pure nomination. This parataxis may indicate the failure of the art of language: 
the organizing powers of language are reduced to mere pointing at natural objects. But it 
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could also celebrate the power to name: language is so powerful that it can call eclipses to 
the eye and thunder to the ear with the bare utterance of a noun. These sequences of 
nouns also help establish rhythms that leave it unclear whether the poem advocates for 
nature or art—or whether it divides the two at all. The lines of the first two stanzas—
which, despite their self-negations, are most confident in their ability to say what nature 
is—are almost unrecognizable as Dickinson’s standard alternating four- and three-stress 
lines.
4
 The lack of coordinating or subordinating connective words and the use of dashes 
in the first three stanzas disguise the rhythmic pattern and, in some cases, dispense with it 
altogether. “The˘   Hi´ ll – The˘   A ´f te˘  rno´on –” and “Squ i´ rre˘  l – E˘  cl i´ pse – th˘e    Bu´  mble˘  be´e – ” 
can be scanned as three-stress, basically iambic (with the exception of “Squ i´ rre˘  l”) lines, 
but their paratactic structure and the use of dashes syncopate them, interrupting what 
might otherwise establish the expectation of a regular rhythm. The second stanza departs 
even further from rhythmic regularity. “Thu´nd ˘e  r – the˘   Cr i´ cke˘  t” has only two stresses, and 
the caesura created by the dash isolates those stresses and prevents the cumulative 
rhythmic effect of alternating stressed and unstressed syllables. The fact that the rhythm 
is jarred in these stanzas implies that nature may indeed transcend the art of language. 
Further, the heavy initial stress on the word “Nay” in lines four and eight, in addition to 
creating a pause, even suggests a stutter: the lines purport to say what nature is, but we 
may hear “Na – Na – ” as false starts to saying the word “Nature,” making the first two 
stanzas, despite their assurance, halting and unsure, as if poetic art were unequal to the 
task.
5
  
Even so, the rhythm of the final stanza, the stanza that seems most unequivocally 
to put nature beyond words, returns to a melodic, easily perceptible iambic rhythm. The 
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formal hesitation and uncertainty of the first two stanzas is finally affirmed on the 
rhetorical level by the claim that nature’s sincerity transcends “our” wisdom and art. But 
here the form of the poem retrenches and instead argues that language, particularly a 
highly artificial language pattern like iambic meter, does have the power to organize and 
name experience. While the poem ends by declaring human art and wisdom impotent in 
the face of a sincerity that, by definition, is supralinguistic, this declaration returns us to 
the assertive rhythms of the very wisdom and art it denounces as impotent.
6
 We can 
almost tap our feet or sing along to this memorable declaration of art’s failure: 
“‘Na ´  tu˘  re i˘ s wha ´  t We˘   kno´w – / Bu˘  t ha ´  ve no˘ A ´  rt to˘ sa ´  y – / So˘ i ´ mpo˘te´nt ou˘  r W i´ sdo˘m  i´ s / To˘ 
H e´r Si˘ nce´ri˘ty´  .” Such lines make doubtful their own claim that human wisdom, artfully 
expressed, is impotent, and this kind of duality is fundamental to Dickinson’s work.  
Because Dickinson is identified with both explorer and bird, namer and nature, 
her poems are often anxious about rendering nature, and by extension all experience, in 
words. Her authority as a poet depends on the assumption that language, in her hands, can 
be revelatory, but she authorizes her experiences as particularly intense by claiming that 
they transcend human language and must be passed over in silence. Too, her culture’s 
identification of woman with nature and experience, rather than with the experiencing 
mind, makes it all the more important for her to guard such experience from 
appropriation in language by shrouding it in silence. This complex relationship to speech 
and silence profoundly affects Dickinson’s formal choices and drives many of her 
characteristic experimental techniques.  
More than any other American poet, Dickinson is known for her silences. Critics 
have pathologized and praised those silences, but they cannot ignore them. Even 
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biographical fascination with Dickinson and the popular appeal of her poems must be 
fundamentally understood in terms of silences. Biographers and readers choose variously 
to fill in the blank of Dickinson’s life and writing, but Dickinson, in both her letters and 
poems, refuses to fill them in herself. At times she seems almost to tease with her 
silences, as if to say, if you don’t know, I can’t tell you. Dickinson’s famed reticence is a 
commonplace of American literary studies and the popular imagination, and much clamor 
has been raised speculating on the cause of her silences. Nominations have included a 
tragic love affair (with various lovers put forward), a tyrannical father, and a debilitating 
illness or physical condition (among the options are agoraphobia, ocular difficulties, and 
epilepsy). Mabel Todd’s 1881 letter to her parents neatly summarizes the popular 
perception of Dickinson in her own time that has, despite the protests of her family, 
literary executors, and contemporary critics, persisted:  
I must tell you about the character of Amherst. It is a lady whom the people call 
the Myth. She has not been outside of her own house in fifteen years, except once 
to see a new church, when she crept out at night, & viewed it by moonlight [. . .]. 
She dresses wholly in white, & her mind is said to be perfectly wonderful. She 
writes finely, but no one ever sees her [. . .]. No one knows the cause of her 
isolation, but of course there are dozens of reasons assigned. (qtd. in Sewall, Life 
216)
7
  
Todd reports to her parents what she and the people of Amherst themselves seem to 
recognize is at least partly invention: she calls this version of Dickinson a “character,” 
and the people call her the “Myth.” The story of Dickinson’s withdrawal and silence is 
recognized as fictional, but it is no less compelling for that, and Todd retells the tale with 
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evident pleasure. By the time of Dickinson’s death, however, the origins of the myth as 
gossip had been obscured. Emily Fowler Ford’s elegy “Eheu! Emily Dickinson,” 
published in 1891 in the Springfield Republican, makes Dickinson’s personal 
idiosyncracies the subject of the poem and takes her peculiar silences, not her newfound 
appeal as a published poet or the quality of her work, as inherently of interest to the 
Republican audience. The poem speaks directly to the departed Dickinson, 
simultaneously lamenting and fetishizing her withdrawal from society: “Oh friend [. . .] 
You shun the eye, the voice, and shy elude / The loving souls that dare not to intrude / 
Upon your chosen silence.” It is Dickinson’s chosen silence that makes her especially 
refined, and it is her “hiding” that is evidence of the quality of her mind, unsuited to the 
“rude” and “crude” intrusions of “common daily strife” (qtd. in Sewall, Life 379). Ford’s 
poem was published hot on the heels of the success of Dickinson’s posthumously 
published work and lays claim to an intimacy with Dickinson (“Oh friend”) by, 
paradoxically, citing a familiarity with Dickinson’s refusal of intimacy. Thus, even the 
earliest reception of Dickinson’s work is marked by a popular appeal that plays upon a 
myth of shyness, extreme sensitivity, silence, and elusiveness that persists today. 
But Dickinson’s silence is not entirely mythical. Richard Sewall’s careful 
biography of Dickinson begins with reticence as a Dickinson family feature, and the bare 
facts of Dickinson’s life bear out the notion of reticence, if not total seclusion. Sewall 
makes reticence a New England trait and an extension of Protestant thrift: “Although 
doubtless there were garrulous New Englanders—there certainly are—the habit of thrift 
extended to speech. They hated to waste words, a quality which became perhaps ED’s 
most obvious New Englandism” (21). Emily Dickinson was a member of a family and a 
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culture that were noted for their reserve, but even in such a setting, she stands out. She 
often declined to descend the stairs to meet visitors at her house, and she famously would 
not venture to her brother’s house next door even for so eminent a personage as Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. While she carried on lively and intimate correspondences with many of 
her family, friends, and acquaintances and even with public figures, she also seems to 
have reserved her communication to a chosen group of people, and even they could not 
count on being received; those not elected to what one poem calls the “soul’s society” 
were almost always met with silence (P409).
8
  
Readers of Dickinson’s poems often feel they have been denied entrance to this 
inner circle and that her poems are, ultimately, not fully interpretable by those on the 
outside. Often the tenor of a complex metaphor will not be supplied, or a poem will begin 
with pronouns unmoored from the nouns they ostensibly replace or deictic terms like 
“this” that point only to an absent referent. While for some readers these referential 
silences make Dickinson’s poems self-centered or even, as David Porter puts it, 
“autistic,” many of Dickinson’s most influential critics have taken these silences as the 
very substance of her poetry. As Sharon Cameron explains in her introduction to 
Choosing/Not Choosing, “to look at the history of Dickinson criticism is to see that what 
is memorialized are her ellipses, her canceled connections” (3). Among others, Cameron 
cites Hartmann on “revoked referentiality,” Leda on the “omitted center” of the poems, 
and Weisbuch describing them as “sceneless.” These and other critics begin from the 
assumption that Dickinson’s poems lack reference or, at the very least, that reference is 
oblique, fragmented, and difficult to trace in her work.
9
 Silences are also a central 
element of Dickinson’s form: her dashes allow her to elide grammatical connectives and 
   
      
71 
 
leave coordination and subordination unspoken and undecided, her condensed and 
multivalent syntax permits so many—often contradictory—readings that it could almost 
be said to refuse meaning, and the absence of titles only adds to the sense that her work 
sidesteps language while also reveling in it.  
 It is this formal incarnation of silence that has made Dickinson’s work so 
influential for twentieth-century poets and critics, especially experimentalists and 
feminists. While early critics were impatient, dismissive, or downright patronizing about 
Dickinson’s style, especially its gaps and absences, her silences have been vital to her 
critical and popular reevaluation in the late twentieth century.
10
 Postmodern readers have 
valued her indeterminacy, her refusal of narrative, and her estrangement of reference as 
laying the groundwork for contemporary poetic attitudes. These are, for many readers, 
evidence of what John Mulvihill calls a “distrust of names and knowledge” that echoes 
familiar twentieth- and twenty-first-century skepticisms (75).
11
 But the most important 
reevaluations of Dickinson have been feminist, and these have also valued her silences as 
forms of protest or proto-feminist resistance to patriarchal norms. Susan Juhasz revises 
the myth of Emily the tragic maiden: “I see her movement into her house and then her 
room as paralleling the movement into her mind that her poems document, because both 
actions were undertaken for the purpose of maintaining her self against pressures from 
the world to lose it” (Undiscovered 11). For Juhasz, as for many other feminist critics, 
Dickinson removes herself from the world because the world, warped by sexist 
philosophies and institutions, is not suited to a woman such as herself. Susan Howe also 
reads Dickinson’s silences as active and powerful: “I think she may have chosen to enter 
the space of silence. A space where power is no longer an issue, gender is no longer an 
   
      
72 
 
issue, voice is no longer an issue, where the idea of a printed book appears as a trap” 
(60). Thus, what might have been a disheartening story of a talented woman silenced by 
an unprepared public and short-sighted editors is converted into a feminist triumph. 
Adrienne Rich provides one of the most enduring metaphors for the feminist potential of 
Dickinson’s silences in her essay “Vesuvius at Home: The Power of Emily Dickinson.” 
She makes Dickinson’s volcanic imagery—a smoldering that can destructively erupt—
into a figure for Dickinson’s poetics and, as the title of the essay suggests, argues that this 
explosiveness is domestic and feminine. Rich claims that Dickinson’s poetry is powerful 
precisely because that power is tightly controlled. Admittedly, eruption implies forceful 
speech, not silence, but such speech takes its force from the pressure under which it is 
suppressed. The volcano does not have power in spite of its hidden or underground nature 
but because of it.  
While it may seem counter-intuitive that silences should be a major part of a 
poet’s appeal, Dickinson’s silences are often considered her most pioneering linguistic 
innovations and cited as evidence of her regard for words themselves. Charles Anderson 
argues that Dickinson develops a “Capacity to Terminate” “into a highly elliptical style, 
pruning away all excess in her passion to get down to the clean bones of language” and 
that such pruning amounts to a “rejuvenation of language” (148).12 Similarly, E. Miller 
Budick claims that Dickinson’s “placeless eventless poetics” elides reference not because 
words fail her but because she is dedicated to words above things: words are valuable not 
for what they refer to but in and of themselves. This “rejuvenation of language” traces a 
line of descent from Dickinson to American modernists and a whole tradition of 
innovation in American poetry that privileges the word itself, rather than what it may 
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describe or explain, in order to revive language and make it capable of something new. 
Techniques that silence ordinary communication, reference, clarity, or decidability are 
marshaled to push language into articulating extraordinary things or speaking in 
extraordinary ways. This makes Dickinson’s silences exploratory or pioneering uses of 
language not refusals of it. Joanne Dobson argues that Dickinson’s personal reticence and 
removal from much of public life allowed her to disregard the requirements of communal 
meaning and thereby develop a revolutionary idiosyncratic language. According to 
Dobson, Dickinson’s “expressive mandate was” not to leave language behind but “to 
develop a language adequate to communicate the uniqueness of [. . .] individual 
existence” (97). “Her characteristic omission of subject and her use of the devices of 
tonal dissonance and sequential disordering of syntax and narrative,” the very same 
techniques that Howe takes as evidence of Dickinson “enter[ing] the space of silence,” 
are, in Dobson’s reading, “designed to articulate that which is, and to some degree 
remains, unarticulated: the ‘silent side’ of individual experience” (127). Dickinson’s 
silences, inasmuch as they are taken as resistance to the appropriations of public and 
patriarchal language or boldly individualist experiments claiming new territory for the 
enlivened word, make her an essential figure in many twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
poetic genealogies and pantheons.  
But we must be careful not to read Dickinson as though she were a modern 
woman, born in the wrong time. The contradictory impulses that affect Dickinson’s 
poetics so profoundly, the inclination to veil and the impetus to articulate the “silent side” 
of experience, are very much a part of her nineteenth-century context. While many 
modern readers claim Dickinson as a proto-feminist radical and her silences as a form of 
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resistance to anti-female elements of her culture, neither her decision to delimit her 
sphere of action nor her sometimes obscure style necessarily departs from nineteenth-
century models of proper feminine behavior.
13
 In Dickinson and the Strategies of 
Reticence, Dobson describes a feminine culture of silence to which Dickinson could not 
have been entirely immune: “anxiety that a full disclosure of woman’s nature might 
contradict culturally prevailing assumptions of feminine morality was intense, producing 
in middle-class society an ideology of feminine reticence so powerful that Higginson 
calls it a ‘gospel of silence’” (57). For a woman writer, such a “gospel of silence” could 
be crippling and, for many, it was. For others, the expectation of reticence inspired a 
poetics of resistance, unveiling, or speaking out.
14
 Dickinson’s poetry seems instead to 
affirm the “ideology of feminine reticence,” despite poems that bare the “soul at the 
‘White Heat’” (P401). According to Dobson, “in an era when reticence was considered a 
primary requirement for the respectable female, Dickinson’s stylistic strategies allowed 
her to address proscribed areas of women’s personal experience, particularly anger and 
forbidden passion, safely—but also with honesty, precision, and strength of feeling” 
(xvi). In this reading, Dickinson does not valiantly escape her corseting culture but 
exploits its prescriptions for feminine discretion, indirection, and silence as strategies for 
expression. Her silences, then, are consistent with nineteenth-century requirements that 
women’s experiences be modestly hidden even as she develops a language of intense 
experience that depends largely on silences for its intensity.
15
  
Though we may balk at the notion that Dickinson’s silences are consistent with 
nineteenth-century gender restrictions, her reticence also aligns her with elements of her 
culture that we cannot consider primarily gendered. Sewall argues that Dickinson was a 
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member of both a family and a regional culture marked by reticence.
16
 Too, her deeply 
personal yet unrevealing poetics is in part a natural development of a religious culture 
that advocates constant self-examination and interrogation of spiritual or religious 
experience while teaching modesty and self-denial. Her mistrust of the wisdom of 
language may also arise from the Puritan dogma that God is fundamentally unknowable. 
Dickinson’s poetic speakers, like the Puritan seeking assurance that she is one of the 
elect, may weigh and measure, evaluate and reevaluate, but in the end they often decide 
that only the voice of God can speak the final word.
17
 True understanding, despite the 
injunction that humans should seek after it, is deferred to the divine. Even though it often 
leads to idiosyncratic language that confounds interpretation, Dickinson’s intense 
scrutiny of interior states aligns her with some of the more conservative elements of her 
culture. But the idea that the unknowable is the ultimate and unattainable goal of 
knowledge, while it corresponds to Puritan concepts of deity, is also taken up by 
burgeoning new philosophies. 
As strange as her contemporaries often found her poetry, it participates in a kind 
of mysticism that they might have recognized and, especially the more liberal among 
them, might have affirmed. Like her contemporaries Emerson and Thoreau, Dickinson is 
drawn to the mystical elements of Puritanism that, in transcendentalist writings, become 
even more explicit, though the unknowable superhuman is often called nature rather than 
God. Dickinson’s poems, as we saw in “Nature – is what we See,” often argue that 
silence is not only a marker of becoming modesty or encompassing introspection but of 
the presence of something that exceeds human expression. This is mystical in that it 
posits a form of communion with something nonhuman that can only be experienced, not 
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explained. Indeed, Louise Bogan’s description of Dickinson’s mystical poetics recalls 
Emerson’s transparent eyeball more forcefully than it does Jonathan Edwards’s sinners in 
the hands of an angry god: “moments of still and halted perception” like “the slant of 
light on a winter day, the still brilliance of a summer noon, [and] the sound of the wind 
before the rain [. . .] share the shock of insight, the slight dislocation of serial events, the 
sudden shift from the Manifold into the One” (138). When Dickinson writes in this mode, 
her poetry points toward something suprahuman as inspiring and authorizing her 
language. Thus, she affirms one of the fundamental tenets of the philosophy of her age, 
both at its Puritan roots and its Transcendentalist flower, that the human must always 
reach past itself and that it must, in some ways, always be found wanting.
18
  
Though some poems, like “Nature is what we See,” are uncertain about the claim 
that experiences are validated when they exceed communication, others more 
unequivocally celebrate mystical unrelatability as approaching the eternal: 
If I could tell how glad I was 
I should not be so glad – 
But when I cannot make the Force 
Nor mould it into word 
I know it is a sign 
That new Dilemma be 
From mathematics further off 
Than from Eternity (P1725) 
The poem compares two types of problems that are difficult to distinguish from one 
another. Lines 1-2 describe the first difficulty or dilemma: language diminishes 
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experience, thus gladness is lessened in the telling. The subsequent lines appear at first to 
elaborate or restate the original problem: the poem is still addressing the insufficiency, 
now called a “Dilemma,” of linguistic creativity. However, the use of “but” to transition 
from the problem of telling gladness and the adjective “new” to describe the “Dilemma” 
of molding “the Force” into words indicate a contrast between these very similar poetic 
tasks. The most obvious difference between these communication challenges is their 
subject matter. The first deals with the possible diminishing effects of language on a 
basic human experience, gladness, while the second contends with a mysterious 
abstraction of power—a “Force”—that, rather than merely being lessened by the 
speaker’s words, is entirely beyond her creative powers.19 The change in verb tense 
reflects this difference. The poem begins with a conditional clause “If I could” and 
continues in the subjunctive. These verbs denote uncertainty and possibility. The speaker 
describes what would happen if she could tell her gladness, rather than what does happen 
when she cannot. In contrast, after the transition the verbs are more absolute. Where the 
speaker speculates and calculates about what would happen if she could tell her gladness, 
she knows what happens when she cannot exert her creative powers upon “the Force.” 
The conditional verbs suggest that the first dilemma is closer to mathematics, a symbolic 
or figurative system that may also stand in for language; the calculation of the amount of 
gladness falls within the purview of established systems, however difficult. The shift to 
the present tense indicates that the speaker discards conditional weighing and calculations 
in the face of a “Force” that exceeds her grasp; because this dilemma is “from 
mathematics further off / than from Eternity”—that is, it is comparatively closer to 
eternity than it is to human symbolic systems like mathematics—the speaker can no 
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longer weigh the effects of speech and must instead describe the failure of language as 
inherent in the attempt to put “Force” into words. When the speaker’s creative and 
linguistic powers fail to mold something that exceeds them, this is a sign of an eternal 
dilemma: it is the lack of words, or signs, that is itself a sign of nearness to the past-
human. Though she is often unorthodox, Dickinson’s worshipful silences and her 
protestations that mere words are not enough share her culture’s hope for rapture and its 
recognition of the limits of human knowledge.
20
   
But as we’ve already seen in a poem like “Nature is what we See,” the silences in 
Dickinson’s work, whether modest or mystical, are only part of the story. She also knows 
the dangers for a poet in vaunting silence as the evidence of knowledge: she can’t 
unequivocally affirm the superiority of unmediated experience without undoing her own 
voice as a poet and dissolving into the nature she also seeks to name—not merely to be 
absorbed into. Certainly, though she relies on language as a necessity of expression, she 
also often enjoys it for its own sake. This tension between the “Sincerity of nature” and 
human “Art to say”—that is, between inscrutable silence as a prerequisite for divine 
authority and assurance in linguistic ability to interpret and shape experience—is not 
unique to Dickinson but rather a predominant conflict in nineteenth-century culture. For 
instance, the furor over philological interpretation of the Bible demonstrates not only the 
rising faith in human knowledge as a tool for accessing the divine but also the anxiety 
and resistance that such a shift caused.
21
 Barbara Packer explains that much of the 
religious debate at the beginning of the nineteenth century centered around textual studies 
of the Bible, particularly German philological and historical criticism. The basic premise 
of reading the Bible in this way, that the human intellect may discover divine mysteries, 
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is at the root of a shift toward human-centered religious philosophy. Packer’s description 
of the excitement that such studies aroused is telling in that it links scriptural mysteries to 
the natural mysteries that nineteenth-century Americans were also engaged in 
discovering: “Watching the textual obscurities of centuries melt before the blast of the 
new historical criticism gave the young scholars of the era a confidence that, like the 
mysteries of nature, the mysteries of Scripture were soluble” (349).22  
This confidence is at play when Dickinson’s poems claim to say what nature is 
and when they claim to lay bare some hitherto unspoken aspect of human experience. She 
shares with the Transcendentalists and other vanguardists of her time an excitement about 
the expansion of what was humanly possible. And this enthusiasm characterizes the core 
of Dickinson's culture as well. Westward expansion, the domestication of wild lands, an 
explosion of new inventions, and the rapidly developing and shifting sense of American 
identity can all be said to rely on the assumptions that undergird the philological turn: 
namely, that human tools are equal to the nonhuman mysteries that surround us.
23
 In this 
context, Dickinson’s stylistic experiments are not concessions to the inscrutable or a 
surrender to divine agency but rather pioneering inventions that extend human agency 
and make more things accessible to language. Certainly, Dickinson’s poetry can be 
inflected by the rhetoric of pioneering exploration. In one poem she calls God a “frontier” 
(P1050), and in another she exhorts the conquistador Hernando de Soto—and, by 
extension, all explorers—to look inward to find the most untouched soil of all: “Soto! 
Explore thyself! / Therein thyself shalt find / The “Undiscovered Continent” – / No 
Settler had the Mind” (P814). She even calls Christ a “Tender Pioneer” because he has 
blazed the trail of death for others to follow (P727). But Dickinson’s alignment with the 
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pioneering impulses of her time is clearest in her experimental impulse itself, her search 
for language capable of exploring the “Undiscovered Continent” of her own mind.   
Given her cultural milieu, it is not at all surprising that Dickinson’s relationship to 
language and silence is deeply conflicted, and her letters bear out this ambivalence. In a 
letter saved by her friend Joseph Lyman it appears that Dickinson considers a growing 
appreciation for language to be part of growing up: “We used to think, Joseph, when I 
was an unsifted girl and you so scholarly that words were cheap & weak. Now I dont 
know of anything so mighty” (Sewall, Lyman 78). She apparently has learned better, now 
that she is a more sifted person, than to disregard the might of words. And this might is, 
further, not heavenly or transcendent but couched in the terms of earthly power and 
earthly beauty: “There are [words] to which I lift my hat when I see them sitting 
princelike among their peers on the page. Sometimes I write one, and look at his outlines 
till he glows as no sapphire.” This love of words is also explicitly connected to her own 
poetic skill: she admires words in and of themselves, and she particularly admires the 
beauty of her own writing.
24
  
But her letters also reveal a mistrust of language, especially direct language, that 
runs deep. One of her early letters to Higginson, on the whole a reticent and even coy 
reply to what seems to have been a request to describe herself in more detail, shows how 
“the wiles of Words” could also be used to avoid certain kinds of speaking (L555). She 
refuses exact or telling detail about herself, offering deliberately evasive responses to 
mundane questions: “You asked how old I was? I made no verse – but one or two – until 
this winter – Sir.” She lists her companions as “Hills,” “the Sundown – and a Dog,” 
which she claims are “better than Beings – because they know – but do not tell.” If 
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knowing but not telling makes something better than a being, Dickinson herself vies for 
this distinction in her singularly indirect letter. In the very letter where she claims her 
“Lexicon” as her “only companion,” she refashions words to the purposes of silence and 
refusal (L261). In fact, an August 1862 letter, also to Higginson, specifically links refusal 
and silence to holiness. In it Dickinson justifies her habit of “shunning Men and Women” 
by explaining that “they talk of Hallowed things, aloud – and embarrass my Dog,” whom 
she praises as “dumb, and brave.” Given such a statement in favor of hallowed silences, 
when her next paragraph evokes “a noiseless noise in the Orchard” one might expect that 
noise to remain noiseless and not be subjected to the talk she has just shunned, but it is 
that very “noiseless noise” that is her special purview as a poet. Though her dog Carlo 
may be admired for his dumbness, Dickinson herself has no trouble finding words for her 
experiences: “I think you would like the Chestnut Tree, I met in my walk. It hit my notice 
suddenly – and I thought the Skies were in Blossom – Then there’s a noiseless noise in 
the Orchard – that I let persons hear” (L271, emphasis added).  
Indeed, Dickinson’s poetic experimentation is driven, at least in part, by the 
contradictions of letting us hear a noiseless noise: the intricacies of such a task require 
innovation. This experimental drive is evident in Dickinson’s more obvious formal 
deviations from the conventions of the poetry of her time, like her dashes and her 
idiosyncratic capitalization. But her dual relationship to silence also motivates her 
experimentation with more conventional poetic devices like metaphor, in particular her 
development of metaphors of selfsameness, or comparisons of a thing to itself, that 
function simultaneously as statements that a thing is literally itself. That Dickinson’s 
poetry negotiates between speech and silence, multiplicity and singularity, is not 
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necessarily surprising. Dickinson criticism is overwhelmingly concerned with dualities in 
her work, her divided loyalties, and her characteristic attempts to pursue seemingly 
exclusive poetic goals simultaneously.
25
 Scholars consistently return, and rightly so, to 
understanding how the poems position themselves between or among competing 
concerns, especially with capturing the music of mortal, natural life while positing, and 
often apparently longing for, an unspeakable force or experience that may lie outside the 
circumference of that life. However, the suitability of statements of selfsameness to 
expressing in language the simultaneous desire for and resistance to the silences of 
supralinguistic phenomena remains unexplored.  
Dickinson’s development of figures in which a thing is related to itself must be 
understood in the context of the paramount importance of metaphorical relation to her 
work. Readers of Dickinson's poems are often struck by her figures; many of her poems 
work by crafting strange and compelling relationships that simultaneously clarify and 
mystify mental experiences. To read her work is to contend with the relational nature of 
her poetics. Her figures may be traditional metaphors (“Grief is a mouse”), similes 
(“’Twas like a Maelstrom with a notch”), extended metaphorical conceits (“My Life had 
stood a Loaded Gun”), synecdoches (“How fortunate the Grave”), or symbols (“The 
Daisy follows soft the Sun”), but they can all broadly be called metaphor in that they 
understand, explain, or name by relation.
26 
It is clear that relation is, if not structurally 
constitutive of, at least characteristic of Dickinson’s poetry. This is borne out by the 
many critics who have claimed that metaphor is the dominant trope of her poetics and is 
the unifying rhetorical strategy in her seemingly disjointed corpus. Robert Weisbuch is 
one of the first to argue that metaphorical figures unify Dickinson’s work, and Dickinson 
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criticism, though wide-ranging, often takes metaphoricity as a central assumption or 
defining problem.
27
 Whether we consider her metaphors to be extensions of a mind, a 
perceiving subject, a biography, a historical situation, a theological tradition, or simply a 
defining feature of poetic language, understanding by relation, it seems, is a principal 
strategy for Dickinson.
28
 Even those critics who argue that her metaphors are not 
communicative, that they fall short of or exceed referentiality in favor of hermeticism, 
often assume that Dickinson’s poetics is relational, though the terms of those 
relationships may be obscured.
29
  
 But, even if we conclude that Dickinson’s metaphors are not referential, we 
cannot read under the assumption that Dickinson’s poems have nothing to say or that her 
figures attempt no kind of reference at all.
30
 Dickinson herself expected her poems to 
communicate. When Higginson asked her to clarify an utterance that went “beyond [his] 
knowledge,” Dickinson responded with incredulity: “you cannot mean it? All men say 
‘What’ to me, but I thought it a fashion” (L271). Though she is apparently familiar with 
not being understood (and takes some pride in this), the word “fashion” implies that such 
misunderstanding is sometimes feigned or disingenuous. Her shock that a man like 
Higginson would fail to understand her indicates that she expects her poems to 
communicate, at least to a serious reader. But even if we take Dickinson at her word and 
assume that her poems are more than (or at least other than) a private language, even if 
we reject the notion that Dickinson’s metaphors are escapist or otherwise irresponsible, 
we cannot deny that Dickinson’s poems at times seem to make a spectacle of their own 
failure, to throw up their hands and say “what” to themselves. Many of them suggest, by 
withdrawing from comparison and disavowing the usefulness of figurative language, that 
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poetic relation inherently fails to grasp experience. Among the many reticences and 
refusals that Dickinson employs, statements of selfsameness—that is, apparently 
tautological propositions that a thing is itself—seem most explicitly to deny poeticity; 
however, within the larger context of Dickinson’s work, selfsameness must also be read 
as metaphorical. Because selfsameness is, in Dickinson’s poetics, simultaneously literal 
and figurative, it is a particularly useful strategy for establishing one of the primary 
tensions in Dickinson’s work: the tension between respect for the hallowed silences of 
singular being and delight in the sapphire words required by variety and difference. In 
short, selfsameness dramatizes the paradox of the “noiseless noise” that Dickinson “let[s] 
persons hear.” 
A statement of selfsameness is an explicit claim that a thing is itself: “grief is 
greif.” Such claims are generally not taken to be metaphorical because metaphorical 
expressions involve two different terms, the familiar tenor and vehicle.
31
 Statements of 
selfsameness are not traditional metaphors because they do not preserve one of the key 
components of metaphor: the simultaneous assertion of identity and recognition of 
difference. For instance, Dickinson’s poem that begins “Grief is a Mouse” uses a series of 
metaphorical statements to explore the nature of grief through relation to something other 
than grief: “Grief is a Mouse,” “Grief is a Thief,” “Grief is a Juggler,” “Grief is a 
Gourmand” (P743). Each of these identifications depends for its power on the difference 
between tenor and vehicle. Inferences are made about grief that would not be possible 
were those differences to be erased: figures in which the subject and predicate nominative 
are very similar—“grief is sadness,” “grief is mourning,” or “grief is missing 
something”—would be less effective metaphors, perhaps not metaphors at all, because 
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they would not preserve the difference that makes the identity expressed in metaphors 
meaningful. Thus, while “Grief is a Mouse” is metaphorical, a statement of selfsameness 
like “grief is grief” functions differently.  
Yet, if we read selfsameness literally, as tautology, then a significant number of 
Dickinson’s poems profess that language is not, after all, a useful tool for understanding 
and communicating difficult or deeply personal experiences. These experiences are 
marked as particularly significant or valuable precisely because they are those things we 
“have no Art to say.” Should we seek to understand love, for instance, we find that “Love 
reckons by itself – alone”:  
Love reckons by itself – alone –  
“As large as I” – relate the Sun – 
To One who never felt it blaze – 
Itself is all the like it has – (P812) 
Like the sun, love is said to be incomparable to any other thing; extreme, blazing 
experiences are selfsame. They cannot be explained metaphorically because there is 
nothing adequate to the equation: “Itself is all the like it has – .” Metaphor is conflated 
with speech by the double senses, “tell” and “compare,” of the verb “relate”; it is clear 
that to communicate is to compare when the speaker’s challenge to convey the 
experience of the sun to a person who has not experienced it—to “relate the Sun – / To 
One who never felt it blaze – ”—fails in the face of the sun’s incomparability. While 
lesser experience may perhaps be told by comparison, “large” things can only be 
measured according to themselves; they are unrelatable. If a thing cannot be compared, it 
cannot be told. Love is love: it is identical to itself and comparable only to itself. To 
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name it exhausts the possibilities for explanation because it is only, fully, and exactly 
love. Taken literally, such an assertion leaves little room for poetic language; instead, it 
elevates experience as silently self-sufficient and outside the knowing-by-relation that is 
the province of artful language.
32
 It vaunts hallowed silences and appears content leaving 
the noiseless noise relatively unheard.  
 “Love reckons by itself – alone –” is not unique in its assertion of the 
selfsameness of its subject. Other objects or experiences that can only reckon by 
themselves include the soul, self, death, divinity, and beauty. The poem beginning “The 
Consciousness that is aware – ” (P817) calls the soul’s properties “adequate unto itself” 
and names death, or “the interval / Experience,” “Adventure most unto itself.” Death not 
only pushes the soul into identification with itself but is itself incomparable: the tiger’s 
death in “A Dying Tiger – moaned for drink – ” (P529) can only be explained by the fact 
that he is dead. In “Behind me – dips Eternity – ,” the Christian mystery of the division 
between God the Father and God the Son is reckoned self-referentially: “In perfect – 
pauseless Monarchy – / Whose Prince – is Son of none – / [. . .] Himself – Himself 
diversify – / In Duplicate divine” (P743). Beauty too is incomparable. Two poems 
explicitly treating the nature of beauty, “Beauty be not caused – It is – ” (P654) and “The 
definition of Beauty is” (P797), both claim that beauty is self-defined and unrelatable. 
And lest we think that only the great themes are self-descriptive and self-sufficient, we 
should also note that “A Bee his Burnished Carriage” (P1351)—though it relies primarily 
on the metaphor of a masculine bee making a conjugal visit to a feminine rose—begins 
with the assertion that the bee and his metaphorical vehicle are one and the same: “A Bee 
his Burnished Carriage / Drove boldly to a Rose – / Combinedly alighting – / Himself – 
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his Carriage was.” In this arresting image, a bee is likened to a gentleman-suitor arriving 
in a carriage to pay court to a lover. But while a gentleman must alight from his carriage 
and thus separate himself from his vehicle, this is impossible for the bee, who is both 
passenger and vehicle. Even when the poem returns to the metaphor of the bee as 
gentleman, this first image insists that the bee is also only itself, a bee, and decidedly not 
a human lover. If we think of metaphor in the sense of carrying over or transportation (as 
the nomenclature of tenor and vehicle makes explicit), for the bee to be its carriage is to 
be a metaphor for itself, short-circuiting the familiar comparison of bee and rose to male 
and female lovers. Though metaphor is predominant in Dickinson’s work, many of her 
poems also collapse comparison and suggest that the world is indescribable by metaphor 
and that things are complete in themselves. “Hope” may be “the thing with Feathers” 
(P314), and “Grief” may be “a Mouse” (P753), but “Blue is Blue – the World through / 
Amber – Amber – Dew – Dew – ” (P733). 
  Poems that name experiences as incomparable or claim that a thing is selfsame 
are, at least on some level, about the insufficiencies of language to relate the large things 
of life; they are about the failure of the voice of the poet and the boundaries past which 
poetic authority cannot reach. They partake of the mystical strain in Dickinson’s poetry 
and in her culture at large that refuses to “speak of Hallowed things” and celebrates 
unspeakability as evidence of divinity or the suprahuman. As Cameron explains, some of 
Dickinson’s poems evade metaphor because, “insofar as names involve distance from and 
interpretation of what has been apprehended, they are precisely what certain experiences 
[. . .] will not yield” (Lyric 49). Certain experiences (again, which run the gamut from 
eternal perfection to pollination) resist the naming and renaming process of metaphor. 
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But to call them unrelatable seems to deny the usefulness of those Dickinson poems that 
do rely on relation for their explanations. However idiosyncratic those relationships are, 
they are not empty exercises or momentary distractions from a fundamental inability of 
poetry to communicate. There is understanding at stake in Dickinson’s metaphors: her 
poems pose real questions, and her metaphors are real answers to those questions even if 
they are not ultimate answers.
33
 Dickinson’s statements of the self-sufficiency of 
experience cannot be simply admissions that poetic language fails as an explanatory tool, 
or they would render useless the majority of her lifelong work to make the noiseless noise 
heard. But if statements of selfsameness are not confessions of the inherent 
insufficiencies of language, how can we reconcile her insistence on the self-sufficiency 
and incomparability of experience in some poems with the overwhelmingly metaphorical 
character of her poetry? We can reconcile them by understanding selfsameness as 
figurative, in addition to being literally true. If Dickinson’s statements of selfsameness 
are also metaphors, self-reference makes more things speakable; it makes even the idea of 
the insufficiency of language the subject of figurative exploration. Selfsameness as figure 
does not deny the creative and communicative possibilities of metaphor but dramatizes 
metaphor’s multiplicity in tension with the singular self-sufficiency and inexpressibility 
of experience conveyed by literal selfsameness. 
But why should Dickinson’s figures of selfsameness be read as metaphorical 
expressions and not simply literal assertions of self-sufficiency and singular identity? 
First, the very fact that Dickinson’s statements of selfsameness are read or heard in the 
context of poetry makes it unlikely that they will only be taken literally. The conventions 
of poetic reading permit figurative interpretations for almost any utterance, especially 
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when its literal relevance or truth is in doubt. Context is crucial in determining whether a 
statement is metaphorical: “Figures of speech arise in an ecology: the preceding 
discourse, environmental events, and the like” (Katz 22). The preceding discourses of 
poetry in general and Dickinson’s poetry in particular contextualize each utterance, 
suggesting that statements of selfsameness cannot unequivocally be taken literally. The 
poem that begins “Love reckons by itself – alone – ” is part of a body of work in which 
love is reckoned by life, death, a prism, and calvaries; death is reckoned by surprises and 
secrets, gifts and debts; eternity is reckoned by clocks, seasons, and seas; and grief by a 
gourmand’s luxury and a martyr’s speechless ashes.34 The relational character of 
Dickinson’s work makes selfsameness not only literal but also a particularly dramatic use 
of metaphor, intensifying its identifying function while, at the same time, preserving the 
differences that make relation possible.   
A claim like “love is love” is therefore not only a literal statement of love’s 
selfsameness and incomparability but an identification of love with love that—like more 
obviously metaphorical two-term figures—relies on difference as well as similarity. To 
read selfsameness in light of Dickinson’s characteristic relational strategies undermines 
claims of incomparability and reinforces her assertions that singularity and selfhood are 
not stable, self-evident categories. To say a thing is itself is not, for Dickinson, to exempt 
it from comparison. Dickinson’s innovative pronoun “ourself,” a pluralized first-person 
singular, indicates that even personhood is susceptible to difference.
35
 The effectiveness 
of “ourself” for diffusing identity is especially evident in the poem beginning “This 
Chasm, Sweet, opon my life” (P1061). The “gaping sides” of the chasm into which the 
sunrise has dropped “Disclose as ’twere a Tomb / Ourself am lying straight wherein / The 
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Favorite of Doom – .” Here the double nature of the pronoun “ourself” is particularly 
pronounced because it is used as the subject of the verb “to be,” the only verb in English 
that defines number in its first-person conjugations. Though in other poems a reader may 
be tempted to recuperate the difficulty of a simultaneously compound and singular 
identity by simply reading “ourself” as an idiosyncratic “we,” the verb “am” indicates a 
singular subject, making such recuperation grammatically impossible and leaving the 
tension between “our” and “self” unresolved: one cannot read the line “We am lying 
straight wherein” as one might replace “Ourself” with “we” or “us” in lines like “Ourself 
cannot decide” or “Between Ourself and Heaven” (P518, P1000).36 This kind of usage 
exemplifies the instability of identity that is characteristic of Dickinson’s poetics in 
general and that informs interpretations of statements of identity as more than literal. In a 
corpus marked by relational thinking and by the division even of oneself, a poem that 
claims self-sufficiency or self-definition should not be taken literally, or at least not only 
taken literally. Reading statements of self-identity as comparisons brings apparently 
incongruous poems like “Love reckons by itself – alone − ” under the rubric of 
Dickinson’s poetics of relation, making it possible to understand them as more than 
abdication of reference or the negation of poetic authority. Metaphors of selfsameness, by 
identifying a thing with itself, do not simply deny the usefulness of metaphorical 
language in favor of supralinguistic mystical knowledge; they are also pioneering in that 
they take new territory for language by extending metaphor into new domains.  
 The most important purpose of that extension is to negotiate the paradox of 
relating, in the sense both of telling and comparing, the unrelatability of some 
experiences. The experiences of death, immortality, and love are frequently figured as 
   
      
91 
 
unrelatable, singular, or selfsame because each of these experiences threatens the 
differences upon which language depends; each promises a silent and silencing unity. 
Dickinson’s poems about death, which are sometimes indistinguishable from poems 
about love, are perhaps most anxious about the possibility of pure self-identity:  
This Consciousness that is aware  
Of Neighbors and the Sun 
Will be the one aware of Death 
And that itself alone 
 
Is traversing the interval 
Experience between 
And most profound experiment 
Appointed unto Men – 
 
How adequate unto itself 
It’s properties shall be 
Itself unto itself and None 
Shall make discovery – 
 
Adventure most unto itself 
The Soul condemned to be – 
Attended by a single Hound 
It’s own identity. (P817) 
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The poem details a purifying process by which consciousness, or the soul, separates itself 
from all other things and becomes entirely self-defined. The same consciousness that is 
aware of others in life will be aware of its separation from others in death. The deictic 
“This” insists that death is not a process of transformation or transfiguration: life and 
death provide different experiences—Neighbors and the Sun in life, only consciousness 
itself in death—but the experiencing consciousness (this one) retains, and is defined by, 
its own identity. What is in doubt is the poem’s attitude toward this isolation or self-
identity. While the poem does not exactly celebrate death, the first three stanzas express 
reverence that this consciousness—the very same one accustomed to awareness of things 
outside itself—would undertake the adventure of leaving behind such relationships in 
favor of self-sufficiency. Their tone is, though guarded, full of admiration for the bravery 
required by this “profound experiment” and, in the final stanza, “adventure.” The 
language of experiment and exploration relates more conventional views of death as a 
journey—“traversing the interval”—to an American exploratory spirit and experimental 
curiosity, but, instead of journeying toward heaven and the possibility of reunion with 
lost others, the soul journeys toward isolation. While the vocabulary of exploration and 
experiment can evoke danger or risk, the dominant chord for the first three stanzas of the 
poem is anticipation and excitement at the possibility of profundity that death offers to 
consciousness.  
 The final stanza begins firmly within the purview of this positive attitude toward 
the isolation of the consciousness in “Adventure most unto itself.” But in the second line 
of the stanza the word “condemned” makes what previously appeared to be an 
exhilarating, if unfamiliar, experiment into a punishment or unavoidable fate. Nothing in 
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the foregoing stanzas has suggested that the experiment of death should be viewed as a 
sentence or doom. This surprising shift revises adventure to include the concept of a 
determined fate: the soul is condemned to be an adventure most unto itself—that is, to 
become entirely isolated in self-definition. The adventure of identity that was portrayed 
as pioneering and brave is now characterized as menacing and inescapable. In this poem, 
selfsameness is both the final adventure and a kind of doom. Here and elsewhere, 
Dickinson is uneasy about unity, in part because it precludes relation and, thus, language. 
The consciousness that is aware of neighbors is a consciousness that is invested in 
language, but, when it has braved the adventure of total self-sufficiency, it has no one 
with whom to speak. The experiment of death is profound because it is undiscoverable by 
any other. It cannot be revealed or spoken about because the consciousness is entirely 
alone. While it is clear that Dickinson’s speakers are often drawn toward the silences of  
identity, they are also drawn toward the multiplicity of mortal life and the language in 
which it must speak. 
 It is this doubleness that makes the “single Hound” so ambiguous. On one hand, 
the hound is a figure for unity because it is the soul's own identity. On the other hand, the 
hound, an attendant for the consciousness in death, pulls the poem back from total 
identity: the self cannot be completely isolated if it is attended by another. The image is 
not one of isolation but of companionship. And if we read the second line of the last 
stanza as part of a syntactic unit with the third line, the undecidability of the hound's role 
is intensified. Instead of the soul being condemned to “Adventure most unto itself,” now 
the hound’s attendance is the punishment or fate: “the Soul condemned to be – Attended 
by a single Hound.” In this sense, the attending hound doesn't rescue the self from being 
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condemned to complete isolation but rather it prevents the self from attaining 
adventurous self-identity. The action is the same: the fact that the consciousness can be 
attended, even if that attendant is itself, indicates that it has not fully attained self-
identity. The hound is a figure for selfsameness, the self become entirely self-defined, but 
as a figure it also preserves a difference about which the poem is of two minds. The 
persistence of relation is simultaneously a form of human resistance to the doom of 
eternal union and a condemnation to the doom of being attended, to the mortal state of 
relation. This ambivalence is also evident in the two meanings of “hound”: beloved 
familiar and persistent nuisance. The multiplication of identity that the hound represents 
protects the self from a poetically fatal dissolution, but it also blocks its fated, and 
perhaps wanted, apotheosis into singular being. As in statements of selfsameness that are 
both literal and figurative, the figure of the hound posits a silencing unitary identity (the 
self attended by the self), but (as either companion or pursuer) it simultaneously 
maintains the relational structures—about which the speaker is apparently uncertain—
that are the province of language. 
 Like the figure of the hound, other types of selfsameness are useful because they 
can sustain the tensions between garrulous variety and silent singularity that underlie 
Dickinson’s explorations of unrelatable abstractions like death, heaven, and love.37 
Joanne Feit Diehl praises the audacity of Dickinson’s figures in what she calls the “quest 
to ascertain the strength of the isolate imagination, her quest to discover what will suffice, 
if not prevail, against the forces of time, death, and silence” (“Ample” 9). However, 
Dickinson’s poems do not merely defend against leveling abstractions like time and 
death; they also show what Cameron calls a “desire for the temporal completion which 
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will fuse all separations into the healing of a unified whole” (Lyric 1). They figure the 
seduction of the very silencing singularity against which they also struggle. When read 
literally, statements of selfsameness push as close as they can to mystical, incomparable, 
unspeakable union because they assert complete self-identity and, thus, transcendence of 
language as a means of communicating experience. But this completion—the fusion 
effected by death, immortality, or love in many poems—is “liberated from the mortal 
encumbrances of both flesh and language” (3, emphasis added): as Cameron argues, one 
of the central problems of Dickinson’s work is the attempt to represent a fusion of self 
and other in language, which reflects and constitutes difference.
38
 The silence of pure 
identity is impossible to express fully in language, but claims of selfsameness approach 
as close as they can in words to the longed for undoing of language.  
And language is not just a lamentable necessity that will be shed upon 
transfiguration. Despite the mystical aspiration toward a unified identity that surpasses 
language by erasing difference between self and other, Dickinson’s poetry is also wary of 
the comprehensive expansion of one identity—whether the self or something outside it— 
to encompass all of experience. The careful admiration of adventuresome death in “This 
Consciousness that is Aware” disappears in a poem like “Silence is all we dread”: 
Silence is all we dread.  
There’s ransom in a Voice – 
But Silence is Infinity.  
Himself have not a face. (P1300) 
Voice is here posited as salvific, countering the loss of self that infinite, faceless silence 
threatens. While statements of selfsameness, when taken literally, seem to long for this 
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silence, selfsameness as a metaphor preserves one of the fundamental prerogatives of 
poetic language—the explanatory or revelatory power of comparison—even as it longs to 
abolish difference. As Jeffrey Duncan explains, Dickinson’s metaphors are characterized 
by a “double-motion”: “In the language of her poems [. . .] she depicts the divisions that 
language causes—between subject and object, for instance, the empirical and the ideal, 
life and death—and the identifications it simultaneously effects, of subject with object, 
the empirical with the ideal, death with life” (114). Metaphor depends on the “divisions 
that language causes”; it is through difference that the relations of language are possible. 
If the “identifications it simultaneously effects” overcome those distinctions, then 
language collapses into silence, life into death, and the multiplicity of empirical reality 
into the monolithic self of God. Metaphors of selfsameness can explore that collapse 
without themselves giving in to it and altogether abandoning poetic language as a means 
to understanding. In statements of selfsameness that are simultaneously literal and 
figurative, Dickinson’s poems have it both ways. Literal statements of selfsameness 
depict near-total unity and edge toward its silences by denying the relational power of 
language; read metaphorically, these statements affirm difference by relating a thing to 
itself. When taken literally, these statements invoke the wish to transcend speech; as 
figures they extend the reach of language, making it capable even of enacting the 
yearning for its own destruction. 
The simultaneous promise and risk of the erasure of difference have most often 
been understood in terms of Dickinson’s anxiety about sexual, especially heterosexual, 
relations. This anxiety is perhaps most explicit in Dickinson’s letters, where it is clear 
that the possibilities of erotic self-destruction are also inflected by Dickinson’s conflicted 
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relationship to silence. In an 1852 letter to Susan Gilbert, Dickinson famously describes 
“trembl[ing]” at the idea that she too may be “yielded up” to the destructively 
transfiguring force of marriage that Susan faces (L93). The feminized flower withers and 
is consumed by the sun, the “man of noon,” obliterated by the consummation it seeks. 
Many readers of this letter have focused on the fact that Dickinson appears to argue that 
sexual or marital union require the destruction of autonomy, often specifically feminine 
autonomy.
39
 Thus, Dickinson’s not marrying may be read as a victory over the dangers of 
unity and her metaphors of selfsameness as weapons in defense of feminine identity.
40
 
However, the letter ends with lines that indicate unity is more than just a threat to be 
overcome:  
God is good, Susie, I trust he will save you, I pray that in his good time we once 
more meet each other, but if this life holds not another meeting for us, remember 
also, Susie, that it had no parting more, wherever that hour finds us, for which we 
have hoped so long, we shall not be separated, neither death, nor the grave can 
part us, so that we only love!   
Though fear and resistance undercut the call for communion earlier in the letter, when 
Dickinson addresses her relationship with Susan, her ambivalence seems to be replaced 
by a more genuine entreaty for distinctions to be abolished in a final identification. In a 
letter written a few months after the “man of noon” letter, Dickinson still asks to be 
united with Susan even though she explicitly recognizes that this will make language not 
only impossible but unnecessary: 
 Susie, forgive me Darling, for every word I say – my heart is full of you, none 
other than you in my thoughts, yet when I seek to say to you something not for the 
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world, words fail me. If you were here – and Oh that you were, my Susie, we 
need not talk at all, our eyes would whisper for us, and your hand fast in mine, we 
would not ask for language. (94) 
Dickinson resists the silencing power of death, love, and eternity, but she also embraces 
that silence as a consequence of authentic being, a togetherness that cannot be 
accomplished by mortals embedded in the inescapable divisiveness of language. Still 
another of Dickinson’s letters, this one written to Emily Fowler Ford, attests that the 
silence surpassing language can only be achieved through true affection and oneness. The 
letter begins with a blank space to which Dickinson later refers: “That is’nt an empty 
blank where I began—it is so full of affection that you cant see any—that’s all” (L32).41 
Silence here is a measure of the depth of feeling. Empty space is offered as evidence of 
fullness of affection; by comparison, affection expressed in language is less full (or at 
least less fully expressed). As in the letter to Susan Gilbert, silence is proof that the 
distinction between beings has been dispelled by love, making language unnecessary. A 
silencing singularity is the ideal state of love and friendship. 
If silence is a sign of love, communion through such identification may be read as 
mystical, with silence as evidence of exceptional or even divine experiences. As such, it 
also indicates the insufficiency of language; Margaret Homans reads the silence 
Dickinson often attributes to communion between women as fatal to poetry. She 
understands metaphor in Dickinson’s poetry in terms of a sexual dynamic: metaphor is 
aligned with heterosexual hierarchies because it “preserves a relationship of distance and 
hierarchy between the two elements of a comparison while seeming to bring them 
together” (“Vision” 124). In contrast, “the poems about two women are characterized by 
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a lack of distance so complete that there is only one identity and one set of terms for the 
two figures. This rhetoric of sameness may be considered a form of metonymy but [it] 
points ultimately toward a lack of language” (124). Thus, Homans claims, relationships 
between subjects that are categorically the same (that is, both female) fail as metaphoric 
structures because they collapse difference, and “it is the overcoming of hierarchy, not 
the absence of it, that is conducive to poetry.”42 While this helps define the importance of 
a gendered subjectivity to experiences of difference and unity, it does not acknowledge 
the importance of selfsameness as a relational figure. If we read depictions of 
relationships between categorically identical elements not as metonymy but as 
metaphors, we can understand the destruction of identity risked in the encounter between 
women, between Queen and Queen (P596 and P693), not as merely the absence of 
hierarchy but a carefully inflected investigation of the necessity of difference. Here is an 
attraction for self-destruction that is removed from heterosexual dynamics of female 
sacrifice to an encompassing male identity. Poems that relate women to women, like 
other metaphors of selfsameness, do not merely assert self-sufficiency or extra-linguistic 
completeness; they make it possible to value difference without valuing hierarchy and to 
seek a perfection beyond language that does not depend on the subordination of one term 
of the relation to the other. The identification of woman with woman is literal: their 
sameness allows them equality and communion. However, as in other figures that relate 
selfsame terms, difference is also preserved by the relational structure of metaphor.  
 Indeed, though Dickinson advocates silence as a sign of understanding and 
communion, she does so in letters, inherently signs of separation between sender and 
receiver. Perhaps it is less risky to ask for the dissolution of identity with the buffer of 
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actual separation. And separation is, itself, its own kind of satisfaction. After all, as one 
aphoristic poem puts it, “A letter is a joy of Earth / It is denied the Gods –” (P1672). 
Letters are a specifically mortal joy; presumably they are no longer needed when one is 
unified with all of being, or even with a beloved. Dickinson’s poems frequently represent 
deferral of consummation as the key to desire, and union is often depicted as either 
thwarted by forces outside the speaker’s control or actively put off. In the poem 
beginning “I cannot live with You –,” the speaker details the reasons and ways that she 
and another must remain apart (P706). She can neither live nor die (“rise”) with the other. 
Finally, because being with the other would disturb and invert Christian cosmology—
making a hell of heaven or a heaven of hell, as it were—they must interpose a difference 
between themselves:  
So we must meet apart – 
You there – I – here – 
With just the Door ajar 
That Oceans are – and Prayer – 
And that White Sustenance – 
Despair –  
In this final stanza, joining with the other is not presented as impossible but, rather, 
something that must be denied the self. Speaker and beloved are near; even so, they 
“must meet apart.” The separating door is even ajar. This small, empty space—an open 
door frame—is oceans, prayer, and despair, and it is this very despair, the agony of 
difference, that sustains the speaker. 
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 This tension between the aspiration toward singular being and the mortal 
necessity of difference drives poems as early as Dickinson’s first known poem “Awake 
ye muses nine, sing me a strain divine” (P1). This is a valentine and treats the subject of 
the ubiquity of love: “Oh the Earth was made for lovers, for damsel, and hopeless swain, 
/ for sighing, and gentle whispering, and unity made of twain.” “[A]ll things” on the earth 
apparently participate in the process of courting, “the two, and then the one,” except for 
the unnamed “thou” of the poem who is the only thing in the world that God has made 
“single.” Even “death claims a living bride,” and Heaven is a “knight” courting the 
“damsel” Earth. Here, courting begins the process of making two into one; thus, death 
claims his bride by erasing the differences between her and himself, and Heaven seeks 
the same dissolution of Earth. The speaker of the poem calls this merging of two into one 
God’s “precept” and promises that “who obey shall happy be, / who will not serve the 
sovreign, be hanged on fatal tree.”43 Though the poem ostensibly seeks to convince its 
addressee of conjugal bliss, there is a lurking peril: there is no available choice that does 
not result in death. You must erase singular identity by joining with another—a kind of 
death—because it is mandated, and, if you resist that mandate, you will be executed. The 
last two lines explicitly link love to death; the poem’s “thou” is exhorted to choose a 
lover and, when that love is consummated in the “bower,” the speaker of the poem 
explains, the addressee will “bid the world Goodmorrow, and go to glory home!” Sexual 
or marital combining does not result in new life but in a farewell to the world and 
abandonment of life for a spiritual home. In this valentine, love, like heaven and death, 
promises the erasure of identity. This early playful poem is already grappling with the 
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longing for union and the resistance to its fatal completion that drives many of 
Dickinson’s major thematic, rhetorical, and formal concerns. 
 As literal statement, selfsameness teeters on the edge of resolving difference into 
singular identity by positing the self-sufficiency of certain things or experiences; 
however, as metaphor it preserves a division that permits the exploration of the 
consummation of death, immortality, and love without the erasure that these forces 
portend. In a sense, such metaphors create erotic sustainability, where longing, which is 
dependent on difference, can be maintained while the destruction of distinctions can be 
held at bay. The following poem argues for the unification of singular identities by 
claiming that the difference between the earthly and heavenly can be overcome: 
Out of sight? What of that?  
See the Bird – reach it! 
Curve by Curve – Sweep by Sweep –  
Round the Steep Air –  
Danger! What is that to Her? 
Better ’tis to fail – there –  
Than debate – here – 
 
Blue is Blue – the World through 
Amber – Amber – Dew – Dew –  
Seek – Friend – and see – 
Heaven is shy of Earth – that’s all –  
Bashful Heaven – thy Lovers small – 
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Hide – too – from thee – (P733) 
The poem exhorts its “Friend” to follow the example of the bird, though the task may be 
difficult, and to dare greatly in order to reach a goal. Though the goal appears far off, 
“out of sight,” in the first stanza, the reassurances of the second stanza suggest that the 
distance is not so great: between the friend and what he seeks is only shyness, which can 
be overcome by daring. “Blue is Blue,” read literally, closes that gap and argues for 
identity. The heavenly is attainable because it is the same as the earthly. The further 
iterations of that identity “Amber – Amber – Dew – Dew” even elide the nominal 
separation of the identifying verb, making a forceful formal argument for the proximity 
of the earthly to the heavenly. The literal reading of the statement “Blue is Blue” concurs 
with the poem’s attitude that the distances between seeker and thing sought can and 
should be erased through identity.  
But the assertion that “Blue is Blue – the world through / Amber – Amber – Dew 
– Dew –” does not only assure that things are themselves and thus heaven can be reached; 
it also risks the destruction of earthly identity, which is made possible by its difference 
from the heavenly. If “Blue is Blue,” then the world is “through,” finished, destroyed in 
its consummation with heaven. The final lines of the poem hint that neither heavenly nor 
earthly participants in this game of hide and seek are certain they want to find each other 
and be joined. Selfsameness, though an accomplishment to be sought after, destroys the 
individual and diverse existence of the world and, by extension, the voice of the poet who 
relates. The metaphorical reading of the claim “Blue is Blue” prevents such destruction 
because it creates separation and relation; one cannot say “Blue is Blue” without dividing 
Blue to serve as both noun and predicate nominative—a separation that fundamentally 
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undermines the assertion of unity and makes blue metaphorically blue as well as literally 
itself. For blue to be related to blue, it must be divided from itself. If heaven and earth 
can be shy of each other, then they must not be the same: they maintain their individual 
identities though the poem advocates reaching out and grasping the heavenly. The 
metaphor of selfsameness expresses a wish to merge the actual with the ideal while 
resisting the destruction that union brings. It can make comparison out of 
incomparability, relate the experience of unrelatability, and make poetry out of the threat 
of poetry’s destruction.  
 Dickinson’s use of selfsameness does not, however, simply replace literal 
selfsameness with figurative. Instead, selfsameness dramatizes an unresolved tension 
between literal claims to identity and the difference inherent in the figuration of 
metaphor. For example, “The Wind – tapped like a tired Man” (P621) ostensibly works 
by traditionally comparative figures, making the natural phenomenon of wind more 
comprehensible by personifying it. However, despite its opening assertion, the poem does 
not understand wind by comparison to human attributes but by comparison to the wind 
itself. The three middle stanzas of the poem use wind imagery to describe the behavior of 
the wind-guest: it is as impossible to offer the wind a chair as “hand / A Sofa to the 
Air −”; the incorporeal guest’s speech is “like the Push of numerous Humming Birds at 
once”; his face is compared to “a Billow” and the music of his fingers to “tunes / Blown 
tremulous in Glass – .” Though the wind is compared only to aspects of wind and air, the 
comparisons are not tautological, and they do not merely insist on wind’s 
incommunicable identity; instead, the poem’s figures rely on selfsameness to reject 
anthropomorphism and invite us more deeply to understand wind on its own terms. The 
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poem makes literally true assertions that wind is wind, and it also compares wind to 
wind. The figure comes away more windy than it started. For Dickinson, to say “a thing 
is itself” is both a denial of the power of language and an extension of it.  
 Similarly, syntactic doubling and identical rhyme are formal instances of 
selfsameness that underline the tension between singularity and difference.
44
 For 
instance, in the final stanza of “’Tis true – they shut me in the Cold – ” the speaker 
supplicates her “Lord” on behalf of those who have harmed her: “The Harm They did – 
was short – And since / Myself – who bore it – do – / Forgive Them – Even as Myself –” 
(P658). A paraphrase might read “Lord, the harm they did was short and, since I who 
bore the harm do forgive them, forgive them as I do (or, as you forgive me).” To 
paraphrase, one must repeat “forgive them” because it is a part of both the explanatory 
phrase, “And since / Myself – who bore it – do – / Forgive Them,” and of the prayer, 
“Forgive Them – Even as Myself – .” Spatially, this double semantic duty collapses two 
instances of the same phrase into one “Forgive Them,” but grammatically their separate 
meanings are maintained by the phrases that come before and after them. The structure of 
the poem overlaps the two, making them literally the same, while preserving the 
difference between the identical phrases through semantic pressures. The meanings of 
“Forgive Them” are exclusive; to read them, each must be alternately absorbed into the 
other. Yet, they can still be simultaneously and individually heard. Such collapsed 
phrases serve the same purpose at the level of syntax as selfsameness does at the figural 
level: they allow a deeper exploration of communion and sameness while preventing the 
dissolution into silence, the oneness that precludes analysis.  
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 Selfsameness echoes tensions already thematically present in the poem, but it also 
creates an ironic formal counterpoint to relatively straightforward themes or attitudes. In 
“Of Death I try to think like this” (P1588), metaphorical selfsameness, or identity that 
preserves difference, formally resists the singularity of death even as the speaker seems to 
celebrate it: 
Of Death I try to think like this, 
That Well in which they lay us 
Is but the Likeness of the Brook 
That menaced not to slay us,  
But to invite by that Dismay 
Which is the Zest of sweetness 
To the same Flower Hesperian, 
Decoying but to greet us – 
 
I do remember when a Child 
With bolder Playmates straying 
To where a Brook that seemed a Sea 
Withheld us by it’s roaring 
From just a Purple Flower beyond 
Until constrained to clutch it 
If Doom itself were the result, 
The boldest leaped, and clutched it –  
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The speaker begins with a mental experiment; she tries to think of death as a brook that 
separates a child from a flower, making death the overestimated force (“a Brook that 
seemed a Sea”) that prevents the seeker from grasping the thing sought. Dickinson 
frequently figures death as a border between mortal life and a more desirable afterlife, but 
here formal elements, especially rhyme, undermine the vision of death as a minor 
obstacle to be hurtled in the victorious attainment of immortality’s rewards. Though the 
poem hints at the possibility of “Doom” for the child who dares to leap the brook, it ends 
with the boldest child’s success in gaining what she seeks, the “Purple Flower.” The 
poem’s rhymes, however, create a counterpoint to the triumph of the child.  
 For words to rhyme perfectly they must be both different and similar; their final 
accented vowel sounds and subsequent consonants must match, and their initial sounds 
must differ. If we consider the form of the words to be reflective and constitutive of their 
content, then to rhyme a word with another not only demonstrates the similarities and 
differences between the sounds of the words but between what the words mean. Just so, 
the first rhyming pair of the poem, “lay us” and “slay us,” emphasizes the difference 
between the tenderness of “lay us” and the violence of “slay us” but also establishes an 
anxious similarity between the two conceptualizations of death; it is, after all, only a tiny 
“s” that separates them. But the final rhyme of the poem, “clutch it” and “clutched it,” 
approaches identity. The selfsameness of the rhyme reminds us that the child’s victory is 
also her doom; she has leaped the stream of death, but clutching the flower precludes the 
possibility for further wanting, for that “zest of sweetness” separation allowed. It is no 
coincidence that a poem ending in the consummation of this life with the next concludes 
with near identical rhyme. The rhyme of “clutch” with “clutch” insists that, when 
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consummation with the next life is accomplished and earthly discord and difference are 
resolved, the complex beauty of difference, embodied in both the exact rhymes and off 
rhymes that play on the edge of unification but do not submit to it, is dissolved into the 
deadness of repetition. The poem cannot, as it sets out to “try,” entirely celebrate leaping 
the brook of death, and the final rhyme’s selfsameness preserves the menace of that leap. 
However, neither can the form of the poem allow the erasure of difference that it warns 
about. Though “clutch it” and “clutched it” are almost referentially and aurally identical, 
difference is still preserved by the change in tense and the disruptive tap of the “ed” 
interposed in the otherwise identical rhyme. Thus, selfsameness, both literal and 
metaphorical, allows the speaker of the poem to stand on the brink of doom, to 
contemplate what it might mean to end the tension of separation that makes poetry 
possible, even to mimic that final consummation of death into silence while still 
preserving the noisy differences of life.
45
 
 Statements of selfsameness that are both literal and figurative are one of the many 
strategies that Dickinson employs to negotiate this central tension in her work, and their 
precise balance between silence and linguistic relation is emblematic of Dickinson’s 
fidelity to the complexities of human experience. Her poetry is multifarious and often 
contradictory, and it would be an oversimplification to claim that a simultaneously literal 
and metaphorical reading of statements of selfsameness solves the riddle of Dickinson’s 
conflicted relationship to the pressures of love, death, and eternity or the unrelatability of 
experience. In fact, one of Dickinson’s most troubling later poems suggests that 
metaphors of selfsameness do not always prevent the silences of self-sufficiency:   
To see the Summer Sky 
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Is Poetry, though never in a Book it lie – 
True Poems flee – (P1491) 
At this late moment, the inexpressibility of the summer sky seems to elude the 
communicative work of metaphor entirely and to endanger the whole project of poetry by 
aligning truth itself with an incomparable, unrelatable, fleeting vision; here, the self-
sufficiency of experience is literal, and no metaphor of selfsameness preserves the 
tension between singularity and multiplicity, silence and language. This mystical strain— 
the authority of unmediated experience and the wish to keep such experience 
undiscovered—is at the center of Dickinson’s poetics. But, as the sheer volume and 
complexity of her work attests, she cannot ultimately abandon the drive to try, again and 
again, to stretch the capacity of language for expressing the inexpressible. The poem 
beginning “To tell the Beauty would decrease” articulates the finely balanced poise 
between mystical and pioneering poetics that makes Dickinson’s poetry so important for 
twentieth-century women writers seeking their own way both to dispel and maintain the 
silences that shape their experiences as women and as poets: 
To tell the Beauty would decrease 
To state the spell demean 
There is a syllableless Sea 
Of which it is the sign 
My will endeavors for it’s word 
And fails, but entertains 
A Rapture as of Legacies 
Of introspective mines – (P1689) 
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The first four lines indicate that language—telling and stating—diminishes beauty. They 
argue for the insufficiency of words and the sacrosanctity of silence; they recognize the 
limits of language and allow a space for otherness to remain unincorporated into the self. 
In the mystic mode, the speaking self necessarily fails in its endeavor to find words: 
“Beauty”—itself unspeakable without dilution—is the sign of a “syllableless Sea” that 
not only should not but cannot be told. But the final four lines admit to the value and 
pleasure of this failure, the rapture of the endeavor, and the pioneering push of the will 
that digs deep in the mines of the self and seeks the legacy of that digging. Even the first 
four lines of the poem, though they declare language diminishing, are haunted by the 
endeavor for the word: the thing that is demeaned by statement is called a “spell,” and the 
“syllableless Sea” flaunts its sibilant syllables, insisting on its own linguistic materiality. 
However doomed to failure, the will to language persists.  
 
Notes
 
1
 Homans discusses two main difficulties in claiming poetic identity or agency for 
women writers in the nineteenth century: “Her association with nature and her exclusion 
from a traditional identification of the speaking subject as male” (Women Writers 12). 
She argues that “where the masculine self dominates and internalizes otherness, that other 
is frequently identified as feminine, whether she is nature, the representation of a human 
woman, or some phantom of desire.” She also claims that identification with “Mother 
Nature” is not a helpful model of creativity for women because “she is prolific 
biologically, not linguistically, and she is as destructive as she is creative” (13). I agree 
with Homans when I argue that complete identification with nature would silence 
Dickinson as a poet. However, I contend that Dickinson’s identification with nature is a 
creative one because her formal innovations take advantage of the prolixity of nature 
while simultaneously maintaining her status as a speaking subject.   
 
2
 Dickinson poems are cited according to their number in Franklin’s 1998 
variorum edition, abbreviated P. Letters are cited according to their number in Johnson’s 
1968 three-volume edition of the letters, abbreviated L. The idiosyncracies of 
Dickinson’s spelling and mechanics (such as “it’s” for “its”) have been maintained as 
they are in Franklin’s versions. 
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3
 While replacing “What we See” with “Heaven” would suggest a mistrust of 
sense perception because it rejects the concrete and human in favor of the abstract and 
divine, the relationship between “What we Hear” and “Harmony” is less decidable. 
Harmony could describe a more rich and complex but still humanly perceptible aural 
experience, but it could also name a superhuman sound, as in the harmony of the spheres, 
or the abstract notion of harmony, as in correspondence or unity. Thus, the second stanza 
may repeat the logic of the first by preferring the heavenly to the earthly, but it may 
instead, or in addition, argue that complex, artful sensory experiences are preferable to 
simple ones.  
 
4
 Some have argued that Dickinson’s characteristic form is derived from the hymn 
measure used in the ubiquitous Watts hymnal; see especially Johnson (Biography) and 
England. Others claim that her use of common measure—quatrains of alternating four- 
and three-stress lines, frequently rhymed xaxa—could have been inspired by other 
sources, such as the British Romantics or popular ballads; see especially Small. 
 
5
 In a variant, breaks that Franklin calls “physical line divisions”—line breaks that 
appear to be dictated by the physical limitations of the page rather than by prosody—
emphasize the tension between certainty and uncertainty about the ability of human 
senses and human language to define or describe nature. These breaks highlight the 
question underlying the poem’s declarative beginning, foregrounding the question—
“Nature is what”—contained within the statement that “Nature is what we See.” The new 
line “Nay – Nature is” also draws attention to the self-sufficiency and incomparability of 
nature by separating it from the comparator terms “Heaven” and “Harmony.”  
 
6
 As I explore in Chapter IV, Gwendolyn Brooks also employs traditional forms 
and recognizable rhythms to emphasize linguistic artfulness, often, as Dickinson does 
here, to create a counterpoint to an apparent rejection of artifice. 
 
7
 Lavinia and Austin Dickinson both answered gossip about their sister’s 
withdrawal from society by insisting that she suffered no great tragedy or loss and that 
her pronounced reticence was, as Lavinia put it in a letter to Caroline Dall, “only a 
happen” (Bingham, Brocades 319). 
 
8
 As I discuss in Chapter III, Lorine Niedecker, like Dickinson, led a relatively 
isolated life characterized by limited sociality paired with prolific correspondence. For 
both women, letters appear to have been the primary means of forging and sustaining 
intimate—and highly linguistic—interpersonal connections without endangering the 
silences and solitude that each saw as necessary to her poetry. 
 
9
 See also Juhasz, Cody, Eberwein, and Hagenbüchle. 
 
10
 See especially Winters and Aiken for examples of critical condescension. 
 
11
 Mulvihill is referring specifically to Dickinson’s refusal to title her poems.  
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12
 The phrase “Capacity to Terminate” is from P1238, which begins “To make 
Routine a Stimulus.” 
 
13
 Wolosky argues that when Dickinson appears to conform to proscriptive 
notions of femininity, she exaggerates them so heavily that they are implicitly criticized. 
While I am sympathetic to this view, especially regarding Dickinson’s posing as girlishly 
innocent or as the daisy at the feet of her master, it does not account for the ways that her 
genuine personal reticence and even some of the peculiarities of her style are consistent 
with nineteenth-century gender norms. Austin Dickinson listed his sister’s occupation as 
“At Home” on her death certificate, and I’m not certain she would have amended such a 
description (Martin 82). 
 
14
 See especially Dobson’s discussion of “Nonconforming Writers” (22-25). 
 
15
 The cultural script for women was full of gaps, silences, and taboos. Some of 
those taboos are unsurprising—sex and desire, strong negative feelings like anger or 
hatred, ambition in traditionally masculine spheres—but an episode recorded in 
Dickinson’s letters illustrates the range of subjects that might be considered unspeakable 
to a respectable woman: “Austin and I were talking the other Night about the Extension 
of Consciousness, after Death and Mother told Vinnie, afterward, she thought it was 
‘very improper’” (L650). 
 
16
 Sewall argues that reticence was a family, regional, and religious trait 
compounded in Dickinson as a poetic trait. “In Emily’s family it [reticence] extended to 
all things personal [. . .]. Indeed, it may have been at the heart of the family problem, 
which in turn may have been at the heart of the latter-day Puritan problem, when human 
nature, failing to meet the rigorous demands of the pristine discipline, began to hide its 
inadequacies behind smooth surfaces” (Life 41). 
 
17
 For the Puritan, total assurance about one’s election to the body of Christ could 
only come after death despite a lifetime of spiritual self-investigation, public proofs, and 
declarations of faith. While Dickinson’s speakers are often flippant when they address the 
Judeo-Christian God explicitly, they too defer true knowledge about the state of the soul 
until after death. However, unlike the Puritan, Dickinson the poet creates speakers 
capable of posthumous address, thus taking on an authority about the soul’s state 
impossible to more orthodox seekers. See Deihl’s Women Poets and the American 
Sublime for a discussion of what she calls Dickinson’s proleptic poetics.  
 
18
 Packer singles out Coleridge’s distinction between reason and understanding as 
attractive and influential to early Trancendentalists, but her discussion recalls the Puritan 
doctrine that God’s ways are beyond human understanding at least as much as it suggests 
Transcendentalist mysticism: “Of course religious concepts like the Trinity, the 
Atonement, and Original Sin appear contradictory to the Understanding; they are spiritual 
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doctrines rather than natural ones and must of necessity appear absurd to the faculty 
devoted to judging the natural world” (354). 
 
19
 In P436 the speaker claims “I found the word to every thought / I ever had – but 
One − .” As in P1725, experiences of human origin—like thoughts and gladness—are 
more accessible to language than powers or experiences that originate in something other 
than the self—like “Force,” nature, or eternity.    
 
20
 Wolosky argues that Dickinson “works within an inherited system of figural 
representation. Its remote origins in Puritan America, urging a figural encoding of events 
in nature, history, and the self as signs, or types, for ultimate things, could be felt 
especially in the habits of orthodox, ante-bellum Amherst [. . .]. The figural or 
typological impulse did not simply die in the nineteenth-century.” I agree that 
Dickinson’s poetics is to some degree an outgrowth of Puritan attitudes; however, it is 
not only figuration that Dickinson inherits but a simultaneous mistrust of figures for 
divine truths. While Wolosky claims that Dickinson’s doubts about “interpretive 
coherence” and her sense that “the world may resist interpretation” align her with more 
modern poets (447), I argue that this doubt is also inherent in the very nineteenth-century 
figural system against which Wolosky positions it. 
 
21
 See Packer’s chapter on the “Unitarian Beginnings” of Transcendentalism in 
the Cambridge History of American Literature.  
 
22
 This conflict is not only the problem of a heretic fringe; it is in fact embedded 
in the logic of Puritanism itself.  
 
23
 However, as I discuss in Chapter I, Thoreau expressed scorn for those who 
believed they could find out the meanings of the scripture. 
 
24
 Her claim that as a girl she dismissed words as weak and only later learned their 
power is somewhat disingenuous. Though Sewall’s biography of Dickinson argues that 
language became increasingly important to her, he also demonstrates that “she rejoiced in 
the sheer thrill of words wonderfully put together” from her earliest letters and 
throughout her life: “In the beginning was the Word has been said of her, and rightly. 
When she was fifteen she wrote Abiah Root, thanking her for a letter, ‘At every word I 
read I seemed to feel new strength.’ Many statements and certainly the practice of her 
later years indicate that the particularizing of ‘every word’ was not casual. ‘A Word is 
inundation, when it comes from the Sea.’ ‘You need the balsam word,’ she wrote to her 
bereaved cousins. ‘How lovely are the wiles of Words!’ she exclaimed to Mrs. Holland. 
Some such enthusiasm was surely behind her remark that for several years in the late 
1850s her ‘Lexicon’ was her only companion. As late as 1883, thanking Mrs. Holland for 
her ‘full sweetness, to which as to a Reservoir the smaller Waters go,’ she paused to say, 
‘What a beautiful Word “Waters” is!’” (675). 
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25
 Cameron’s influential Choosing/Not Choosing is emblematic of how crucial the 
concept of Dickinson’s writing as balanced between multiplicity and singularity has been. 
But earlier criticism like Weisbuch’s 1979 Emily Dickinson’s Poetry shares a picture of 
Dickinson’s work as determined by its movements between the particularities of 
individual experience and the leveling forces of abstraction, and more recent scholarship 
has often maintained this focus. In 2000, Alfrey, describing Dickinson’s revisions of the 
romantic sublime, explains that she utilizes a feminine intersubjectivity to encounter 
inexpressible otherness fully while resisting domination by it (56-57). Von der Heydt 
considers how Dickinson’s nature poetry uses spatiality, especially the experience of the 
shoreline, to counterpoise “her power with sensuously satisfying objects [. . .] to her 
encounter with oblivion” (105).  
 
26
 Poems listed here are P753, P425, P764, P1079, and P161. Each of these 
figures is itself the subject of study in contemporary investigations of language and 
thought; the term “metaphor” often refers to a particular kind of metaphorical expression 
composed of a subject and predicate nominative, but it also refers to the entire class of 
figures of speech “in which a word or phrase is shifted from its normal uses to a context 
where it evokes new meanings” (“Metaphor”). Further, in contemporary metaphor 
theory, “metaphor” also often refers to relational thought processes themselves, which 
Lakoff calls “cross-domain mappings,” and not only to the language in which they are 
expressed (“Contemporary” 203). I begin by using “metaphor” in its larger sense as a 
cognitive process, but my analysis will focus on its linguistic instantiation in 
metaphorical expressions. Though the differences between strict metaphorical 
expressions (non-literal statements composed of a subject and predicate nominative, also 
called “nominative metaphors”) and figures like simile and synecdoche are significant, 
my focus here is on the basic structure that unites them: the play of similarity and 
difference that makes them meaningful as figures. 
 
27
 Weisbuch reads Dickinson’s poems not as records of particular completed 
thoughts but as instances of thought in action, which is, for him, analogical or 
comparative in nature. Similarly, Freeman focuses on metaphor as the fundamental 
feature of Dickinson’s work. She uses conceptual metaphor theory to claim that 
Dickinson’s poems are built on structural schematics that are metaphorical extensions of 
basic human experience. Sharon-Zisser also claims metaphor as structurally central to 
Dickinson’s poetics, ultimately reading her use of metaphor as metalinguistic 
commentary on the power of language itself. Cameron suggests that the “characteristic 
Dickinson angle” is comparative and that the difficulty facing Dickinson’s comparisons 
is their need to comprehend both incomprehensible abstraction and “the particularities of 
the temporal world” (Lyric 5). Feminist scholars have been particularly interested in the 
gendered implications of metaphor in Dickinson’s work. Juhasz and Barker have argued 
that Dickinson’s metaphors are strategic revisions of a culture that did not cultivate 
poetry in women or the feminine in poetry. Juhasz argues that Dickinson uses metaphor 
to create a feminine linguistic space, a counter to masculine speech predicated on the 
silence of the other, where communication between subjects is possible (“Adventures”). 
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Barker reads light as the structuring metaphor for Dickinson’s relationship to her family, 
her art, her culture, her body, divinity, sexuality, love, and eternity. 
 
28
 Hagenbüchle argues that Dickinson’s dominant poetic structure is metonymy 
rather than metaphor. Because she wishes to preserve the fundamental mystery of 
experience, Dickinson favors inferential rather than comparative figures. I agree with 
Hagenbüchle that Dickinson’s poetry is marked by a respect for inexpressibility. 
However, where he claims that Dickinson’s poetry develops toward metonymy in order 
to avoid the “stated relationship of equivalence in metaphor,” I focus on Dickinson’s 
strategies for evoking the inexpressible through metaphor itself (36). Though we agree 
that Dickinson’s poetry tends toward silence, mystery, and absence, I focus on metaphor 
because it is in comparative figures that the desire for the self-sufficiency of experience is 
most in tension with the desire for linguistic expression that Hagenbüchle also recognizes 
as inherent in poetic work: “As a ‘musicienne du silence,’ [. . .] Dickinson could not 
function as a poet; so she tries by stylistic means to approximate this ideal as closely as 
possible” (40). Metonymy may allow Dickinson to approximate the ideal of silence, but it 
is through metaphor that she holds silence most dramatically in tension with poetic 
speech.  
 
29
 Cody claims that Dickinson’s use of metaphor, especially metaphors for 
sexuality, is part of a smoke-and-mirrors act, a diversion from the truth of her fears and 
anxieties. In The Art of Emily Dickinson’s Early Poetry, Porter initially reads Dickinson’s 
use of analogical figures as a record of the mind’s negotiations between the physical and 
the spiritual, the actual and the ideal. But in his revisionary later study, Dickinson: The 
Modern Idiom, he argues that Dickinson’s metaphors are a closed referential system, 
divorced from the world of shared lived experience; they become a solipsistic record not 
of the human mind’s figuring capacity but of Emily Dickinson’s mind, fully interpretable 
only by Dickinson herself and decodable only by a literary forensics that resurrects the 
distant metonymic forefathers of her most mystifying metaphors and dusts their bones for 
clues.  
 
30
 Though Dickinson’s figurative language has frequently been accused of failure 
in that it allows the poems (and their readers) to ignore or dismiss important political 
realities like the abolitionist struggle and the Civil War, recent work by scholars like 
Richards and Barrett suggests that Dickinson’s figures may have a wider political reach 
than previously understood. Similarly, feminist scholars have read Dickinson’s supposed 
obliquity as an invaluable technique for claiming authority: see especially Juhasz, Barker, 
Eberwein, and Rich for sustained feminist treatments of Dickinson’s strategic withdrawal 
from reference. 
 
31
 While there are competing theories about how exactly metaphor works, most 
confirm the traditional two-term structure. Long-standing conceptions hold that 
metaphorical language is a type of rhetorical flourish, useful for illumination of difficult 
or novel concepts but ultimately interpreted in terms of its accuracy in reflecting real 
similarities between what it compares. In this view, metaphor simply makes it easier to 
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perceive a previously existing, objective similarity between a familiar object or concept 
and a less familiar one (Johnson, “Introduction” 24-25). The major strains of 
contemporary metaphor theory disagree with many of the basic assumptions of classical 
metaphor theory, most importantly that metaphor is only linguistic and that it works 
through similarity. Black’s interaction theory claims that metaphor is not a unidirectional 
picking out of properties, where the characteristics of a well-known thing help us to see 
that another thing has those same characteristics, but a bidirectional interaction between 
both of the compared objects or experiences that is at least partially constitutive of the 
perceived similarities and differences between the analysands (72-77). In Lakoff and 
Johnson’s formulation of embodied cognition, conceptual metaphor is the process by 
which our cognitively basic bodily experiences, like motion through space, temperature, 
and object manipulation, are extended to less direct experiences, like time, human 
relationships, and thinking itself, and constitute the very ways we understand and reason 
about those experiences. Glucksberg and Keysar’s categorization theory argues that 
metaphor works by the inclusion of the tenor in a category synechdocally represented by 
the vehicle. Though these theories are fundamentally opposed on many counts, they all 
view metaphor as comparative in the sense that it involves an interaction of some kind 
between distinct domains. Katz’s “Review” is an excellent overview of the development 
of metaphor theory in the twentieth century. See also Gibbs and Lakoff. 
 
32
 Even in a poem that posits self-reckoning as true knowing, singularity is in 
tension with multiplicity: love is like love alone, but it is also like the sun in its very 
incomparability or selfsameness. 
 
33
 Deppman explores how even Dickinson’s definition poems (often dismissed as 
giving in to terminal vagueness or admissions of undefinability) use indirection, 
complication, contradiction, and paradox to explain and analyze, not merely gesture 
toward, confusion or unknowability (“Change”). 
 
34
 Examples of love’s reckoning: P287, P442, P325; Death’s: P704, P166, P644, 
P426; Eternity’s: P302, P457, P720; Grief’s: P753.  
 
35
 At least thirteen poems make self into “ourself”: P282, P337, P354, P369, 
P392, P407, P518, P522, P544, P600, P740, P1000, P1061. In the poem beginning “One 
need not be a Chamber,” the memorable line “Ourself behind Ourself concealed” makes 
the division and doubling of the self startlingly corporeal (P407).  
 
36
 Dickinson also frequently uses other –self pronouns: “itself,” “myself,” 
“themself.” These are sometimes used like “ourself” to create both unity and separation, 
but, as unambiguously singular pronouns, “itself” and “myself” do not demonstrate as 
forcefully the simultaneous multiplicity (our) and unity (self) that draws Dickinson. 
“Themself” is both multiple and singular, but, as a third-person pronoun, does not as 
clearly implicate the speaker or presiding consciousness of the poem in its identity 
pranks. 
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37
 In Trying to Think with Emily Dickinson, Deppman argues that Dickinson’s 
poetry is intellectually driven and not solely, or even primarily, a poetry of feeling. I 
would add that metaphors of selfsameness are a powerful tool in the service of such an 
intellectual drive; the tensions that they are suited to sustain are a part of the complex 
philosophical, theological, epistemological, and ontological work that Dickinson’s poems 
“try to think.”  
 
38
 See especially Chapter 4, “The Mourning That is Language.” 
 
39
 Homans’s description of this loss of autonomy as “sacrifice” is characteristic of 
critical treatments of the dominant tropes in the “man of noon” letter (Women 175-76). 
 
40
 Martin argues that the Victorian feminine ideal of selflessness, taken to the 
extreme by Dickinson, becomes a kind of mystical union where lines between self and 
world are erased. If mystical union is part of the logic of self-sacrificial care-giving, this 
may be another reason for ambivalence to such erasure of self. 
 
41
 Erkilla reads these letters to Sue and to Emily Fowler as representative of 
Dickinson’s special communication with women, a “speaking among women that cannot 
be heard and thus cannot be interrupted by the potentially dangerous ‘ear’ of a listening 
(male) world” (24-31). In contrast, I argue that what makes this communication special is 
that it is not speaking.  
 
42
 Homans goes on to identify strategies in Dickinson’s death poems as more 
effectively overcoming hierarchy than poems about relationships between women, in 
which hierarchy is merely absent. 
 
43
 This imagery also hints at the crucifixion of Christ and implies that his sacrifice 
may have been a punishment for separating himself from God. 
 
44
 Deppman also points out the importance of form to Dickinson’s “thematic 
obsession with things that refuse to reveal themselves to her” (Trying 7). 
 
45
 The line breaks and emendations in the manuscript version of this poem further 
utilize metaphors of selfsameness to undermine the achievement of final unity. Line 15 is 
broken in the middle, leaving “If Doom itself” to emphasize the relationship of self-
sufficiency to Doom. And, though I have not been able to see the poem in manuscript, 
Franklin’s variorum edition indicates that line 7, “The same Flower Hesperian,” is written 
“flower Flower Hesperian,” interrupting the rhythm of the poem to insist on and 
simultaneously question the unified and unifying identity of death’s flower by doubly 
representing it. It may be that Franklin has correctly chosen to view this doubling as an 
error and that he is right to delete it from even the variorum edition. However, to my 
mind, the repetition of “flower” too conveniently reinforces the effects of other formal 
and thematic elements in the poem to be merely a mistake.  
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The fact that Dickinson’s manuscripts often supply variants or, perhaps more 
accurately, simultaneous multiple possibilities (at once chosen and not chosen in 
Cameron’s terms), suggests that the rhetorical power of establishing tension between 
unity and multiplicity through both attempting and undermining selfsameness is vital to 
Dickinson’s work. 
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CHAPTER III 
SHACKLE AND FLOOD:  
LORINE NIEDECKER AND CONNECTIVE LANGUAGE 
Jane Knox’s biography of Lorine Niedecker, published in 1987 by the Dwight 
Foster Public Library in Fort Atkinson, Wisconsin, begins with an epigraph from one of 
Niedecker’s long poems, “Wintergreen Ridge.” Contemporary critics often defend 
Niedecker’s work from what they see as an imprecise popular view of Niedecker as a 
regional nature poet, and one might expect Knox’s biography, published for a local 
audience invested in identifying Niedecker with her Wisconsin home, to sketch just such 
a picture. But, instead of the “horsetails” and “club mosses” everywhere available in 
“Wintergreen Ridge,” Knox chooses these more abstract lines to begin her biography:  
Nobody, nothing  
         ever gave me   
                  greater thing  
 
than time  
         unless light  
                  and silence  
 
which if intense  
         makes a sound (253)
 1
 
Nature, especially the flora and fauna of her native Black Hawk Island, figures largely in 
Lorine Niedecker’s poems as subject matter, but the lines that Knox chooses speak to 
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Niedecker’s style instead of her subject. Indeed, the phrase “silence // which if intense / 
makes a sound,” could be considered an ars poetica. These lines point to a central 
dualism in Niedecker’s work: Niedecker’s silences are intense, but the condensation of 
her language also brings individual words, both their meaning and music, into a 
resounding clarity. Niedecker’s poems are quiet; they are spare, careful, often oblique, 
and their short lines and small stanzas usually leave them surrounded by the silence of 
white space. But the language of these concise acts of expression is rich with sound: 
affective alliterations and complex verbal music, snippets of speech, the noise of animal 
life, and the babble of languages invoked by Niedecker’s play with etymology. This 
opposition indelibly marks Niedecker’s poetry, particularly her explorations of poetic 
form. She often described herself as pulled between competing aesthetic modes—a 
concision approaching silence and a delight in language—and her formal innovations 
were a means of negotiating between or reconciling these alternatives.  
Lorine Niedecker is better known for reticence than garrulousness; in fact, in 
“Poet’s Work,” she herself characterized the poet as one who learns “to sit at desk / and 
condense” (194). Much of Niedecker’s work supports the notion that she labored in a 
poetic “condensery,” distilling profuse ordinary language into its more precise poetic 
essence. But, though a poem like “Something in the water” confirms the importance of 
silence, even in its extreme terseness language flourishes: 
Something in the water 
like a flower 
will devour 
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water 
 
flower 
2
 
The poem is cryptic, briefly signaling an unnamed “something” that “will devour.” The 
information the poem provides about its purported subject, “something in the water,” is 
strictly circumscribed. While the simile, “like a flower,” evokes an aquatic blossom, the 
only certain thing is that the “something” is not a flower; it is only like one. Further, 
because of the grammatical ambiguity of the first three lines, the phrase “like a flower” 
could apply to the noun “something,” the prepositional phrase “in the water,” or the verb 
“devour.” Thus, the something could simply be like a flower, it could be located in the 
water like a flower, or it could devour like a flower does. In this final instance, the 
isolated nouns of the last two lines, “water” and “flower,” may be the things that a 
flower, and by analogy the “something,” devours. But they may also simply be ambient 
description, setting the scene for the action of the first three lines. Ultimately, the poem 
undermines its own sparse imagery, suggesting a devouring but refusing to articulate 
exactly what devours what. This fecund confusion depicts fundamental natural 
relationships—like those between plant and water—as dangerous, interpenetrative, and 
involving a “something” unavailable to the observer’s language. 
Formal silences—particularly brevity and omission—are crucial to the poem’s 
treatment of this ineffable interaction. Brevity here works primarily to short-circuit 
linguistic connections. The shortness of the individual lines separates the objects of the 
poem, interrupting the linkages that syntax effects. The phrase “Something in the water 
like a flower will devour” establishes grammatical relationships, however uncertain, but 
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the curtness of the lines suppresses those interactions in favor of self-contained phrases. 
This brevity also creates more white space—emphasized by the extra spaces surrounding 
the final single-word lines—which visually separates the individual lines of the poem, 
pulling against the relationships implied by the sense of the words. The effect of these 
silences is to shield “something,” “flower,” and “water” from impinging language, 
creating a countercurrent of stubbornly isolate identity amidst the poem’s interpolations. 
Like brevity, strategic omissions deny connections, but they also create them. The poem 
refuses to provide narrative context that might clarify the significance of its images, and 
it omits the conjunctions and punctuation that would integrate its short lines into a 
sentence with determinate grammar and meaning. This elides the particular relationships 
that such context and grammar would establish, but it also makes various, mutually 
exclusive interactions possible. Any punctuation would inevitably limit the possible 
readings of the poem, resolving at least some of the uncertainty. For instance, even the 
simple addition of a final period would convert the poem into a single sentence, requiring 
the integration of “water” and “flower” into the grammar of the previous phrase, 
foreclosing the possibility that they exist independently. And certainly, the inclusion of 
conjunctions or prepositions, especially in the final two lines, would more strictly 
delineate the proliferating meanings. The poem excludes these elements, silencing 
important relational functions of language like subordination and coordination and 
leaving the interactions between its objects indeterminate. The effect of omissions that 
allow multiple readings is similar to concision that works against linguistic interaction: 
they refuse to say what the mysterious “something” is, leaving it to float beside “flower” 
and “water” in a wash of malleable connections.  
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However, though the principal uncertainty of the poem depends on strategic 
silences, the result of that uncertainty is a focus on the free play of language and its 
musicality; the very abundance of meanings achieved through brevity and omission 
reveals the copiousness of even the most restricted language. When narrative context, 
conjunctions, and punctuation are excised, the connections they effect are not. 
Additionally, the destabilization of the syntax and grammar disassociates the words from 
their usual communicative functions and foregrounds instead their musical qualities. 
Unmoored from descriptive or argumentative purpose, the rocking, loosely iambic 
rhythm of the lines is more easily perceptible. The rhythm counters the isolating effect of 
the line breaks because each line ends with an unstressed syllable and begins with a 
stressed syllable, implying a rhythmic continuity. Rhyme furthers this musical unity. 
While the possible meanings proliferate, fully half of the words sound a single dominant 
rhyme: “flower” rhymes with both “devour” and “water,” linking them in a structural 
similarity that forms a counterpoint to the poem’s multiplicity of meanings. Language 
serves here to work against the dissolution of the discrete object by creating a unified 
musical identity, and yet that very music crosses the boundaries of individual words. 
Even where silences are clearly paramount, Niedecker relishes the possibilities of 
language. Brevity and omission work in this poem to limit the impositions of language, 
but they also allow the poet’s language to come into its own. The poetic properties of 
language here dramatize the predominant conflict of the poem between a world in which 
individual identities—something, water, flower—remain separate and yet are inextricably 
and inexplicably linked, nourishing and devouring one another.  
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Opposing allegiances to silence and sound are a driving force in Niedecker’s 
poetry that is often obscured by too narrow a focus on her biography and subject matter. 
But Knox’s choice to address this conflicted relationship, rather than Niedecker’s family 
ties or her observations of the natural world, reminds us that Niedecker has always had 
astute readers, attentive to her formal choices. Though she lived and wrote in relative 
obscurity, such readers have succeeded in establishing a place for her, if belated and 
somewhat tenuous, in the American poetry canon. In her 1992 Kenyon Review article 
“Lorine Niedecker the Anonymous,” Rachel Blau DuPlessis casts Niedecker as a literary 
outsider:  
She is unknown. She is therefore erased. Every time she is mentioned, she must 
be re-introduced. Proposed as a value. Re-explained. Unerased—a curious process 
in critical construction. These moves mean that a lack-luck aura of victim will 
hang over the writer; she becomes pathetic, a welfare case. (99) 
However, in 2006, when the article was reprinted by DuPlessis in Blue Studios, this 
statement of Niedecker’s critical invisibility had been dropped. Several important 
publications have contributed to the realization of Lorine Niedecker’s importance to 
twentieth-century American poetry.
3
 Unlike early reviewers and critics, who often 
characterized Niedecker’s poetry as charming but small, unconsciously perceptive but 
intellectually passive, new work on Niedecker takes for granted that she is a mature, self-
aware poet with a fully developed aesthetic that is responsive to and influential on 
American poetics more generally.
4
 In particular, critics are reevaluating Niedecker’s 
influence on late twentieth-century experimental poetry and positing her work as 
exemplary of an ethically engaged innovative poetics.
5
 She is also much admired among 
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poets, as evidenced by the collection of poetry, Epitaphs for Lorine, published after her 
death and the volumes of more recent periodicals given entirely to poems by, about, and 
for Niedecker.
6
 Lorine Niedecker, it seems, is no longer “a welfare case.” The 
circumstances of those decades of obscurity are, however, instructive. 
Contemporary critics of Niedecker have observed how factors like gender, class, 
and socio-economic status contributed to her relegation to the footnotes of American 
literary history. However, Niedecker’s neglect is not only a result of critical blindness or 
institutionalized prejudice; it is also a function of the character of her life and work.
7
 
Though she worked hard to bring out collections of her poetry, in some cases paying 
publishers part of the publication costs, Niedecker refused the kind of self-promoting 
theorization and literary careerism that was important to the reputations of like-minded 
contemporaries such as William Carlos Williams and Louis Zukofsky.
8
 She published 
scant critical prose—none of it about her own poetics—and this silence may have 
contributed to her placement on the margins.
9
 In addition to these refusals of print 
publicity, Niedecker actively avoided local celebrity, sending her books only to a few 
close friends and imploring them to keep her poetic vocation under their hats.
10
 This 
reticence is well documented in personal and critical accounts as well as in her letters, 
and it lends credibility to the highly affective descriptions of her quiet life on Black 
Hawk Island and her shy, retiring personality that dogged early reviews and criticism.
11
 
Even in contemporary scholarship this characterization sometimes persists, in part 
because it echoes Niedecker’s own sense of herself.12 For instance, in response to a 
picture of the author printed with Zukofsky’s Some Time, Niedecker depicts herself as 
demure: “They can put a creeping mint for me when I have a book” (Correspondence 
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235). But, while the suggestion that her jacket photo should be a creeping mint is shy and 
self-deprecatory, such an image obscures the confidence of “when I have a book.” Since 
she first began publishing, responses to Niedecker have tended to emphasize her 
“creeping mint” pose and minimize her outspokenness and self-confidence. While there 
are many possible explanations for such an emphasis, including sexist and classist 
condescension, this is not only a case of biography and biology influencing the reception 
of poetry: the emphasis on Niedecker’s personal and professional reticence is also a 
response to the poems themselves.
13
 
In addition to shaping the picture of Niedecker the person, silences and refusals—
such as a terse style, very short poems, and the elision of connective language—have 
dominated discussions of Niedecker the poet, and responses to these silences are wide 
ranging. While critics like Heller and Cox take Niedecker’s formal silences to reflect her 
supposedly retiring personality, much of the more recent critical interest in Niedecker 
centers on quietness, obliquity, and even self-effacement as integral to her poetics. 
DuPlessis makes a compelling case for self-deprecation and shyness as strategic career 
moves for Niedecker, and her evaluation of folk forms, ballads, and haiku has been 
influential in establishing Niedecker’s quietness and condensation as a deftly wielded 
poetic tool (“Fusion”). Recent writing has similarly posited Niedecker’s condensed forms 
and strategies of omission as feminist and anti-consumerist rejections of mainstream 
American values.
14
 But perhaps the most influential and thoroughgoing discussion of the 
integral role of silence in her poetics is Peter Middleton’s essay on Niedecker’s use of the 
folk.
15
 Middleton argues that Niedecker’s silences mark an “absence of intersubjectivity” 
and a refusal to “[appeal] to the universalizing languages and frameworks of modern art 
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and the avant-garde” (172). They are part of a folk aesthetic that preserves the 
particularity of the local by resisting the notion of universal communicability.
16
 He 
claims that Niedecker’s poems run counter to avant-garde “blandishments” by refusing 
certain kinds of speech and, at times, refusing to speak altogether: her silences resist the 
apprehension of experience in language by confronting the reader with what she does not 
and cannot know.
17
 For Middleton, as for many other readers, Niedecker refuses 
language, particularly narrative or direct language, because it violates the integrity of 
some objects or experiences.
18
 While responses to Niedecker’s silences are sometimes 
fundamentally opposed—with some readers taking them to be unconsciously expressive 
of her personality and others taking them to be radically and intentionally political—the 
body of Niedecker criticism is often unified by the sense that “In Niedecker’s poetry [. . .] 
the silences that surround the words are at least as important as the words themselves” 
(Hatlen 53).  
Certainly, Niedecker would not have resisted the idea that her poetry is marked by 
silences. She regarded silence as one of the highest attainments of good poetry, and she 
saw it both as an aesthetic ideal and as a necessary condition of poetry’s reception and 
production. In a 1968 letter to Corman, she makes silence a primary tool of the poet’s 
craft: “Here—I think this is it—the ultimate in poetry. The hard and clear with the 
mystery of poetry—and it’s done largely with words omitted. Stark, isolated words which 
somehow must connect with each other and into the next line and the sense of sound” 
(Between 145).
19
 For Niedecker, omission is the method by which “the ultimate in 
poetry” can be reached: detaching words from each other and creating mystery in the 
“somehow” of their connection. An aesthetic of omission is everywhere evident in 
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Niedecker’s poetry, but it is particularly striking when one compares her letters to her 
poems. Her often chatty and personal letters supply biographical contexts for many of her 
poems, but these details are, almost without fail, not included in the poems themselves. 
For instance, during her friendship with the dentist Harold Heine in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, Niedecker sent Corman a poem in which the speaker’s friend has “dentist 
fingers.” However, upon reconsideration, she decided the inclusion of that biographical 
detail was a mistake and anxiously solicited Corman’s address in Japan from Zukofsky so 
that she could correct it. She describes the situation to Zukofsky as a professional 
misstep: “Sometimes I can be so blind, especially on something directly out of life. 
There’s a pitfall for poets—directly out of life” (Correspondence 271). Silences—in this 
case, omissions of biographical detail—are a necessary and sometimes difficult part of 
creating poetry out of experience, and Niedecker saw a failure to omit certain details as a 
failure of craft, “a pitfall.” Silence about her personal life was fundamental to her 
method, and talking about something like her affection for Heine was a temptation to be 
avoided for the sake of poetic integrity. And while omissions of biographical detail could 
be motivated by a simple need for privacy, Niedecker’s silences extend well past a 
resistance to personal revelation. In her work on one of her longest poems, “Lake 
Superior,” she condensed 260 pages of notes into five pages of terse poetry.20 
Significantly, however, most of what she omits is not biographical—she excises 
historical and geographical research and narrative transitions, as well. These omissions 
are not a matter of personal delicacy; they are fundamental to an aesthetic practice 
steeped in silence.  
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A short piece Niedecker wrote after the death of her mother depends on the 
omission and “stark, isolated words” that she advocated to Corman: 
I hear the weather 
            through the house 
or is it breathing  
                     mother (150) 
The poem is quiet: the scene is so muted that the speaker can hear a sound hushed enough 
to be either weather or breathing. And the formal silences in the poem—its extreme 
brevity, its uncertainty of reference, and its lack of punctuation—intensify this effect. 
These four lines are a powerful evocation of grief partly because of what they leave out: 
in particular, definitively articulated relationships between the objects in the poem. The 
only line in which two nouns are decisively related is the first, in which “I” and 
“weather” have a clearly delineated connection. Each other line sets apart single nouns, 
“house,” “breathing,” and “mother,” leaving their relationships tenuous by interrupting or 
destabilizing them with line breaks and diffuse prepositions. Is the weather coming 
through the house, or does the speaker hear through the house to the weather outside? Are 
the weather and breathing mutually exclusive options for what the “I” is hearing, or is the 
weather breathing? The word “mother” is suspended alone at the end of the poem on its 
own line, unrelated to the rest by syntax or punctuation. It may be an address—the 
speaker whispering to a present mother to ask her what she hears or whether the 
breathing is hers; an apostrophe—the speaker remembering an absent mother in response 
to the realization that no one else is breathing in the house; or a quotation—the word that 
the weather is breathing. The poem omits the biographical detail, the elaboration of 
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images, and the punctuation that would resolve these variables. The only certainty in the 
poem is the basic sensory relationship of the first line, hearing the weather. We must 
make our own decisions about how the objects in the poem relate, or we must concede 
that they exist together indeterminately. “Mother” may or may not be a question, and 
there may or may not be a voice that will answer it. The omissions of the poem, then, 
enact an experience of grief, of uncertainty and isolation, rather than simply relating it. In 
this poem, as in many others, silences are a central tool of Niedecker’s craft.  
Silence was interior to good poetry for Niedecker, and it also surrounded it. Her 
experience of poetry, as both a reader and writer, was quiet and intensely private. Unlike 
many of her contemporaries and correspondents, Niedecker did not give frequent public 
readings, and she generally preferred to read poems silently. When Corman visited her in 
Black Hawk, he pressed her to record herself reading some of her poems.
21
 By all 
accounts, the experiment was not particularly successful. Niedecker had little experience 
reading aloud, and she was uncomfortable with the way intonation and pronunciation 
could create ambiguities not present in the poem as written.
22
 Her dislike for recording 
her poems, and for readings in general, was based on the belief that silent reading allows 
us to experience a poem more fully: “I like planting poems in deep, silence, each person 
gets at the poems for himself. He has to come to the poems with an ear for all the music 
they can give and he’ll hear that as Beethoven heard tho deaf” (Between 241).23 Though 
she uses the language of sound to describe the effect of planting poems in silence, 
“music” and hearing are removed from an exterior physical experience and relocated 
inside the silent mind, a space available to the deaf as well as to those who can literally 
hear music.
24
 Silence, here, allows for an intensely personal and private encounter with 
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poetry—the emphasis on “for himself” is Niedecker’s own. In 1967, toward the end of 
her life, Niedecker wrote Corman reaffirming the importance of silence to both reader 
and writer:  
Poems are for one person to another, spoken thus, or read silently. How would 
[your poems] be read to a hall filled with people? If I close my eyes I look for the 
words on the page. If the silence could be governed among the people, if your 
voice came from somewhere not seen, i.e. radio, or out of suffused light—perhaps 
OK. If your ear is acute you sound your poem in silence. (Between 121)  
She valued poetry as a private, quiet exchange between people, not as a public 
declamation. Though Niedecker was apparently unmoved by church rituals and the 
Christian sensibilities that surrounded her, her language here, as she imagines the ideal 
reading of Corman’s poems, has something of the silence of the cathedral about it. 
Though she speaks of technologies and arrangements that might insure the reverential 
silence she believes necessary to a successful reading of Corman’s work, these are meant 
primarily to reproduce the true chamber of poetry, the individual ear. If the “ultimate” in 
poetry is attained by “omission,” it is also apprehended in silence. 
An atmosphere of silence was equally important to the production of poetry as to 
its reception, and Niedecker cultivated the solitude that made possible the wide stretches 
of silence she required. It is this type of regard for silence that has contributed most to the 
picture of Niedecker as a recluse. However, her choice to limit her social life was more 
than a quirk of personality; it was a professional necessity. In fact, solitude and silence 
ran counter to some elements of Niedecker’s character—her joy in conversation, her need 
for intellectual stimulation by sharing her reading and thinking with others—and she 
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spoke often in her letters of the difficulty of preserving the solitude and silence she 
needed to write. She wrote to Zukofsky of her efforts to keep coworkers, neighbors, and 
acquaintances at a distance, even when she felt an affinity for them, because such 
attachments were, in the end, useless for her poetry.
25
 Even when, late in her life, 
Niedecker married, the decision seemed to surprise her, in large part because of its 
possible threat to the silences that her relative seclusion provided. She expresses to 
Zukofsky a fear that her “human(!) happiness” might be “upsetting to the other thing 
[she’s] built up,” which might, given “another couple years,” entirely seperate her from 
the “silly coming and going” of ordinary society (Correspondence 331). Marriage is 
desirable because it provides “human(!) happiness” but troubling because it involves her 
in relationships that are dangerous to her writing. Though she decides to marry Al Millen, 
she still wants to preserve the silences in her life that are so important to her poems.
26
 
Niedecker recognizes the anti-sociality of her resistance to the “silly coming and going” 
of the people around her, equating it with selfishness in a letter to Corman, but she 
cherishes this selfishness as the prerogative of the poet:  
I think both LZ’s and my last years are going to be very selfish ones. We’ve 
reached an age—8 years (with me) to 70. It would be nice to imbibe from 
whatever source we can something of that silence that you, still young, already 
have. Not that I’m doddering, or as sick as Z. Silence I mean in which to write. 
our poetry. (Between 61) 
Silence, here, is an intimate part of the poems themselves and of the circumstances of 
their composition. 
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However, though Niedecker makes silence the long-deserved reward of a poet’s 
old age or the precocious and admired attainment of youth, she also subverts that stance 
in the same breath. She wants to be clear about the meaning of silence for herself and for 
Zukofsky, but in the process of elucidating the value of quiet and restraint, her language 
takes on a life of its own. For example, though clarification generally limits the possible 
meanings of a statement, Niedecker’s qualifying phrase,“[s]ilence I mean in which to 
write. our poetry,” multiplies them. The period between “write” and “our poetry” 
suggests that “our poetry” is the object of the verb “write”—as if the phrase were written 
“Silence I mean in which to write our poetry”—and that it is a summary of the previous 
phrase, making “our poetry” equivalent to “silence in which to write.” Niedecker’s 
anxiousness to delineate what silence means to her, as well as the ambiguity of her 
explanation, show its importance to her thinking, her poetry, and her life. Conversely, the 
variability of meanings available in Niedecker’s argument for silence points to a strain 
that runs counter to her sparseness and demonstrates her affinity for language. Indeed, 
Niedecker’s statement on behalf of silence not only explores and extends the meaning-
making power of language; it also celebrates its music. The prosaic tone of the letter may 
obscure musical elements that lineation helps reveal:  
We’ve reached an age— 
8 years (with me)  
to 70.  
 
It would be nice  
to imbibe  
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from whatever source we can  
something of that silence  
that you, still young, already have.  
 
Not that I’m doddering,  
or as sick as Z.  
Silence I mean  
in which to write.  
our poetry.
27
 
More than casual assonance is evident throughout these lines, and it often resolves into 
rhyme: “me,” “70,” “Z,” and “poetry” are full rhymes, and “nice,” “imbibe,” and 
“silence” may be heard as off rhymes. There is also an iambic/anapestic rhythm 
underlying these lines, especially in the last sentences. That Niedecker’s prose should 
contain poetic elements is not, in itself, remarkable, but it is revealing that such 
concentrated linguistic music would appear in lines touting silence. Despite her frequent 
statements in favor of silence, Niedecker was drawn toward aural music and the aesthetic, 
emotional, and intellectual possibilities of language—particularly spoken language— 
individual words, and even phonemes. Though she praised silence in others and sought it 
in her own work and life, Niedecker also prized language for its ability to connect human 
beings to others, its beauty as an object in itself, its expressive power, and its rhetorical 
and intellectual flexibility.  
Despite her relative isolation in Black Hawk, it is clear that Niedecker treasured 
her relationships with others, many of which were developed almost entirely through 
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words exchanged in letters. Cox describes her letters as distinctive because of her 
“delightful deshabille style, talking to someone, not just talking,” and written 
correspondence was a primary means of establishing intimacy and connection in her life 
(Between 191). Niedecker’s letters to Zukofsky and Corman are perhaps the best 
examples of this, but she also carried on extensive correspondence with other writers and 
publishers all over the world, as well as with some of her neighbors. Her letters create a 
sense of community: she speaks with the personal, intimate style that Cox notices, and 
she quotes extensively from conversations she’s had with others and reproduces parts of 
letters she has sent and received, inviting other voices into dialogue with her own. And, 
while an evident appreciation for written language as a means of creating relationships is 
not unexpected in Niedecker’s letters, it is more surprising to find such pleasure in the 
relational aspects of language in the poetry of a writer who so often avowed the 
importance of silence in her work. In a letter to Zukofsky about returning to writing after 
a fallow period, she connected her own creative vitality to the ability to include rather 
than to omit:  
You know something—I don’t know how the old time poets did it—the poetic 
vein was the soft-spoken, hushed, sweet-worded kind of thing, almost artificial, 
but maybe in their time it was earthy enough for poetry . . . now I find when one 
hasn’t been writing for awhile, you start off in something like that soft vein, but as 
soon as you get used to writing again, you pick up everything for poetry, get into 
everyday speech etc. (Correspondence 147)  
This “pick up everything” attitude characterizes many of Niedecker’s poems, even 
though they may also be described as “hushed.” One result of picking up everything is 
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that “everyday speech” becomes a source of inspiration and material. Niedecker often 
noted the speech of those around her and converted it, sometimes with very little change 
or none at all, into poetry. She cherished the silence provided by privacy, but she valued 
the language that surrounded her and the connections it effected between people. 
Niedecker’s reading also makes it clear that written language was, for her, a tool for 
establishing relationships. She was often moved by the words of others, perhaps most 
dramatically evident in her reaction to Zukofsky’s 1931 essay in Poetry. Throughout her 
life Niedecker read poetry, philosophy, and natural and political history and responded 
actively to what she read, often by initiating correspondences with writers she admired or 
with whom she felt an affinity. As in her correspondence, in her reading and note-taking 
she did not favor terse language but instead took copious notes, reveling in the words of 
others, copying down long quotations, and sending copies of her annotations to Louis and 
Celia Zukofsky, among others. Like the folk sayings and chat of her family and 
neighbors, the words of philosophers and historians were a source of material for her 
poems. Given her claims for the importance of omission, she was remarkably open to 
inclusion from a variety of sources, especially dialogue. She opened her poetry to 
language—from everyday speech, to correspondence between kindred minds, to the 
words of long-dead philosophers and historians. Such openness opposes a 
communicative, even voluble strain to the reticences and refusals that are equally 
important in Niedecker’s work.28 
In addition to the babble of human communication, Niedecker was also drawn to 
the music of language itself, highly conscious of the noises that words made. An offhand 
description to Zukofsky of her encyclopedic reading illuminates how important dialogue 
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with other writers was to Niedecker, but it also deemphasizes communicative language in 
favor of musicality: 
Yes, Hudson, he’s coming up on my reading list. Gilbert White just at hand. 
Fabre, Humboldt favorites too. Encyclopedic stuff too. But all this won’t be 
remembered, likely, when I open the door out home beside the marsh some spring 
night and hear the sora rail running down the scale—the spoon-tapped water 
glass. (Between 146) 
Niedecker relished the noise of nature, enjoying the clatter and cacophony of her marsh, 
but her appreciation of nature’s sounds is most fully realized in language. She indicates 
that the sora rail’s music trumps mere words, but her language for the rail’s sounds makes 
its own music.
29
 The rhyme of “rail” and “scale” signals a shift away from “encyclopedic 
stuff” and toward the more performative use of language evident in the final phrase: the 
“spoon-tapped water glass” is an instance of language with the power to absorb, inspire, 
and please Niedecker at least as much as it is a description of natural sounds that have 
that effect.
30
 The syncopated rhythm of the phrase (with four syllables stressed out of 
five), the assonance of “tapped” and “glass,” and the dramatic oral shift from the very 
low vowel of “spoon” to the high vowel of “tapped” emphasize the linguistic virtuosity of 
the poet. Niedecker appears to be less concerned with evoking a natural phenomenon 
here than with exploring the possibilities of the sounds her own words make. 
Niedecker’s interest in language, however, exceeded the musical; the meanings of 
words were also important for understanding and describing the world around her.
31
 
Though she admires Corman for his silences, she approves of Dahlberg, when he is “at 
his best,” because “he knows words—earthy, wonderful, rich words—‘cormorant’ 
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words!!” (Correspondence 284). Dahlberg’s vocabulary is rich because it names 
precisely; he says “cormorant” rather than simply “bird.” While an emphasis on words as 
music often silences the communicative aspect of language, as in nonsense, the 
usefulness of words—their manifold meanings, their histories and their connotations, 
their precision—pulls against Niedecker’s attraction for silence. This usefulness is 
evident throughout Niedecker’s poetry in her puns and intricate word play, such as her 
famous “condensery.” Even in her letters, she often explores the subtler possibilities of 
words, allowing their meanings to multiply. For example, she wrote Corman about a trip 
she took with her husband, Millen: “Yes, the Lake Superior trip was a great delight if I 
can make the poem. Traverse de Millens! A millennium of notes for my magma opus” 
(Faranda 94). She plays the changes on these words—“Millens” becomes “millennium,” 
echoing both plenitude (thousands) and familial proprietariness (Millen), and “magnum” 
is converted into “magma,” merging the Greek word for greatness with the geological 
theme of her observations. Though writing to a poet whose silences she so admired, 
Niedecker exults in the possibilities of language, not only musically but intellectually. 
The fact that she converted hundreds of pages of notes on her trip to a few pages of 
poetry dramatically illustrates Niedecker’s aesthetics of omission; however, the fact that 
she wrote so many pages of notes in the first place—as well as reading extensively in the 
regional history and geography of the area, copiously annotating her reading and even 
consulting local experts—also indicates that her condensation is not born entirely out of 
silence. Rather, it is won from a welter of language and sound. This is not to say that 
Niedecker’s poems do not strive for and attain the silence that she valued so highly but to 
point out that silence in Niedecker’s work is always in tension with a vibrant 
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communicative life and profuse, saturated language that is fundamentally attractive to 
her. She wrote whole poems that seem almost swallowed by their own silences, like “We 
must pull / the curtains— / we haven’t any / leaves” (242). But she also wrote short 
stories, lively radio plays, and poems with rhymes like “in Dakota” / “take you where you 
want to go ta” (152). 
A poem like “How bright you’ll find young people,” included in Niedecker’s “For 
Paul” series, illustrates a very different relationship to language from poems more 
representative of her condensed style:  
How bright you’ll find young people,  
 Diddle, 
  and how unkind. 
When a boy appears with a book 
they cry “Who’s the young Einsteind?” 
Einstein, you know, said space 
is what it’s made up of. 
And as to the human race 
“Why do you deeply oppose its passing” 
you’ll find men asking 
the man with the nebular hair 
 and the fiddle. (139-40)  
This poem foregrounds language—particularly conversation (intimate, folk, and public) 
and music—to explore the relationship of the singular person to the human race. The 
speaker addresses “Diddle,” a nickname of violin prodigy Paul Zukosfky, the son of 
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Louis and Celia Zukofsky, and she advises him about what she anticipates will be 
difficult interactions with other children. The speaker begins by ventriloquizing the 
young people’s mocking comparison of a reading boy to “Einsteind.” Though the 
comparison is intended to insult, the speaker takes it up as useful, quoting Einstein’s 
words as instructive, however gnomically, for the boy. By the end of the poem, the 
speaker, too, is calling the boy a “young Einsteind” by conflating the two figures in the 
final image: “the man with the nebular hair and the fiddle.” In contrast to the strict 
isolation of objects in “I hear the weather through the house,” two of the objects in this 
poem, the boy and Einstein, are so intimately related as to become one identity. This 
fluidity of relationship is accomplished through the play of language rather than the 
restriction of its connections. 
Niedecker’s poetic here is one of inclusion rather than omission; its resources 
range from biographical detail, to Niedecker’s reading, to the idiosyncracies of folk 
speech in the quoted “Einsteind.” Perhaps most noticeably, the poem’s musicality—
obvious rhymes like “space / race” and “Diddle / fiddle” and rolling rhythms as in “How 
bright you’ll find young people / Diddle”—creates a sense of levity appropriate to its 
purpose: assuring a child upon his enrollment in school.
32
 But that very musicality can 
also work against the lightness. The rhyme of “unkind” with “Einsteind” heavily 
emphasizes both those words, sounding the more serious subject of the poem—
antagonism between the singular individual and the human race—even as it makes light 
of this.
33
 The kinds of relationships language can propose or create are paramount to the 
articulation of this scientist-musician boy-Einstein’s involvement with the rest of 
humanity. On the most basic level, the poem functions through dialogue. It casts itself as 
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an act of direct communication, beginning with an intimate personal address, “Diddle,” 
and then proceeding through other kinds of conversation: the children tease “Diddle,” 
Einstein’s words about space are reported to him, and Einstein poses a question to the 
human race. Last, the men ask “the man with the nebular hair and fiddle” a question that 
at first appears to be addressed to them. It is in this moment of difficulty, the uncertainty 
of who is speaking to whom, that the relationships between figures become most 
unstable. On one level—in that the phrase “And as to” initially attributes the poem’s 
second quotation, “Why do you deeply oppose its passing,” to Einstein—the poem argues 
that the singular person is so distant from the rest of the human race that he may question 
why one would resist its destruction. This attributes a callousness to genius that recalls 
Einstein’s part in the development of the atom bomb. However, the question “Why do 
you deeply oppose its passing”—which at first contributes to a portrait of the exceptional 
intellect’s emotional distance from humanity—turns, in the next line, to a question posed 
to the genius by other men. The music of the poem reinforces this new alignment with the 
off rhyme “passing / asking,” creating an aural identification of the question with the 
asking men that further wrenches it away from its initial, more tenuous, connection with 
Einstein. Whether the question shows men surprised at the exceptional person’s regard 
for humanity or expressing their own disregard for it, the genius emerges in the poem as a 
man who is concerned for a human race that fails to connect to or understand him. This 
reading counters the poem’s simultaneous proposition that the genius is distanced from 
others, perhaps even made cruel, by his specialness. The driving duality in the poem 
turns, significantly, on an act of speech that, through the pull of other linguistic forces 
like grammatical implication or musical similarity, is rendered in two mutually exclusive 
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ways. In this poem, the strategies of omission by which poetry approaches silence are 
subordinated to the connections language effects, both grammatically and musically. As 
in many of Niedecker’s poems, language is not excised, it flourishes.  
An attention to this countermovement aligned with speech and language has been 
nascent in Niedecker criticism since the early reviews of her books and has become more 
and more important in a contemporary understanding of her work. For a reader like 
Heller, even Niedecker’s spareness is evidence of a trust in the capacity of language: “she 
is a true keeper of the word-hoard, repurifying its contents through scrupulous use, 
reawakening in her readers the sheer dignity of human utterance” (“Niedecker” 54).34 In 
this formulation, Niedecker’s silences are deployed in the service of language and 
improved human communication, revitalizing language rather than circumscribing or 
mistrusting it. This analysis is compelling in that it explains why Niedecker, who is 
clearly invested in language, would so often define poetic success as the omission or 
limitation of language.
35
 But the claim that Niedecker’s silences serve language does not 
account for the elements of her poetics that are far from silent, such as her frequent use of 
dialogue or overheard language, her dense patterning of repeating and contrasting sounds, 
and her sometimes elaborately etymological and punning word-play. These elements 
have encouraged critical attention to sound or voice.
36
 Indeed, a shift in focus from 
silence to sound has been important in revising limited concepts of Niedecker’s work: as 
Nicholls argues, attention to the dense materiality of her language and sound-play causes 
“the beguiling image of the poet as naïve nature-lover [to recede] in favour of the 
rigorous stylist testing the limits of language” (194). For many readers who credit 
Niedecker as a “rigorous stylist,” the materiality and possibilities of language do not 
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replace silence as a motivating factor, rather they are held in tension with it.
37
 Tension, of 
course, does not necessarily denote conflict, and critics like Skinner and Robertson 
characterize Niedecker’s speech and silence as mutually supportive, creating a poetics of 
listening.
38
 These approaches are fruitful because they take into account Niedecker’s 
responsiveness to her aural environment and her delight in sound, while recasting her 
silences as active ethical response. In the end, however, the concept of Niedecker’s 
poetics as a type of listening too neatly resolves the tension between sound and silence 
into cooperation and, thus, cannot fully account for the divergence that Niedecker saw in 
her work between silences and the effusiveness of language.  
For Niedecker, the opposition between these two aesthetic attitudes constituted an 
interior battle because they were mutually exclusive modes that were both integral to her. 
In 1968, toward the end of her life, she wrote Corman about her struggle to find what she 
called a “new ‘form’”: 
This strange winter of mine is passing away [. . .] the battle with myself as to the 
new form I feel but don’t quite dare to use [. . .]. The new ‘form’ may materialize 
all unconsciously sometime but I’ve made a turnabout again toward the short 
poem, don’t feel I shd. leave what’s been a part of me all these years. (Between 
155-56) 
Her narrative of searching for a new way of writing alludes to a single season, one winter, 
spent exploring alternatives to the silences of the short poem and a speedy return to the 
condensed aesthetic that was “a part of [her].” But words like “battle,” “feel,” and “dare” 
indicate that conflict between the short poem and the—presumably longer, looser—new 
form runs deep. If Niedecker “feels” or intuits this style rather than observing, admiring, 
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or understanding, it is likely as much a part of her as her more customary condensed 
style. Further, if she doesn’t “dare” to use the new form, the outcome of the battle has not 
been decided so much as deferred out of apprehension and a feeling of loyalty to the 
familiar. A letter written to Zukofsky four years earlier shows that the interior battle 
Niedecker describes to Corman was not a mere seasonal affliction but a clash marking 
Niedecker’s entire career: 
There is sumpn in me moving to a new place [. . .]. I’m trembling on the verge of 
something, a form of poetic thinking that depends maybe too much on readers’ 
imagination, but we’ll see. I don’t know if it’s called metaphysical or not, not 
necessarily, I guess, but anyhow this has been in me from the beginning and 
somehow it’s got to come out. (Correspondence 343)  
She is uncertain about what exactly she is “trembling on the verge of,” calling it, vaguely, 
“sumpn” and “something” and qualifying her statements with “maybe,” “we’ll see,” “I 
don’t know,” “not necessarily,” and “I guess.” But this uncertainty disappears in her 
summation of the situation. Her “anyhow” puts her uncertainty to one side in order to 
state definitively that this “sumpn in [her]” has “been in [her] from the beginning and 
somehow it’s got to come out.” Apparently, her accustomed forms have not adequately 
expressed this unknown other thing, but its eventual expression, in some novel way, is 
inevitable. Both the short poem, then, and the “sumpn” unexpressed by the short poem—
perhaps the language excised in her process of omission—are “in” Niedecker, and she 
characterizes her poetry, particularly her relationship to form, as a response to their 
opposing pulls. In these letters, Niedecker describes her internal discord in very personal 
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terms, but this inner battle was also reflected in Niedecker’s ambivalent literary 
allegiances. In 1966, she summarized her poetic career to Kenneth Cox: 
 I feel that without the Feb. ’31 issue of Poetry edited by Louis Zukofsky I’d 
never have developed as a poet—I literally went to school to William Carlos 
Williams and Louis Zukofsky and have had the good fortune to call the later my 
friend and mentor. Well – – there was an influence (from transition and from 
surrealistes) that has always seemed to want to ride right along with the direct, 
hard, objective kind of writing. The subconscious and the presence of the folk, 
always there. (“Extracts” 36)  
Niedecker’s evaluation of her poetics recognizes several sources—Zukofsky and 
Williams, the hard and clear, transition, the subconscious, and the folk—and she divides 
these influences into two strains, most simply summarized as Objectivist and Surrealist, 
that correspond in important ways to her attraction for silences and language.
39
 
For both good and ill, Niedecker’s relationship to the Objectivists, particularly 
Louis Zukofsky, has been central to her poetics and her reception. As we have seen, 
Niedecker viewed Zukofsky’s 1931 special ‘Objectivist’ number of Poetry and her 
resulting correspondence with him as integral to her work: without them, she says, she 
“would never have developed as a poet.” That is not to say, however, that she was a 
convert to Objectivism or acolyte of Zukofsky’s. Rather, Niedecker responded strongly to 
Zukofsky’s Objectivist program because the essays that he wrote to accompany the 
poems he chose for the February 1931 Poetry articulate elements already present in her 
own poetics. That issue of Poetry contains, along with poems chosen by Zukofsky, an 
editor’s statement outlining concepts—under the label “Objectivist”—that Zukofsky feels 
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are markers of good poetry.
40
 Chief among these are sincerity and objectification. In 
sincerity, he explains, “writing occurs which is the detail, not mirage, of seeing, of 
thinking with things as they exist, and of directing them along a line of melody” 
(“Program” 273). Objectification, on the other hand, is the combination of moments of 
sincerity into a structured whole that achieves the “totality of perfect rest” and to which 
“the mind does not wish to add” (276). The poem, like other “discrete objects,” should be 
whole and entire unto itself. He also argues that objectification can be accomplished in a 
very small number of lines through “active literary omission,” which gives the reader 
“facts” and “information” by leaving things out. Zukofsky’s focus on craft and on the 
poem as a created thing echoes Niedecker’s own meticulous attention to detail in her 
poetry. In addition, his argument that a single word was in itself an “arrangement” and an 
object with poetic resonance may have appealed to Niedecker’s interest in etymology and 
her desire to preserve the particularities of language.
41
 While all of these elements of 
Objectivism resonate with Niedecker’s practice, she seems to have responded most 
intensely to the Objectivist respect for the integrity of objects—“the quality of things 
being together without violence to their individual intact natures”—and its resultant 
silences, particularly avoidance of the subjective (278).  
The aesthetic of omission that Niedecker adopted, in part under the instruction of 
Zukofsky, was a response to the belief in the self-sufficiency of an external world 
resistant to the interpretation and manipulation of the poet, or “the object unrelated to 
palpable or predatory intent” (Zukosfsky, “Objective” 16). She echoes the Objectivist 
tenet that the writer should “think with things as they exist” when she writes Zukofsky, 
“For me, when it comes to birds, animals and plants, I’d like the facts because the facts 
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are wonderful in themselves” (Correspondence 243). Along with Zukofsky and the other 
Objectivists, Niedecker espouses the idea that the poet should recognize and accurately 
record the poetic facts around her rather than impose her own thoughts or, worse, feelings 
upon them. Penberthy describes Niedecker’s adoption of Objectivist techniques as one of 
several “stratagems of avoidance”:  
The role of the poet was always problematic for her, and one can read her poems 
as a succession of stratagems of avoidance. She rejected the notion of deciphering 
or interpreting experience. The afflatus of the poet, the attachment to ego, held no 
appeal. She preferred to attend to what already existed and to find the least 
intrusive means of reflecting it. (“Part One” 71) 
Objectivism articulated a set of tactics that were important for Niedecker throughout her 
career as a poet, even when she found herself most in tension with them, because they 
offered her a useful model for a non-intrusive poetics that protected the natural facts from 
the encroachment of the subjective. If the poet’s job was to create a poem that allowed 
objects to retain their individual identity, she must, as far as possible, restrict the 
apparatus of poetic subjectivity—expressive, connective language—in an attempt to let 
the facts exist in and of themselves. While words, as objects themselves, need not be 
abandoned entirely, the poet’s voice was an instrument of predation and an indulgence to 
be excised by a responsible craftsperson. Thus, Niedecker’s silences are part of a poetics 
that has a dual relationship to language, recognizing its boundaries while resisting its 
power to threaten the boundaries between the poetic self and other integral objects. 
Zukofsky and Niedecker shared an interest in a poetics that resists the subjective, 
as his praise for her New Goose demonstrates: “She speaks and sings against all that’s 
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predatory in ‘Mother Goose.’ Whatever in it is still to be touched or felt she recreates for 
people today to feel and touch in her—their—own way” (qtd. in Penberthy, “Part One” 
42). New Goose shows the most direct influence of Zukofsky, and Objectivist principles 
more generally, of all her published volumes. Many of the poems in the book are small, 
some as short as a single line, and they almost always avoid interpretation of events, 
eliding context and commentary.
42
 A poem like “A monster owl” makes explicit the 
Objectivist-inspired ethics that underlie the book’s aesthetics: 
A monster owl 
out on the fence 
flew away. What 
is it the sign 
of? The sign of 
an owl. (103)  
The poem is, in a sense, a manifesto for a poetic attitude that respects the “individual 
intact nature” of its objects. Unlike, for example, an Imagist poem, which would most 
likely juxtapose the owl to another image or evoke transcendent realization reached 
through observation of the owl, Niedecker’s poem makes the owl into a self-referential 
sign. In this way, she recognizes and short-circuits the subjectivity of a poetics that is 
concerned with using objects as signs of other things, thus doing violence to their natures. 
This poem also offers insight into Niedecker’s participation in Objectivism because of the 
role Zukofsky’s editorial advice played in its composition. A 1938 letter from Niedecker 
to Zukofsky allows us to reconstruct her original version of the poem and compare it to 
the final version, in which she accepted changes proposed by Zukofsky. Penberthy 
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reproduces this original version, which includes several words deleted from the final 
version, in the notes to her edition of the poems: 
A monster owl 
Out on the fence 
flew away. Now 
what’s it the sign 
of. The sign of 
an owl I guess. (375) 
The most significant change from this version to the final is the deletion of the phrase “I 
guess.” While this draft of the poem still argues that the owl is self-sufficient and casts 
doubt on poetry that makes objects into signs for other things, it also acknowledges the 
mind that perceives the owl as a sign of itself and suggests that this perception is not 
infallible. Rather than making a statement about the owl’s unavailability to a sign-making 
poetics that is a closed system “to which the mind does not wish to add,” this version of 
the poem dramatizes the workings of the mind that guesses the owl to be self-sufficient. 
Likewise, the word “now” situates the poem more firmly in time, making it the record of 
a mind’s immediate response to the owl’s flight and implying the possibility of change in 
the owl’s status as sign. It also implies a colloquial interlocutor to whom the musing 
question, “Now what’s it the sign of,” is posed. All of these elements make the owl’s 
independent status contingent on an observer and perhaps even the subject of 
conversation. But, in accordance with Zukosfky’s advice, Niedecker deleted “I guess” 
and “Now,” eliminating language that acknowledges the owl’s relationship to the 
speaker, removing the speaker entirely. Her compliance demonstrates not simply a wish 
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to please Zukofsky but the development of a technique of omission that she would 
continue to use consistently to separate the object of the poem from the subjectivity of the 
poet.
43
 
However, despite Niedecker’s affinity for the anti-predatory techniques of 
Objectivism—particularly its use of silences to fend off the incursions of language—she 
also sought what she frequently called “something more.” In an early letter to Mary 
Hoard, she points out a deficiency in the Objectivist mode and explicitly names 
Surrealism as, at the very least, a useful supplement to Objectivism:  
I had spoken to Phyllis I think about Louis Zukofsky and the Objectivist 
Movement [. . .]. Objects, objects. Why are people, artists above all, so terrifically 
afraid of themselves? Thank god for the Surrealist tendency running side by side 
with Objectivism and toward the monologue tongue. It is my conviction that no 
one yet, has talked to himself. And until then, what is art? (“Local Letters” 87)  
In its fixation on objects and its scrupulous avoidance of the subjective, Objectivism is 
not able to accomplish what, for Niedecker, is essential to art: interiority and self-
exploration, particularly through language, or talking. Alternatively (“Thank god”), 
Surrealism offers Niedecker strategies that do not jibe with Objectivist principles and 
prejudices. In fact, due in part to efforts to draw Niedecker criticism out of the shadow of 
Zukofksy and bolstered by the increased availability of Niedecker’s letters and early 
poems, recent criticism has made abundantly clear that Niedecker was greatly influenced 
by Surrealist ideas, both as a beginning poet and much later in her career.
44
 If Niedecker 
was frustrated by poets who regarded objects more closely than they did themselves, she 
could turn to Surrealist proclamations like “Pure poetry is a lyrical absolute that seeks an 
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a priori reality within ourselves alone” for affirmation of her tendency to look inward. If 
she felt Objectivist condensation to be restrictive or unequal to the task of monologue, 
she could turn to Surrealist litanies of words and the belief that the “literary creator” “has 
the right to use words of his own fashioning and to disregard existing grammatical and 
syntactical laws” in order to achieve a “rhythmic ‘hallucination of the word’” capable of 
expressing an interior reality that eludes objective knowledge (qtd. in Penberthy, “Part 
One” 26).45 The Surrealist aesthetic promised tools for looking inward that were 
stringently denied by an Objectivist focus on externality, which clearly stymied 
Niedecker despite enabling her own resistance to the predatory subjective.  
Surrealist illogic and linguistic expressiveness are as important to Niedecker’s 
poetics as Objectivist precision and refusal of subjectivity. While Objectivist silences 
appealed to Niedecker as a discipline, the free play of language in the Surrealist aesthetic 
appealed to her aspiration to push poetry to represent nonrational mental states. The 
importance of this countercurrent is perhaps most evident in Niedecker’s early letters to 
Harriet Monroe, in which she was uncharacteristically willing to articulate her poetics. 
She sent poems to Monroe at Poetry accompanied by an explanation of her “theory” of 
poetry, which, despite her recent and eager correspondence with Zukofsky, takes a 
decidedly different direction from his pronouncements:  
Poetry to have greatest reason for existing must be illogical. An idea, a rumination 
such as more or less constantly roams the mind, meets external object or situation 
with quite illogical association. Memory, if made up of objects at all, retains those 
objects which were at the time of first perception and still are the most strikingly 
unrecognizable. (Correspondence 21)
46
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As in her letter to Hoard, Niedecker here expresses doubts about the primacy of objects to 
poetry. Instead, she is interested in poetry that explores the illogic of the relationship 
between mind and object, particularly the meeting between the mind and the 
unrecognizable objects of memory. The play of language can create illogical associations 
between objects, which mimics the working of the mind. This “reason for existing” 
departs from Objectivist notions in two significant ways: it makes the poet’s illogical 
mind, rather than her intellect, central to poetic composition, and it blurs the boundaries 
between poet and object, removing objects from their contexts and appropriating them as 
emblems of a private logic.
47
 The relationship between poetry and the landscape of the 
mind becomes more explicit in the next letter that Niedecker sent Monroe, this time 
explaining how her experiments with language in a particular poem (CANVAS) 
represented distinct levels of consciousness: 
for me at least, certain words of a sentence,—prepositions, connectives, 
pronouns—belong up towards full consciousness, while strange and unused words 
appear only in subconscious. (It also means that for me at least this procedure is 
directly opposite to that of the consistent and prolonged dream—in dream the 
simple and familiar words like prepositions, connectives, etc . . . are not absent, in 
fact, noticeably present to show illogical absurdity, discontinuity, parody of 
sanity). (qtd. in Penberthy, “Part One” 27) 
While she was responsive to Objectivism’s suspicion of the subjective, Niedecker’s 
poetic interest went beyond objects to include the relationship between objects and the 
perceiving mind, and her explanation of the “planes of consciousness” shows that, for 
Niedecker, the mind—“the constrictions appearing before falling off to sleep at night” as 
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well as the “deep consciousness,” “monologue,” and the “social banal”—was linguistic.48 
Surrealism was attractive to Niedecker because it affirmed her desire for a poetry capable 
of expressing the illogic of the subconscious and because it allowed for a more expansive 
use of language by which to explore that interiority. In a sense, Niedecker’s Surrealism 
extended the reach of her Objectivist tendencies, making the mind another thing that the 
poet could “think with.” Penberthy points out that Niedecker’s attention to her mind was 
not an indulgence in interpretive or lyrical subjectivity; instead, “her attention to the 
transitional states of her own mind was exhaustive and exact [. . .]. She had no interest in 
self-regarding embellishment of these psychic depths, only in disciplined documentation 
which words [. . .] alone could accomplish” (“Part One” 30). From Objectivism, she took 
“disciplined documentation,” but from Surrealism she took the authorization to make the 
inner workings of her own mind her subject and flowing, illogical language her tool for 
relating what she called the “folk tales of the mind” (“Local Letters” 88).  
The influence of Surrealist ideas, particularly interest in the subconscious and 
flowing, subliminal language as a means of accessing the subconscious, is most evident 
in Niedecker’s early poems. However, as Niedecker herself indicates in numerous letters, 
this strain was a constant presence “right along side” her better-known Objectivism. A 
relatively late poem, “I married,” evidences the tenacity of Niedecker’s interest in 
interiority and her continued use, albeit highly controlled, of Surrealist-influenced 
techniques that she aligned with a more freewheeling relationship to both language and 
the relationships it creates: 
I married 
in the world’s black night 
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for warmth 
  if not repose. 
  At the close— 
someone. 
I hid with him 
from the long range guns. 
  We lay leg 
  in the cupboard, head 
in closet. 
 
A slit of light 
at no bird dawn— 
  Untaught 
  I thought 
he drank 
too much. 
I say 
  I married 
  and lived unburied. 
I thought— (228)49 
The poem narrates the speaker’s marriage and, though it cites warmth as the purpose of 
the union, the tone is cool and the images imply that the wedding is a desperate, final 
play for companionship, “at the close— / someone,” that does not yield the hoped-for 
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results. “At the close” hints that the participants seek solace late in life or perhaps that 
they are uniting for comfort in the face of a more general cataclysm, signaled by the 
“long range guns” and “no bird dawn.” But, instead of warmth, by the final lines, the 
speaker’s life is marked by death: she lives “unburied” and inarticulate, unable or 
unwilling to finish the thought that the last phrase leaves suspended. In addition to its 
narrative qualities, the most obvious difference between this poem and a poem like “A 
monster owl” is its emphasis on a speaker. Where “A monster owl” elided the “I” who 
made guesses of what the owl might be a sign, this poem begins firmly in the province of 
individual experience with “I married.” As the poem progresses, it becomes clear that the 
speaker is not simply reporting on objectively observable events but on her own private 
experience and interpretation of those events with reminders like “I say” and “I thought.” 
And, while “the world’s black night” could refer to a dark time in history or associate old 
age with winter or war, the poem turns inward with lines like: “We lay leg / in the 
cupboard, head / in closet.” Of course, these lines could refer to external circumstances as 
well; they may be an exaggeration of real, or at least possible, events, or a folk-inspired 
description of living in a cramped space, but they also evoke a Surrealist aesthetic of 
disembodied parts, disturbing juxtaposition, and dreamlike instability of boundaries.
50
 
The poem uses objects to furnish an interior mental space, rather than invoking them as 
“wonderful in themselves.” 
The speaker does not maintain a careful distance from the poem’s objects: 
instead, she is free to use language to manipulate and infiltrate those objects in the 
interest of expressive images. Neither the objects nor the people who appear in the poem 
remain intact. The boundaries of cupboard and closet are penetrated by the speaker and 
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her spouse, who “lay” in them. Further, the ambiguity of the verb “lay” emphasizes the 
dissolution of the boundaries around and between objects in the poem. The verb is 
primarily intransitive, making “leg in the cupboard” an adverbial phrase describing how 
“we lay,” but it may also be read transitively: the speaker and her spouse laid a leg in the 
cupboard and laid a head in the closet. In contrast to the scrupulous boundaries between 
speaker and thing in some of her other poems, this freedom is almost violent. Throughout 
the poem this disarming, even threatening, intimacy belies the Objectivist regard for “the 
quality of objects being together without damage to their individual intact natures.” One 
is left imagining a night-time wedding in which the speaker gains warmth from her 
partner. This permeability is reiterated as the bodies of the speaker and her spouse seem 
to lose their individuality, crammed in the cupboard as disembodied parts converted to 
disturbing domestic objects—intimating an underlying danger to the folkloric leveling of 
hierarchies between animate and inanimate things. Too, because language is Niedecker’s 
tool for accessing and communicating the subconscious or interior, the poem is much 
longer than many of her others, more willing to use ordinary connector words and clearly 
narrative sentences that establish relationships between objects and people. The only 
concession she makes to her usual highly condensed style is to delete the article before 
“closet,” but all of her other sentences retain the kind of language that she would 
generally omit. The poem extends the reach of language rather than limiting it, exercising 
a poet’s subjective control over the objects in the poem. It plays out the logic of marriage, 
enacting the erasure of identity required by a ritual in which two become one.
51
 Though 
this makes certain figures for relationship possible, such as the conversion of people into 
domestic objects, ultimately it appears to do harm to the speaker.  
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Certainly, the choice to establish these kinds of relationships between objects and 
between subject and object was not one Niedecker made easily. She included this poem 
in a letter to Cid Corman, where her comments after the poem make clear that she saw it 
as a departure from her more customary style: “Just a few minutes ago rather spontaneous 
from a folk conversation and I suppose some of my own dark forebodings. We shd. try to 
be true to our subconscious? Sorry it is another I poem. My god, I must try to get away 
from that” (Between 132). This description of the circumstances of the poem’s 
composition—emphasizing its spontaneity and its origins in both the “folk” and in the 
inner workings of her own mind—at first appears to be an affirmation of such techniques. 
However, the question mark introduces an element of uncertainty that immediately 
becomes outright repudiation of the focus on the self. Niedecker begins with a statement 
very much in line with Surrealist principles—“We should try to be true to our 
subconscious”—but, by the time she reaches the end of the sentence, she is compelled to 
convert it into a question. Clearly, the problem with being true to one’s subconscious is 
that it invites the “I” poem, a tendency that Niedecker felt as something she should avoid.  
While Niedecker saw Surrealist linguistic freedom (which she connected to both 
the subconscious and the folk) as a means of correcting Objectivism’s inability to address 
interiority, she more frequently described Objectivism’s silences as a necessary 
corrective to a tendency toward effusiveness and self-indulgence. In this light, her 
statement about “developing” as a poet when she “went to school” to Zukofsky may be 
significant as an indicator of the role Objectivism played as a learned form, signifying 
maturity. Objectivism was part of growing up for Niedecker; it required effort and 
education to steer herself away from an aesthetic that she may have identified with her 
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more natural, untrained, apprentice self. She often characterized Objectivist condensation 
and elision of referents as good behavior and considered copious language, particularly 
personal language, as a surrender to temptation or lack of discipline. This model of 
conflict echoes an almost religious mortification of the flesh to save the spirit, 
particularly when she writes to Zukofsky, the preceptor of the Objectivist school. In her 
comments to him on sending some new poems to the Quarterly Review of Literature, 
stylistic decisions take on spiritual significance, however tongue-in-cheek: “Be nice 
surprise to youz when you see ’em in print. I destroyed a lot of lines—I’m a saint” 
(Correspondence 300). Omission is saintly and excess of language is sin as we also see in 
her description of writing “right out of life” as a “pitfall” (271). Poetic craft, particularly 
omission and condensation, is a devotional practice that shelters the initiate from her 
baser instincts. Surrealist interiority may allow Niedecker to turn her poetic gaze inward, 
but it is also fraught with danger, particularly the lure of excess and the indulgence of the 
poetic ego. Objectivist hardness and concision helped her to resist those enticements and 
maintain the ethical stance that was so important to her, the regard for the autonomy of 
the poetic object. 
Niedecker, was, by and large, very well behaved in this respect. But, even when 
reporting on her own saintly omissions to Zukofsky, her ambivalence toward those 
omissions is apparent: she tells him, “I destroyed a lot of lines,” not, “I salvaged” or 
“rescued” or “healed,” any of which would put her more in line with Objectivist ideals of 
omission in the service of perfection, totality, or perfect rest. She professes a faithfulness 
to Objectivist practice, but she also has moments of rebellion. She writes to Zukofsky 
quoting a letter of rejection from the editor of the Quarterly Review of Literature: “Weiss 
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returns The Element Mother: ‘Perhaps you have cut away too much from these, at least 
we miss in them some of the cross-grained snazzy detail we enjoy in your work’” 
(Correspondence 233). Her only comment is “!,” but one wonders why she quoted this 
response to Zukofsky, arbiter of condensation. It may demonstrate her devotion to the 
correctness of condensation and remind Zukosfky of what she has sacrificed to it, but it 
also demonstrates, with the corroboration of Weiss, that her work has something that 
exceeds and even runs counter to the aesthetics Zukofsky advocates. In a letter to 
Kenneth Cox, she similarly opposes a “solid,” mature style to effusiveness. But, perhaps 
feeling more free with him to question Objectivist correctness, she admits an attraction 
and affinity for “flowing” language and “abstraction”: “these French [poets], you know, 
get something out of abstractions that sometimes I do and that gives me an idea that 
poetry should be much more mysterious and flowing than any style we more solid 
citizens have allowed” (“Extracts” 37). Niedecker here identifies with the “solid citizens” 
who have disallowed a “mysterious and flowing” style, but she also sees something of 
herself in poetry that gets “something out of abstractions.”  
Despite the usefulness of some Objectivist principles, then, her relationship with 
the silences of Objectivist condensation was complex and, finally, undecided, in part 
because of the sacrifices it required. Her comments to Zukofsky about destroying lines, 
notwithstanding their just-joshing tone, reveal a sense of loss. To be a solid citizen she 
must excise a “mystery” and “flow” to which she is clearly drawn, and, even if Niedecker 
herself did not directly connect these sacrificed elements to the feminine, Objectivist 
rhetoric often did. Objectivism, like the Poundian modernism with which it was in close 
dialogue, authorizes itself as rigorously intellectual and morally and artistically controlled 
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by opposition to a degraded emotional permissiveness and excess, proposing itself as a 
needed corrective to a feminized laxity.
52
 The feminization of linguistic excess is part of 
what Gail Kern Paster calls the “familiar discourse about women’s bodies”: 
 this discourse [. . .] inscribes women as leaky vessels by isolating one element of 
the female body’s material expressiveness—its production of fluids—as 
excessive, hence either disturbing or shameful. It also characteristically links this 
liquid expressiveness to excessive verbal fluency. (44) 
Carl Rakosi’s description of why he found the Objectivist label fitting for his work relies 
on a similar logic, though it submerges its gendering: “[Objectivism] conveyed a 
meaning which was, in fact, my objective: to present objects in their most essential reality 
and to make of each poem an object, meaning by this the opposite of vagueness, loose 
bowels, and streaming, sometimes screaming, consciousness” (107). In this formulation, 
the poem should be bounded, specific, and discrete—qualities associated with a 
masculine principle—and not subject to the indignities of permeability, flow, or 
emotional subjectivity—considered feminine. It may be that Niedecker’s dreamlike 
aesthetic of linguistic free association, which she sometimes considered an unruly 
personal tendency, is in part a rebellious response to the masculinist implications of 
Objectivist control.  
This is not to say, though, that when Niedecker wrote in a condensed style it was 
because she internalized anti-feminine values. Niedecker’s poetics cannot be simplified 
into a binary opposition, with Objectivist silences representing masculinist oppression 
and Surrealist linguistic freedom standing for feminist resistance. Niedecker often 
expressed a personal distaste for what she saw as excessive or even vulgar, which she too 
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connected to uncontrolled bodies. When she writes Corman about the “west coast 
ferment,” this aversion colors her admiration: “I’m buzzing with a new look at the west 
coast ferment—i.e. Allen Ginsberg’s poems, notably Kaddish. It still moves me but why 
must the show of vitality come by way of misery, dirt, sexiness. No better poetry than the 
quiet” (Between 101). She opposes the “sexiness” of Ginsberg to a “quiet” that she did 
not feel should be sacrificed for a “show of vitality.” Niedecker’s search for what 
Objectivism didn’t give her—the ability to look inward, the possibility of flow and 
vigor—was coupled with a resistance to “misery, dirt, sexiness” and a personally 
ingrained desire to avoid excess and indulgence.
53
 While we may question how and why 
this was ingrained in Niedecker and even posit that it is a result of patriarchal cultural 
models, for Niedecker, excess, particularly sexual or bodily excess, was a failure of 
discipline more than a revolutionary act. Moreover, the parts of Objectivism that inspired 
Niedecker, its quiet aesthetic of omission and its devotion to the facts, “wonderful in 
themselves,” could also be a form of feminist resistance. If women have been a poetic 
object par excellence, explored by male subjectivity, then Objectivist refusal to transgress 
the boundaries of objects and a general insistence on the limits of the poetic subject could 
be tools of a feminist poetics that seeks to represent without appropriating. This is 
singularly useful for a woman writer who is suspicious of personal revelation. Neither 
Objectivist nor Surrealist strategies are definitively feminist, but they complement and 
contradict each other in Niedecker’s work in ways that suggest a gendered aspect to 
Niedecker’s complex negotiations with form.54 Niedecker’s affinities for particular 
elements of both Objectivism and Surrealism may share nascent or unacknowledged 
feminist motives, but the achievement of a poetry that can both expand the range of a 
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female poetic subject and maintain the boundaries of a feminized poetic object is marked 
by conflict. 
We have seen that the value of silence for Niedecker is constantly in tension with 
her belief in the usefulness and beauty of language, and her wrestling with both 
Objectivism and Surrealism plays out a related friction. Objectivism provides strategies 
for the doing of silence in her poetry that safeguards objects from poetic appropriation, 
while Surrealism provides strategies for allowing language free play to create 
connections among objects and between poet and objects. The mystery and flow created 
by Surrealist juxtaposition and dream illogic help Niedecker approach an ideal of 
unmediated access to the unrestrained mind, while Objectivist condensation prevents the 
mistreatment of memory’s unrecognizable objects as mere pretexts for self-indulgent 
subjectivism. Objectivist insistence on autonomy is a tool for feminist resistance to the 
predatory poetic subject, while Surrealist “streaming” allows the use of feminized modes 
of thought and expression connected to a repressed female embodiment. It is no wonder, 
then, that so many of Niedecker’s letters reveal uncertainty, doubt, and indecision. In her 
poems, she often chooses to follow one strain or another, tending now toward the 
reserved now toward the talkative, now toward condensation now toward expansiveness, 
now toward objective observation and now toward dreamlike imagery. But, again, this 
was not a choice that Niedecker could make definitively. Thus, her experiments with 
form show her working out a means of simultaneously achieving a protective, respectful 
silence aligned with Objectivism and a flowing, expansive expressiveness aligned with 
Surrealism rather than merely oscillating between the two. 
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 Even in New Goose, arguably Niedecker’s most Objectivist volume, her poems 
combine linguistic restraint and permissiveness. For example, “Don’t shoot the rail” 
appears, on one level, to conform to an Objectivist aesthetic. In fact, it opens with two 
separate exclamations enjoining a wild-eyed addressee to leave others—a bird and a 
man—alone: 
Don’t shoot the rail! 
 Let your grandfather rest! 
Tho he sees your wild eyes 
he’s falling asleep, 
his long-billed pipe 
on his red-brown vest. (92)  
The poem’s “you” appears determined to disturb the peace of both the rail (short for sora 
rail) and the grandfather, and the speaker seeks to prevent the shooting that would wound 
or kill the bird and disrupt the grandfather’s sleep. The poem’s primary objects—“you,” 
bird, and man—are presented as separate beings on the verge of being thrown into 
relation with each other. The violence that the “you” intends would force unwanted—
and, in the case of the rail, potentially deadly—interaction between formerly isolated 
objects. Instead, the speaker asks the “you” to refrain, leaving both rail and grandfather to 
sleep undisturbed. Thus, by intervening against violence on the level of narrative, the 
speaker dramatizes the isolation of individual “intact natures” that Niedecker considers 
central to her poetics. 
However, even as it demands restraint of its addressee, the poem itself performs 
its own invasions, overlapping its subjects to create a composite grandfather-rail figure. 
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The descriptive language applied to the grandfather makes him bird-like. The image of a 
man nodding off with a long pipe tucked against his vest calls to mind a sleeping bird and 
the color of the vest, red-brown, evokes its plumage. In fact, the upper back feathers of 
sora rails are generally a dark, reddish brown. These descriptors imply that “Don’t shoot 
the rail!” and “Let your grandfather rest!” are not separate injunctions but refer to the 
same action. The speaker may be arguing that the shooter should not harm the rail 
because it should be respected as grandfather—a relative and an elder. While this regard 
furthers the poem’s regard for the boundaries of natural objects, it also endangers such 
boundaries by making its primary figure simultaneously animal and human. This kind of 
figuration owes more to a dreamlike Surrealist-inspired linguistic freedom, where logical 
distinctions give way to impressionistic merging, than it does to Objectivist precision.  
The poem formally reflects its ambivalence toward maintaining boundaries 
among objects, both countermanding and reinforcing the speaker’s demand that rail and 
grandfather be left in peace. The opening lines establish a grammatical ambiguity that 
unsettles the following description. The meaning of the pronouns in the final four lines 
depends entirely on whether “grandfather” is another name for the rail or a second 
subject. This doubt is unresolvable because the words denote a human subject while 
imagery and sound patterns merge human and animal. For instance, though the word 
“long-billed” is obviously bird imagery, the grammar of the phrase makes the pipe bird-
like rather than the man. The image associates bird and grandfather, but it does so 
obliquely, scrupulously refusing to directly attribute an avian identity to the human 
subject. Similarly, the music of the final line identifies man with rail, but its literal 
meaning subverts that identification. The strong, repetitive consonants in “red-brown” 
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create an echo that carries over so that it is easy to hear the poem’s final words as 
“breast,” a misapprehension that lends itself to reading the sora rail and the grandfather as 
one and the same. Conversely, the actual word, “vest,” does the opposite, settling on a 
decidedly human identity for the figure by describing his clothing. Thus, the poem 
identifies its objects—blurring bird and grandfather into a single subject, “he”—while 
simultaneously maintaining the distinction between the two subjects through precise, 
objective language that refuses the metaphorical conflation of human and animal. 
Niedecker doesn’t choose between Surrealist and Objectivist modes but plays them 
against each other to create fruitful metaphorical juxtapositions while limiting the power 
of language to manipulate objects in this way. 
While discussions of the rhetorical, philosophical, and aesthetic influences of 
literary movements like Objectivism and Surrealism can help clarify the significance of 
Niedecker’s allegiances, these kinds of issues were important for Niedecker primarily 
insofar as they helped her delineate and answer questions about how poetry should be 
made. In some ways, attention to theoretical motivations interferes with poetry. She 
writes Corman about her frustration with such distractions: “Been carrying on a 
correspondence with Eshleman. Mostly at his behest—technique, why I don’t write 
differently, why he doesn’t. I’m no good at it—I write from notes, which seem to always 
stay notes, grocery lists. I throw up my arms and scream: Write—cut it and just write 
poems” (Between 153). She argues against too much exploration of reasons and 
philosophies in favor of simply getting the writing done.
55
 But, while she avoided critical 
discussions, Niedecker was often willing to talk about her poetic practice. Niedecker was 
an experimentalist, always refining her methods, seeking to extend the reach of her 
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poems. Indeed, while her discussions of craft are frequently intellectual, sometimes even 
esoteric, she also refers to her poetic experimentation as an emotional and physical need: 
“I’ve become lately very—painfully—interested in poetry [. . .]. If I don’t get over into 
the strange and new thing I feel I’ll bust” (149). It is this experimental necessity, the 
search for a poetry that will get her “over into” the new, that marks her participation in 
programmatic literary movements. Even when she appears to be declaring herself an 
Objectivist or nominating Surrealism as an important countercurrent in her work, she is 
generally not discussing literary philosophies or aesthetic epistemologies as such. 
Literary currents are compelling for her when they provide strategies for writing, and her 
involvement in schools of literary thought is, at bottom, driven by questions about how 
words can and should be put together to make a poem. Particularly, she is interested in 
discovering how to avoid subjective excesses and respect the particularity of objects 
while still being able to express the illogical relationships of the mind with a flowing and 
lively language. 
Her response to language—particularly the sentence—makes clear that this 
conflict is rooted in craft. In the midst of her search for “something else,” she articulates 
an important metaphor for her poetics: “You [Corman] and Jonathan Williams have 
thrown off the shackles of the sentence and the wide melody. For me the sentence lies in 
wait—all those prepositions and connectives—like an early spring flood. A good thing 
my follow-up feeling has always been condense, condense” (Between 33). Niedecker is 
much better known for her “follow-up feeling” of “condense, condense” than for her use 
of the relational structure of the sentence. Thus, it may seem that Objectivist practice is 
largely a successful corrective to the excesses of the sentence. But her diction indicates a 
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more complex situation: she refers to the sentence as both a shackle and a flood. For 
Corman and Williams—male writers who favored a spare, condensed, haiku-inspired 
poetry—the sentence is a constraint that can be thrown off by a triumphant will. 
Niedecker, too, responds to the sentence as a shackle, but—as a woman writer working 
within and against the lingering legacy of the conversational and emotional “poetess”—
the sentence is also a spring flood, a compelling figure of undeniable energy even in its 
destructiveness.
56
 Niedecker’s mixed metaphor is a measure of her uncertainty about 
language itself as represented by the sentence, which is intimately tied to rhetoric and 
meaning by its grammatical and narrative qualities. Niedecker focuses in particular on 
“all those prepositions and connectives” because they represent the meaning-making 
capacity by which discrete objects are put into relationship with each other and about 
which she is conflicted.  
Language’s ability to penetrate the individual nature of objects, as embodied in 
prepositions and connectives, constitutes a constraint. This limitation is frequently 
overcome in Niedecker’s writing and in the poetry she admires simply by omitting 
prepositions and connectives, which describe and, in a sense, dictate how the objects that 
appear in a sentence interact. Prepositions and connectives are tools of the predatory and 
controlling consciousness, forcing objects out of themselves by requiring certain kinds of 
interactions between them. Thus, for Objectivist writers to condense language, 
particularly by omitting connectives, allows objects to remain self-contained. Just as 
eliding the subject—cutting the “I” from a poem—prevents predation, removing 
relational language leaves objects alone with themselves and intact. As Niedecker 
explains in the letter to Harriet Monroe above, “prepositions and connectives belong 
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upwards toward full consciousness,” and, as such, they are the instruments of an 
organizing mind. Inasmuch as she seeks a poetry that deemphasizes or undermines the 
power of poetic subjectivity over its objects, Niedecker silences the elements of language 
that clearly evidence that power.
57
 
But, for Niedecker, the sentence is also a flood, which points to both the danger 
and appeal of its excesses. The flood is not an incidental metaphor for Niedecker.
58
 
Floods were a constant reality of her life on Black Hawk Island, and they figure 
prominently in both her letters and poems. The destructiveness of flood waters is 
obvious, and Niedecker captures this hazard with detailed immediacy: “Torrential rains, 
water rising at Fort, my husband’s cucumbers & squash swimming. Depend on nothing” 
(Between 41). That final sentence summarizes numerous letters describing the 
devastation of human efforts—foundations flooded, whole houses unredeemable from the 
water—and points to a frequent theme in Niedecker’s poems as well.59 But Niedecker 
also captures the less obvious importance of flooding to life on the river. She spent most 
of her life on the flood-prone banks of the Rock River and Lake Koshkonog, and she sees 
flooding as natural: “We have frogs here now and sora rails giggle. No flood this spring, 
very unnatural” (Between 39). While the spring floods may lie in wait to wash away 
one’s cucumbers, they also represent the return of life and growth after the stagnation of 
winter. When the floods recede, they leave fertile soil along with ruined houses. The 
fecundity of the flood appears in Niedecker’s poems as “my rich friend silt” and a 
“source / to sustain her— / a weedy speech, / a marshy retainer (168, 170). One short 
poem uses a single image to suggest both a deathly bloat and a bloom carried on the 
water: 
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White 
among the green pads— 
 which 
   a dead fish 
or a lily? (184) 
Water, especially flooding, represents for Niedecker both deadly excess and teeming life. 
Thus, if prepositions and connectives are a flood, they are to be fought back but are also 
an inevitable and irresistible force of life.  
Prepositions and connectives are the locus of Niedecker’s anxiety about and 
attraction to the overwhelming qualities of language because they allow objects to move 
around, into, above, and below each other, mixing them all into a wash of relationship. 
Niedecker’s characterization of the prepositional or connective properties of language as 
a destructive flood in some ways reiterates the attitudes that make it a shackle. The 
connections that language makes are still oppressive and something the poet should 
resist. But where Niedecker figures Corman and Williams’s resistance to the sentence as 
a fait accompli (“have cast off”), her own process of dealing with connectives is 
portrayed in the present tense. The sentence “lies in wait” for her, and her success in 
confronting it is uncertain. Moreover, her phrasing makes prepositions and connectives 
sound almost as much a temptation as a threat, echoing her frequent characterization of 
condensation as saintly. In addition to the danger it conveys, the figure of language as 
flood accords language its own activity and identity. If language overflows Niedecker’s 
poems, then Niedecker is not a sinner but a beleaguered believer. Niedecker as poet is 
distanced from the act of excess, a victim of the flood, allowing her poems to revel in 
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language without necessarily granting power over objects to the poet or speaker. While 
omission and condensation prevent the subject from using language to invade the object, 
language may also overpower the subject, thwarting its control over language as object. 
Niedecker’s use of flood imagery reverses the agency that so worries her in writing too 
heavily dependent on the subjective. In this formulation, it is not the speaker of the poem 
who uses language to penetrate other individual natures. Rather, insofar as the flood 
represents the richness and danger of language, it overpowers the poet, dissolving her 
intact nature along with all else in its path. In this way, the poet is able to surrender to 
language without becoming the predatory subject. Instead, she becomes an object among 
objects. If the prepositional and connective property of language is a flood, it is not only a 
dangerous excess to be held at bay by human efforts but an unstoppable, superhuman 
force that both revives and overwhelms.  
The primary effect of the engulfing sentence, particularly its prepositions and 
connectives, is to establish relationships without implicating the poet in breaching the 
integrity of the poem’s objects. When the usual distinctions—between river and shore, 
house and yard, even human and animal—are washed away, surprising, rewarding 
relationships may be formed. This is important to Niedecker because relationship is a 
means of accessing interiority and understanding how the mind encounters objects.
60
 In 
fact, she makes relationship as such the language of the subconscious. As we have seen, 
years before she writes Corman about her difficult relationship to the sentence, Niedecker 
explicitly names “prepositions and connectives,” the very language functions she aligns 
with the sentence’s dangerous flow, essential to dream language: “in dream the simple 
and familiar words like prepositions, connectives, etc . . . are not absent, in fact, 
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noticeably present to show illogical absurdity, discontinuity, parody of sanity” 
(Correspondence 27). The freedom of relationship that marks the interior landscape of 
the mind is a kind of flood, a metaphor echoed by our term “stream of consciousness” 
and Rakosi’s disgust at the “streaming, sometimes screaming, consciousness.” Niedecker 
is drawn to a poetry that can access mysterious interior relationships, and—as language 
particularly equipped to create “illogical absurdity” and surprising shifting associations 
among objects—prepositions and connectives are attractive to her. It is possible that 
Niedecker aligned this simultaneously destructive and enlivening connectivity with a 
feminine principle. In particular, Niedecker associated nature, particularly water, with her 
mother and her mother’s life (140).61 Such an identification corresponds to Objectivist 
and modernist suspicion of excess or overflow as feminine, and Niedecker’s 
understanding of relational language may be shaped by a conflicted response to the 
feminine. Certainly, what seems to enthrall and repulse Niedecker about the flood is its 
menacing and empowering ability to overrun boundaries. It is clear that when language 
overflows its bounds, bounds that are strictly set by Niedecker in her condensed mode, 
she feels the result as disordered and uncontrolled. But her feelings about that disorder 
are, again, divided. She writes to Corman about a sought-after change in her poetics, an 
anticipated migration into a new form: “It’s probably only that old dream thing that 
threatens to mess things up but never really does—still, this time when it comes it might” 
(Between 149). She pulls back somewhat from the idea that what she’s feeling is entirely 
new by recalling her youthful fascination with dreams. And when she recalls “that old 
dream thing” she does not decry the mess it makes but rather appears to regret its failure 
to “mess things up” as much as it promises. She is hopeful about the possibility of 
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impending mess though fearful of it.
62
 The connective or relational power of the sentence 
is both shackle and flood—and as flood it is both vital flow and dangerous overflow.  
This makes Niedecker’s use of prepositions and connectives particularly 
significant to her conflicted relationship between speech and silence. On one hand, 
silencing the connections made by the sentence allows her to throw off restrictive, 
determinate meaning that compromises the singular identity of objects. On the other, 
prepositions and connectives, particularly those that establish illogical or overflowing 
connections, extend the reach of language into the subconscious mind as well as 
attributing an agency to language itself. Her metaphor for the sentence is mixed because 
“prepositions and connectives” belong to “full consciousness,” something to be cast off, a 
predation to be resisted; but they also belong to the language of dream, a fluid interaction 
between mind and mysterious, unrecognizable objects that approaches the ideal art of 
talking to oneself. Niedecker uses prepositions to work out her desire to throw off the 
shackle of the sentence—that is, its restriction of an object’s agency—without losing the 
vigor of its flood—its overwhelming of the subject’s agency and access to interiority 
through uncontrollably proliferating relationships.
63
 She does this by placing prepositions 
and other connectives ambiguously, undermining the positions they establish. Despite her 
statement to Corman that her response to the inundations of the sentence has been to 
condense, her poems are often rife with connectives, which is all the more surprising 
given how short they generally are. Like many of her poems, “She was a mourner too” 
uses relational language, particularly prepositions, freely. The elusiveness of the 
connections made in this poem shelters the integrity of objects from incursions by the 
subject while creating shifting relationships between identities: 
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She was a mourner too. Now she’s gone 
  to the earth’s core, 
with organ notes, buried by church that buries the live, 
intoning: That torture called by men delight 
    touches her no more. 
So calm she looked, half smiling: Heaven? 
      No, restore 
my matter, never free from motion, 
   to the soil’s roar. (111) 
The poem records the speaker’s thoughts upon the burial of another, and the general 
sense is that the speaker is uninspired by the church’s way of understanding death and its 
aftermath. Rather than the transport of the soul beyond earthly torture (or delight), she 
posits, or at least asks for, a return to the earth, a dismissal of the body rather than a 
transcendence of the soul. What is at stake in the poem, then, echoes what is at stake in 
Niedecker’s poetics: individual intact nature and access to something outside ordinary 
consciousness. The first preposition we encounter in the poem begins line two, “to the 
Earth’s core.” The duality of this preposition points up a crucial problem in the poem. We 
could read that line to say that the dead woman, as a singular self, has gone to the Earth’s 
core. If she can be located in the core of the Earth, she is still identifiable as herself. This 
first meaning echoes a common religious notion of the persistence of identity after death. 
However, one could also read that line to mean that the absence of the dead woman is so 
complete as to extend to the Earth’s core. This reading reinforces the dissolution of 
identity described in the final lines of the poem. In addition to allowing contradictory 
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readings, the undecidability of the preposition formally enacts a dual response to 
language. It preserves the singularity of objects, here “she” and “the earth’s core,” which 
slip the shackle of the relationship imposed by language’s connectives. But it 
simultaneously intimates a mysterious connection, illogical and undecideable. This 
impulse is so powerful that the “she” is diffused, untouchable, and swallowed into the 
soil. The poem’s rhymes also reinforce its indecision about the resolving of the singular 
into a shared identity. The full rhyme—“core,” “more,” “restore,” and “roar”—and the 
off rhymes—“live” and “delight,” “Heaven” and “motion”—create shared aural 
identities, while the only end word without a rhyming partner, “gone,” resists that 
similarity. The structure of the poem performs a simultaneous preservation of the singular 
soul and the fusion of that soul with something larger. 
At every turn, connective language, particularly prepositions, accomplishes this 
through uncertainty. The chief figure of the poem, “she,” is defined primarily by relation 
and preposition—“to the Earth’s core,” “with organ notes,” “by Church”—but these 
relationships are indeterminate: have the “she” and the “organ notes” gone together to the 
earth’s core or is she buried with organ notes? If she is buried with organ notes, does that 
mean that her burial is accompanied by organ notes or that she and the music are buried 
together? Does the church bury her, or is she buried near the church? Each of these 
prepositions creates more than one possible connection among the poem’s objects. 
Further, the grammatical instability created by the prepositions destabilizes the basic 
relationship between subject and verb, making it possible to read the verb “intoning” as 
belonging to either “organ notes,” “church,” “the live,” or even “she,” each of which 
attributes the phrase “That torture called by men delight / touches her no more” to a 
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different source. If the source is “organ notes” or “church,” the meaning is similar: the 
church or the church’s music decrees that the buried “she” has escaped the torture of 
worldly temptation. But if the source of that phrase is “the live,” the imagery changes, 
and the living people at the funeral are buried by the church while they are intoning that 
delight is torture and death is freedom from it. If it is the “she” that is connected to the 
verb “intoning,” the phrase becomes an indirect quotation because it uses “her” rather 
than “me.” This reading implies that the buried woman still retains her identity and is 
capable of speech, though indirect.
64
 These ambiguities complicate the interpretation of 
the poem, and they also undermine the meaning-making function of language, the 
sentence’s power to impose relationships on the objects it positions. The individual 
nature of the thing cannot be mastered by the relationships the prepositions dictate. 
However, refusal of the connective properties of language could also be accomplished 
simply by deleting the prepositions, leaving the objects isolated from one another. 
Instead, the inclusion of indefinite connectives allows the poem to dramatize the contact 
between perceiving mind and object, an illogical subconscious flow in which all things 
are related but in unpredictable and unstable ways. Multivalent relationships are 
important in this poem because they echo its themes. But even when such grammatical 
figuration doesn’t advance the poems’ subjects so directly, Niedecker uses prepositions 
and connectives similarly, simultaneously short-circuiting and multiplying the 
relationships that language establishes between subject and object and among objects. 
Because prepositions and connectives represent the sentence for Niedecker, they are an 
important tool for managing a complex and shifting relationship to silence and speech.  
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Like prepositions, conjunctions are intimately involved in the connective 
functions of the sentence. In “Easter Greeting,” the conjunction “or” works like the 
prepositions in “She was a mourner” both to use and diffuse relational language.  
I suppose there is nothing 
so good as human 
immediacy 
 
I do not speak loosely  
of handshake 
 which is 
 of the mind 
or lilies—stand closer— 
smell (221) 
The title of the poem indicates a narrative context of greeting, further particularized by 
Easter, which indicates the spring season and calls to mind the Christian resurrection 
story. In the first stanza, the speaker appears to make a relatively straightforward 
statement. The stanza break, along with the capital “I” of the following stanza, 
recommend that the first three lines be read as a self-contained utterance, which is easily 
interpretable: the speaker supposes that human immediacy is unsurpassed by any other 
thing. The next stanza introduces further context for that statement, but, as often occurs 
with Niedecker’s clarifications, it expands rather than limiting possible meanings. The 
speaker clarifies that she does not “speak loosely / of handshake,” but this contextualizes 
her first statement in two mutually exclusive ways. In one possible interpretation, 
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“handshake” is an example of or a synonym for human immediacy, and the speaker 
declares that she speaks carefully about the matter. However, “I do not speak loosely of 
handshake” could also qualify the subject at hand, delineating human immediacy as 
something more specific than “handshake.” After this initial complication, the 
conjunction “or” further increases the possible meanings, and the various readings it 
allows are in turn inflected by the two fundamentally different rhetorical contexts created 
by the ambiguity of the phrase “I do not speak loosely / of handshake.” 
Because of the absence of punctuation, it is difficult to determine exactly what 
options the preposition “or” establishes, but other formal elements imply grammatical 
structure. For instance, the indentation of “which is of the mind” separates it from the rest 
of the stanza, creating a visual parenthesis that allows “or” to connect “lilies” with 
“handshake”: “I do not speak loosely of handshake (which is of the mind) or lilies.” In 
this version of the poem’s potential grammar, “lilies” are like “handshake”; depending on 
the reading of the first line of the stanza, they are either an example of or an imprecise 
description of human immediacy. If lilies exemplify human closeness, this suggests a 
dissolution of the distinctions between kinds of life, a leveling of the taxonomic 
topography. But if to talk of lilies is to speak loosely of human immediacy, this signifies 
a resistance to such leveling as imprecise. Like this most available reading of the 
conjunction’s role—linking handshake and lilies—other possible grammatical 
interpretations are also dually significant. For instance, proximity endorses the 
conjunction of “lilies” with “the mind” as one of two things that contain handshake, as in, 
“I do not speak loosely of handshake, which is of the mind or lilies.” If handshake 
belongs to or characterizes the mind or lilies, this implies that a physical human greeting 
  
178 
 
is non-physical or non-human. In addition, this mental or botanical handshake either 
exemplifies human immediacy or misses the mark, depending on how the first line of the 
stanza is read. 
Because of the lack of standard determiners of syntactical relationship (even the 
separation achieved by capital letters is undermined here by the fact that “I” is always 
capitalized), “or lilies” remains grammatically flexible, creating possible readings even 
beyond the limits of the stanza. For instance, if they are combined with “human 
immediacy”—as in, “I suppose there is nothing so good as human immediacy (I do not 
speak loosely of handshake, which is of the mind) or lilies”—lilies are, along with human 
closeness, one of the highest goods. It is also possible that the lilies are not connected to 
any one of the other nouns of the poem but are, instead, posited as an alternative to the 
rest of the poem as a whole. When the flowers are introduced, the tone changes, moving 
from an internal, contemplative supposition about abstract concepts—even “a handshake” 
is rendered abstract by the deletion of the article—to a concrete immediacy evidenced by 
the shift to the more physical lilies and the direct injunction to use one’s senses: “or 
lilies—stand closer— / smell.” It may be that this change indicates an abrupt, mid-
sentence swing from one subject to another, in which a sensual experience pulls the 
speaker out of her abstract thought. It may also be that the change is caused by the 
speaker greeting another person, the addressee of the imperative “stand closer—smell.” 
In either case, the “Easter Greeting” of the poem’s title is an encounter based in 
immediate physical interaction. The “or,” in addition to its other possible functions, 
marks a turn from supposing to smelling. Where “or” is generally one of the restrictive 
examples of connective language, delineating a choice among alternatives, in Niedecker’s 
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hands it becomes more permissive. Like her use of prepositions in “She was a mourner,” 
this variability limits language’s ability to dictate the nature of relationships between 
objects by diffusing it, but it also expands language’s capabilities by allowing a single 
word to form numerous poetically generative relationships. 
Niedecker continues both to limit and extend language as her form undergoes 
significant changes throughout her life. As we have seen, she wrote to correspondents 
that she was seeking out a new form in the late 1960s. Perhaps buoyed by support from 
other publishers and writers or freed by less frequent and less emotionally intense 
correspondence with Zukofsky, Niedecker was actively developing a form that allowed 
her to express a “sumpn” that she connected to a youthful prolixity and opposed to her 
Objectivist condensation. One of the most immediately evident effects of this change is 
her exploration of considerably longer forms.
65
 While much of Niedecker’s early work is 
known for being quite short, she wrote several important long poems toward the end of 
her life.
66
 Despite this development, however, Niedecker continues to use ambivalent 
prepositions and unstable connections simultaneously to promote linguistic freedom and 
silences in her work. In an important later poem, “My Life by Water,” equivocal 
prepositions both create and resist the connections language effects. The title of the poem 
is emblematic of Niedecker’s use of prepositions throughout much of her work. The 
preposition “by” could mean that the speaker’s life is conducted near water, but it may 
also mean that the speaker’s life is created or authored by water. If the speaker’s life is 
“by” water in the sense of near it, that relationship signals a parallel existence that 
permits influence without jeopardizing individuality. Relationship as proximity of one 
thing to another evokes Objectivist silences and a resistance to language’s connective 
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powers. However, if the title of the poem is “‘My Life’ by Water,” this could mean either 
that it is water’s autobiography or that it is the poet’s biography written by water.67 This 
either deemphasizes the poet-speaker as the subject or makes the biographical subject 
itself a creation of the object. Thus, the preposition “by” simultaneously invokes a limited 
relationship that inherently suggests discrete identities and an entanglement that 
challenges the very distinction between creator and creation by implying that water writes 
the poet’s life—even as Niedecker authors the poem in which water is her biographer.  
Throughout the poem, prepositions and other connectives perform a similar 
duality, both realizing and resisting relationship:  
My Life by Water 
 
My life 
   by water— 
     Hear 
 
spring’s  
    first frog 
      or board 
 
out on the cold  
   ground 
      giving 
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Muskrats 
   gnawing 
      doors  
 
to wild green 
   arts and letters 
      Rabbits 
 
raided 
   my lettuce 
      One boat 
 
two— 
   pointed toward 
      my shore 
 
thru birdstart 
   wingdrip 
      weed-drift 
 
of the soft 
   and serious— 
      Water (237) 
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In one sense, the poem is a relatively straightforward naturalistic sketch. The speaker 
describes what she observes in spring near a flood-prone body of water. Niedecker 
captures this intimately familiar experience with her usual sensitivity to the neat detail. 
She focuses particularly on the sounds of spring in the Wisconsin riverine climate, the 
onset of the frogs’ croaking for mates or the defrosting of a frozen yard that results in a 
creaking board. The poem savors the populous multivocality of returning life: the 
muskrat’s destructive gnawing is converted into a species of creativity—“wild green / 
arts and letters”—and the speaker’s solitude is punctured both by hungry rabbits and 
visitors in boats. But, despite the interest of the poem in a vibrant aquatic fertility and 
sociality, because she was writing in the midst of a search for a new form, her treatment 
of this subject is especially fraught, and something of the mess she fears and hopes for 
seeps in. If prepositions and connectives “lie in wait” like an “early spring flood,” to take 
on the subject of an actual early spring flood is to risk being washed away by them. 
Though there are, perhaps surprisingly, fewer prepositions in this poem than in many 
others, those that are included create a sense of chaotic interrelationship among the 
objects of the poem. The greatest density of prepositional relationships occurs toward the 
end of the poem: “One boat // two— / pointed toward / my shore // thru birdstart / 
wingdrip / weed-drift // of the soft / and serious— / Water.” The first relationship is clear: 
the boats are pointed toward the speaker’s shore. However, both “thru” and “of” are less 
certain. It may be that each prepositional phrase modifies the one that came before it: the 
boats are pointed toward the shore through the sights and sounds of the water. In this 
case, the prepositions and connectives take the poem farther and farther from the 
individual “one boat,” increased to “two,” directed toward something, through something 
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else, which is of another thing. And this propagation of relationships is intensified as the 
poem uses one preposition to interrupt the connections posited by another, making more 
interactions possible. The stanza beginning “thru birdstart” can also function as a 
parenthetical separating “my shore” from “of,” leaving two different subjects—“my 
shore” and “birdstart / wingdrip / weed-drift,” themselves objects of other prepositions—
vying for the object of the preposition “of.” The grammar is further complicated by the 
placement of the final dash, which makes it possible that either “the soft / and serious” or 
“Water” are the object of the preposition. Thus, the boats could be “pointed toward my 
shore of the soft and serious” or “pointed toward my shore of the (soft and serious) 
water” or simply “pointed toward my shore” through the sights and sounds of the water. 
As we saw in Niedecker’s earlier work, these radically uncertain prepositions have 
simultaneous and contradictory effects. On one hand, like the frogs, doors, muskrats, and 
boards of the poem’s earlier images, the objects of these final stanzas collide into 
surprising and unstable relationships in the flood of language. On the other, the very 
uncertainty of relationships undermines the predatory aspect of language that would rob 
objects of their individual natures by reifying their relationships to one another.  
Again, in addition to prepositions, other types of connectives perform dual 
functions; verbs also work both to extend and limit language in this poem. In particular, 
Niedecker uses verbs that are both transitive and intransitive, connective and self-
contained. The first three stanzas of the poem are structured by the primary verb “Hear” 
and the secondary verb (a gerund serving as an object) “giving.” The verb “Hear” is in 
the form of a command—perhaps to the reader, perhaps to the speaker herself—to hear a 
frog or a board giving. This hearing is the primary relationship when the poem begins, 
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and it establishes connection between the speaker and the reader, as well as between the 
speaker/reader/hearer and the frog or board to which they attend. Further, it could be that 
the hearer must choose between hearing two sounds—the sound of the frog croaking or 
the sound of the board creaking; but it may also be that there is one sound of unknown 
source—it could be either a frog or a board. The verb “hear” establishes several 
relationships, opening the poem with language that subjects its objects to verbal 
determination and extends the reach of language by establishing multivalent 
relationships. But the poem undermines the verb’s claim to its objects in two ways. First, 
its placement after a dash and at the end of the stanza separates the verb “Hear” from its 
objects. “Hear” may be an apostrophe to the reader or simply an evocation of the act of 
listening that is removed from the grammar of the surrounding phrases. This reading 
would leave the following noun phrases isolated as well, objective descriptions of objects 
in themselves rather than objects of the speaker’s or reader’s hearing. Second, the 
placement of the verb in the same stanza as the introductory phrase indicating position, 
“My life / by water— ,” also calls to mind the homophone “here.” The deictic word 
“here” implies that speaker and reader share the space to which the poem points. 
However, it also distances the reader from the objects of the poem, both by diluting with 
a second meaning the readers’s involvement through the apostrophizing command “hear” 
and by underlining the reader’s lack of access to the actual “here” to which the word 
points. Like her prepositions, Niedecker’s use of the verb “hear” both establishes various 
connections and destabilizes those connections. In this case, Niedecker restricts the 
connective property of language through punctuation and the echo of a homophone in 
addition to the verb’s flexibility. The secondary verb, “giving,” also serves 
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simultaneously to restrain and further language’s relational function. “To give” is 
fundamentally a transitive verb, in its most common usage taking both a direct object and 
an indirect object, “to give something to something.” Thus, the verb “give,” suspended at 
the end of the stanza, invokes a silence or omission, a suppression of the connective role 
the verb generally plays. The usual relationships established by a transitive verb like 
“give” are further stymied here since the verb is used in its much less common 
intransitive sense, “to collapse or break.” Such a move shuts down the relationships of 
language, retaining a focus on the singular thing, the board, in itself, giving way. But 
“giving” also connects objects, in this case “board” and “ground.” To hear something 
“giving” is an idiosyncratic but interpretable use of the verb. However, in its intransitive 
sense, the verb “give,” especially in informal speech, often carries the preposition “out.” 
And, in fact, the stanza begins with the word “out,” looping the stanza back on itself in a 
syntactic inversion where the board is “out on the cold / ground / giving” but also “giving 
out on the cold / ground.” Thus, the verb both performs and refuses its usual function of 
connection. Like variable prepositions, verbs that both connect subject with object and 
refuse to do so help create a poetic attitude that takes advantage of language’s dynamic 
relationships without permitting the subject to inhabit the object’s sovereignty.68  
While ambiguous prepositions and connectives, such as transitive verbs, appear 
throughout much of Niedecker’s work as a means of both extending and limiting 
language, her own sense of her work during the period in which she wrote “My Life by 
Water” was that she was reaching for a new kind of form. Such a change is most evident 
in the interaction between sentences and stanza divisions.
 
The enjambed three-line stanza 
form Niedecker develops in “My Life by Water” is not unique to this poem.69 However, 
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the frequency of enjambment is noticeable compared to other instances of similar 
stanzaic forms. The poem enjambs syntactic units across lines, which is more common to 
Niedecker’s short poems than her longer ones. In fact, Niedecker’s short lines—which 
isolate objects, as we saw in “I hear the weather”—are often used to exemplify the 
importance of silence in her work. However, they also make it difficult not to use 
enjambment, which prevents the lines themselves from existing as isolated objects, 
despite separating the things they name. For example, a single-word line like “Muskrats” 
in one sense leaves the object uninterpreted. Similarly, “gnawing” and “doors” receive 
their own lines. But the enjambment of the lines connects each of these detached words 
into a phrase, “muskrats gnawing doors,” that establishes a clear relationship between 
objects. The structure of the stanzas mirrors the structure of the lines. “Muskrats gnawing 
doors” is set apart in its own short stanza. But the next stanza establishes a new 
relationship “to wild green / arts and letters,” disrupting the closed system of the previous 
stanzas with a strange image that connects the muskrats gnawing doors to a distant world 
of “arts and letters.” Also, the seeming incompleteness of the verb “giving” relates the 
muskrats to the previous stanza. Thus, while the short lines and stanzas suppress the 
connective power of language, that condensation gives rise to enjambment, making the 
boundaries of lines and stanzas permeable to grammatical relationships reaching across 
them. The structure of sentences in the poem similarly both separates and connects. The 
elision of periods and other punctuation allows for a freer play of connection between 
what would normally be distinct utterances, indicating an openness and linguistic 
freedom.
70
 For instance, the verb “giving” may be the end of a sentence. But it may also 
continue that sentence—in a strange instance of the usual grammar of the verb to give—
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with the board giving muskrats to arts and letters or giving the muskrats to rabbits that 
may be raiding not only the lettuce of their own sentence—sounding a possible pun on 
“letters”—but the boats of the next. Nonetheless, despite this invitation to linguistic 
freedom, Niedecker cannot completely throw over her “short poem” style and her desire 
to restrain the connective quality of language. Thus, while the lack of periods and the 
enjambment of sentences across stanzas create multiple relationships, the poem maintains 
the capitals that imply partitions without entirely committing to them.  
In “My Life by Water,” Niedecker works out a form that utilizes the relational 
quality of language—allowing the flowing interrelationships that she believed gave 
access to interiority—while simultaneously limiting the aspects of language she 
distrusts—particularly the way language’s connective properties exercise the poetic 
subject’s will over the object. She uses a similar three-line, highly enjambed form for her 
longest poem “Wintergreen Ridge,” perhaps because that form allowed the kind of 
linguistic freedom necessary to sustain a longer poem. However, as we have seen, 
Niedecker’s ambivalence toward language is acutely felt, and in her work after North 
Central she pulls back from the freedom and prolixity she achieves in poems like 
“Wintergreen Ridge” and “Paean to Place.” Writing Corman about her “strange winter,” 
she expresses discomfort with this kind of loosening: “I’ve made a turnabout again 
toward the short poem, don’t feel I shd. leave what’s been a part of me all these years” 
(Between 156). The fact that Niedecker’s last poems are among her longest may appear to 
belie her “turnabout toward the short poem,” but, in contrast to the enjambment of lines 
and stanzas in previous longer works, these poems are characterized by distinct, 
independent elements. These short, highly condensed parts signify a return to a more 
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restrained mode, but their aggregation under larger themes or subjects indicates that 
Niedecker’s relationship to condensation has been changed by her experiment with more 
freely flowing language in poems like “My Life by Water.” The major works of 
Niedecker’s last years are biographical poems about “great men” like Thomas Jefferson, 
John Adams, William Morris, and Charles Darwin.
 
But after allowing her own life to be 
the subject of her poems in unprecedented ways in “My Life by Water” and “Paean to 
Place,” Niedecker appears wary of the notion that a poet can create a unified picture of a 
life. Perhaps because the danger of intrusion on the part of the poet is so strong in 
biography, Niedecker pulls back from the relational language that she allowed when she 
herself was the subject. In these late poems, she moves from permeable boundaries 
between lines, sentences, and stanzas to a more strictly delineated form.
 71
  
“Darwin,” Niedecker’s final published poem, exemplifies this mode. Where 
before she sometimes used spaces or unobtrusive typographical symbols to separate the 
parts of a poem, in “Darwin,” as in several of her other biographical poems, Roman 
numerals decisively divide and ordinate the parts of the poem. Each narrates a separate 
event or phase in Darwin’s life without the grammatical bleeding across boundaries that 
characterizes earlier poems divided into sections. Occasionally, stanzas within the 
sections are enjambed, but this indicates a longer independent thought and does not create 
the grammatical ambiguities of “My Life by Water.” In general, both single lines and 
stanzas are more self-contained. The final stanzas of the second section are tersely 
individual even though they create a narrative:  
Fossil bones near Santa Fé  
Spider-bite-scauld 
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Fever 
 Tended by an old woman 
 
“Dear Susan . . . 
 I am ravenous 
  for the sound 
 of the pianoforte” (296) 
The first of these stanzas consists of four lines that stand alone. The second stanza is set 
apart from the previous not only by syntax and stanza breaks but also by quotation marks 
that emphasize its distinction. These line- and stanza-level rejections of the connective 
power of language echo the rigidity of separation created by the Roman numerals. Like 
condensation and omission, these reinforcements of boundaries prevent the free flow of 
language, focusing instead on the individual, isolated objects, “wonderful in themselves.”  
Yet, while “Darwin” returns to an aesthetic of silence, its very length indicates 
that Niedecker’s “turnabout” to her “short poem mode” was also marked by her 
investigation of the possibilities of flowing language. For example, despite the emphatic 
distinction between parts of the poem, “Darwin” continues to omit periods and use only 
capital letters to divide the poem at the sentence level. As illustrated by the stanzas 
quoted above, the poem relies on capital letters and on line and stanza breaks to establish 
phrasing. Though it does not generally test those separations with enjambment, the lack 
of periods still makes it possible to create grammatical connections that overflow the 
expected boundaries. For instance, the capital beginning the phrase “Tended by an old 
woman” and the fact that it comes at the end of a list of self-contained utterances suggest 
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that the verb “tended” refers to an implied subject, Darwin himself. However, the lack of 
periods also makes it possible to read the verb as referring back to any of the previous 
nouns or noun phrases. Though less pronounced than in her earlier poems, the lack of 
periods permits a countercurrent of linguistic movement that works against the poem’s 
silences. Ambiguous prepositions also continue to form a part of this countercurrent. For 
instance, an apparently straightforward stanza in the first section depicts a wearied 
Darwin: “He was often becalmed / in this Port Desire by illness / or rested from species / 
at billiard table.” While the primary meaning of the preposition “at” locates Darwin at the 
game table, it is also possible that Darwin rested from the species that was at the billiard 
table, that is, rested from the human race rather than from the animals he studies. Though 
this complication is minor, it indicates the variability of relationships established even by 
apparently ordinary language use, and it establishes an interchangeability of human and 
animal species that informs the themes of the poem. Though Niedecker does return in 
many important ways to the aesthetic of silence identified with her short poem style, she 
continues simultaneously to employ linguistic connection as flow, if not overflow. 
This narrative of Niedecker’s formal experimentation—beginning in Surrealist 
freedom of linguistic connectivity, moving through Objectivist omissions to a 
simultaneity of language and silence, to, finally, an aesthetic of silence only minimally 
undermined by currents of disruptive linguistic connectivity—reveals an important 
dynamic in Niedecker’s formal negotiations of her conflicting attractions for silence and 
language. Silences are useful to Niedecker as a “follow up feeling” to overpowering 
language. The relational or connective property of language must be allowed to enter the 
poem, but it is equally important to clean up after it. In this sense, silence, despite its 
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alignment with Objectivist masculinity and hardness, is a domestic action. Language 
makes a mess of things, destabilizing relationships and making boundaries permeable in a 
way that is, for Niedecker, necessary but unsustainable. When she writes Zukofsky about 
her post-flood housekeeping, Niedecker takes evident pleasure in tidiness after 
disruption: “All my surfaces shine, a hard varnish shine but looks good to me, renewed 
table feet, doors etc after a flood. All my surfaces are hard, all my interiors, quiet and 
relaxing” (Correspondence 253). She delights in her ability to recover a livable space 
after the encroachment of the floodwaters, but, tellingly, she does not relocate to higher 
ground. The process of flooding and rebuilding is central to her life and an important 
analogue for her experience of the sentence as flood. Indeed, that Niedecker’s silences 
come after linguistic flow and overflow invests them with a vitality that distinguishes her 
poems from the sterility of writing in which silence is not so hard-won. Though she often 
felt her allegiances to circumscribing and celebrating language as mutually exclusive, her 
grammatical figuration develops as a response to the need to permit language to thrive 
without allowing it to overwhelm the poem’s objects, including the poet herself.  
 
Notes
 
1
 Except where otherwise noted, Niedecker’s poems are quoted from Lorine 
Niedecker: Collected Works.  
 
2
 Untitled poems will be referred to by their first lines. 
 
3
 In 1996, the National Poetry Foundation published Lorine Niedecker: Woman 
and Poet, a collection of reviews, letters, and critical essays. Penberthy, the editor of that 
volume, also edited a volume of Niedecker’s letters, primarily to Zukofsky, published in 
1993. In 2008, another collection of essays, Radical Vernacular, was devoted entirely to 
Niedecker criticism (Willis). The first full biography of Niedecker appeared in 2011, 
collecting biographical information that had previously only been available in archives 
and scattered sources (Peters). Perhaps most importantly, Penberthy’s meticulously 
edited volume, Lorine Niedecker: Collected Works, was published in 2002. 
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4
 Cox’s attitude is representative of early evaluations of Niedecker’s work. While 
he praises her writing as “as careful and complex,” he suggests that readers may miss 
these virtues “hidden under feminine ease” that camouflages her craft as mere “sketch 
notes or diary jottings” (29). Even an otherwise perceptive essay by Heller at times 
makes Niedecker a composer of “artless” poems “without intellectual means” that 
“resonat[e] with pure being” (“Seen” 26-27). Much recent criticism questions the 
underlying values of such reading, reevaluating the role of the small or seemingly minor 
in feminist resistance, anti-consumerism, and modernist practice. See especially 
DuPlessis and Willis. 
 
5
 See White for a discussion of Niedecker’s relationship to contemporary 
American poetry and Jenkins and Skinner for explorations of the ethics of her poetics. 
See also Altieri for the ethical dimensions of Objectivism.  
 
6
 Wilk edited a special memorial issue of Truck in 1975 and Corman an issue of 
Origin in 1981. More recently, in 2005, Court Green published a dossier on Niedecker 
including book reviews, criticism, and poems honoring Niedecker by contemporary poets 
(“Dossier”). Jonathan Williams edited Epitaphs for Lorine.  
 
7
 This is not to say that such prejudice did not contribute to Niedecker’s absence 
from the canon. As Perloff and others have observed, Niedecker’s position as a woman 
and an experimentalist has made her ineligible not only for inclusion among the only 
recently revalued Objectivists but for feminist critical reevaluation. Further, over-
simplified early critical response to Niedecker as a regionalist or a naïve nature poet, 
along with her highly condensed style, reinforced the idea that she was a minor talent. 
Finally, the notion that she was merely an acolyte of Zukofsky, an evaluation that 
Niedecker herself did much to further, has also contributed to her critical neglect.  
 
8
 Despite allegations of professional naivete, Niedecker was very conscious of the 
financial burdens of artists, both herself and others. She often mentions household costs 
or rents in her letters, and she sent small sums to the Zukofskys and other writers whom 
she felt could benefit from financial assistance. She occasionally mentioned payment in 
letters to publishers, though most often on behalf of others. And, though paying 
publishers may seem like a mark of desperation to some modern readers, at the time 
Niedecker was publishing, it was not uncommon for writers to cover part or all of 
printing and advertising costs. Niedecker was willing to pay to have her books printed, 
but she was also an agent in that process. She was concerned that the editions be well 
made and designed to her taste; thus, she was much more willing to send money to 
publishers she trusted, like Corman, than to presses she felt might not put out books 
matching her vision. Though Niedecker is often characterized as unwilling to engage in 
the business of poetry, most likely because of her vehement rejection of participating in 
the promotional aspects of publishing, her letters reveal that she was by no means 
unacquainted with the costs of publishing. She also made detailed legal inquiries that 
show her anxious to preserve her rights. 
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9
 She wrote only a few pieces promoting the work of friends and correspondents 
Zukofsky and Corman. 
 
10
 The regular conversation of her coworkers at the hospital or her neighbors in 
Black Hawk Island was a source of poetic material, and she viewed local notoriety as 
endangering poetic production. 
 
11
 Niedecker herself resisted such biographical attention. Regarding what she 
called a “flattering” review of her poems by Jonathan Williams, she protested to 
Zukofsky, “And LN personally—when what we’re talking about is poetry!” 
(Correspondence 321). 
 
12
 DuPlessis mentions Niedecker’s “demeanor of intentional modesty” 
(“Anonymous” Kenyon, 97), while Jowett discusses a personal “tendency to self-
effacement” (“silence” 32). Further, despite Breslin’s work showing the mutuality of the 
Niedecker/Zukofsky relationship, contemporary critics often continue to paint Niedecker 
as a disciple, buried under Zukofsky’s pronouncements about her work. 
 
13
 Heller’s essay “Lorine Niedecker: Light and Silence” exemplifies the kind of 
condescension that, masquerading as praise, dismissed Niedecker’s poems as mere 
outgrowths of her life rather than meticulously crafted responses to it: “Niedecker’s 
poems are for the most part notations of isolation, of the poet’s own and her world’s 
sheer recalcitrance, a record of an inert and almost blind physicality which she confronts 
in both her native landscape, the rural Midwest, and in its people, ‘the folk from whom 
all poetry flows / and dreadfully much else.’ The poems strike the reader as natural and 
seemingly artless constructions, as artless as the region they mirror, a part of the United 
States, plowed and grazed but as yet unhumbled by technology” (51). 
 
14
 Jenkins, for example, argues that the omission of the body in Niedecker’s 
poetry, especially the female body, rejects dialectical notions of gender and 
empowerment and provides an “opportunity for freedom” (313). In a different vein, 
Pritchett reads an emphasis on nothingness or emptiness in Niedecker’s poems as a 
means of “placing the poem outside the stream of commodity exchange” (96). Clausen’s 
1987 “Rediscovery” review of Niedecker’s collected works hails her silences as a 
strategically chosen and empowering corrective to the over-simplified feminist “catch 
phrase,” “Break the silences!,” effectively making Niedecker’s silences a feminist 
resistance to mainstream feminist values (11).        
 
15
 Jowett’s unpublished doctoral thesis, “‘and silence’: Lorine Niedecker and the 
Life of Poetry,” takes silence as its organizing theme. Though it devotes a section to 
silence in Niedecker’s forms, focusing in particular on condensation, biographical 
omissions, and the use of white space and line breaks in her stanza forms, the bulk of the 
thesis focuses on silences in Niedecker’s life, context, and critical reception.  
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16
 I take up the question of Niedecker’s relationship to Objectivism and 
Surrealism later in this chapter. Contrary to Middleton, I argue that Objectivist practice 
was an essential tool for Niedecker’s resistance to the appropriative violence of 
subjective language. Nevertheless, I concur with Middleton’s point that, in addition to 
aesthetic preferences, Niedecker’s use of silence is driven by ethical concerns about 
appropriation and representation.  
 
17
 Quartermain implicitly makes a similar argument about silence in “Reading 
Niedecker”; he suggests that Niedecker’s poems are a kind of “gossip,” which uses 
silences in that it takes for granted the familiarity of the reader with shared local history 
or personal experiences rather than explaining them. 
 
18
 See Westover for an economic analysis of Niedecker’s refusal of appropriation 
and commodification. See also Upton for a discussion of Niedecker’s formal choices as 
“defense against encroachment” (46). Though they do not address silence directly, both 
of these more recent discussions make implicit arguments about formal silences as 
resistance to appropriative forces.  
 
19
 Niedecker admired Corman because, she said, he was “the only one who 
[could] carry over the silence [of painting] into poems” (Between 49).  
 
20
 See Penberthy’s “Writing Lake Superior” for an analysis of Niedecker’s 
process of condensing her travel notes into a poem.  
 
21
 Niedecker only read her poems before an audience once. The event 
disappointed her, and she refused all other requests to read her work. As she wrote to Cox 
in 1970: “I really do not approve of reading aloud or listening to someone read” 
(“Extracts” 42).   
 
22
 Niedecker wrote Cox about the particular difficulties of translating a poem from 
print to speech: “I got to thinking as I read how one can write for print and it means one 
thing and let it out of the mouth and into a listener to become something else e.g.: my 
Darwin commences:  
                   His holy  
                             slowly  
                                         mulled over  
                      matter 
 
from the mouth is it holy or wholly or holey????” (“Extracts” 42). 
 
23
 She wrote similarly to Cox: “For me poetry is a matter of planting it in deep, a 
filled silence, each person reading it a silence to be filled—he’ll have to come to the 
poems—both writer and reader—with an ear for all the poems can give and he’ll hear 
that as Beethoven heard tho deaf” (“Extracts” 42). This version of her reaction to reading 
aloud further emphasizes silence as crucial to both the creation and reception of poetry. 
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24
 Her reference to Beethoven being able to “hear” music “tho deaf” supports the 
possibility, explored by several critics, that the deafness of Niedecker’s mother may have 
influenced the poet’s relationship to sound and silence. See especially Robertson. 
 
25
 In 1958 she wrote Zukofsky, “The business of loneliness—the mind has to be 
sharp to keep one from getting uselessly involved just for the sake of a moment of less 
loneliness” (Correspondence 244). 
 
26
 She writes Corman regarding her “immanent marriage” and calls it “unnatural” 
though Millen is her “connection to life.” Life, it seems, interferes with poetry: “Till life 
settles down, this frog is singing silently” (Between 40). Niedecker mitigated this 
problem by circumscribing the noise of life. Perhaps the most striking reminder of this is 
the image of Niedecker wearing earplugs so that she could write while Millen watched 
the television. 
 
27
 This lineation is not intended to make Niedecker’s prose lines into a poem—to 
be sure, her poems are generally subtler—but to make their poetic elements more 
immediately evident. 
 
28
 Even when Niedecker indulges this voluble strain, she is careful to maintain a 
distance from what she quotes, often crafting whole poems from the words of others 
without direct comment or contextualization. Discussing her tendency to use quotation in 
her work she calls herself “a weak sister” of Marianne Moore, arguing “I appreciate but 
don’t criticize” (Between 75). Once again, Niedecker’s strongly felt respect for the 
individual, in this case, the words of others, is inflected as a weakness of nerve or of 
intellect.  
 
29
 In one sense, this statement reinforces the value of silence because it argues that 
the quiet experiences of listening to the natural world supersede human voices and 
language. But, while the sora rail’s call may undermine the power of language in that it is 
more memorable than the information gleaned from her reading, that call is not silent. 
 
30
 Another instance of Niedecker’s enjoyment of natural sounds coinciding with 
her delight in language emphasizes that sounds do not necessarily have to be melodious 
in order to please: “Not all harsh sounds displease— / Yellowhead blackbirds cough / 
through reeds and fronds / as through pronged bronze” (271). 
 
31
 Like many modernists, Niedecker was fascinated by the power of names, in 
particular taxonomic nouns. She believed that individual words and names could be 
transformative. She wrote to Zukofsky that she had recently discovered a name for a local 
plant. She then listed names for that plant in a kind of litany: “Creeping Jenny, Creeping 
Charlie, Creeping loosestrife, moneywort, yellow myrtle—all the same. Somebody is 
going to come along some day and tell me my name is Rosa Bonheur and that I’ll get 
poisoned if I paint a horse eating equisetum” (Correspondence 154). Her list of the 
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names for the plant delights in the variability of sounds, but her brief fantasy about being 
transformed into nineteenth-century painter Bonheur also implies that names can 
influence as well as describe identity. 
 
32
 Throughout “For Paul,” a collection of poems ostensibly written for the son of 
Niedecker’s former lover, Zukofsky, Niedecker uses nursery rhyme rhythms and playful 
language, often in strong contrast to difficult adult themes like war and death. Though 
one can detect a certain playfulness in all of Niedecker’s poetry, it is often terse and 
curtailed. Perhaps the figure of the childish listener allowed Niedecker to indulge 
linguistic playfulness in a way she considered more suspect in poems intended for what 
she elsewhere called “solid citizens.” 
 
33
 The ostentatiousness of the rhyme’s reliance on linguistic manipulation may 
also align the poet herself, as an artist who flouts convention, with the nebula-haired 
fiddler figure. 
 
34
 Though the title of Heller’s essay is “Lorine Niedecker: Light and Silence,” he 
focuses largely on Niedecker’s relationship to language as a physical experience. He 
takes her silences to constitute an intellectual and moral ambiguousness and refusal to 
comment, casting her work as personal rather than public or political. Aesthetically, he 
argues that her rhetoric is achieved through sound-patterns rather than statement (51). 
This immersion in the sounds of language, rather than its logical or meaning-making 
properties, is credited to Niedecker’s local sensibility and a sensuous (rather than 
sensible) “inert and almost blind physicality” (51). While I concur that sound-patterns 
and other non-rational forms of meaning are central to Niedecker’s poetics, I do not 
follow Heller in his evaluation—which seems to me inflected by gender- and class-based 
assumptions—of such strategies as unintellectual. Certainly the largely male, white, and 
middle- to upper-class Language poets frequently use similar strategies but are rarely 
described as sensuous, physical, or unintellectual, nor does Heller describe Zukofsky as 
such despite the obvious similarities between his reliance on sound-suggestion and 
Niedecker’s own. 
 
35
 It is also useful because it demonstrates a continuity between Niedecker’s work 
and the modernist tradition to which she is so often seen as ancillary.  
 
36
 Penberthy points out that “[v]oice is one of the most memorable features of 
[Niedecker’s] work. She had an exquisite awareness of voice, of speaking out of silence, 
of speaking at all, of speaking in the rhythms and locutions around her, or of speaking in 
a literary voice” (“Part One” 73). See also Robertson and Dorn. 
 
37
 See Waldman, Walsh, and Clausen for other treatments of the tension between 
speech and silence in Niedecker’s work. Each of these writers is working under very 
different assumptions—Waldman is a poet-critic, Walsh an appreciator, and Clausen a 
reviewer—but they all point to sound and silence as opposing forces in Niedecker’s 
work. 
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38
 For Skinner, Niedecker’s attraction for language, especially play with syntax 
and assonance, allows her to collapse the hierarchical distinctions between human and 
nonhuman, achieving a Darwinian leveling that allows for “particular attention” to the 
nonhuman world. He argues that silences are important for Niedecker but primarily as an 
act of listening: human subjectivity is silenced to allow the “nonhuman other” to be heard 
(56). Robertson also uses the concept of listening to explain Niedecker’s simultaneous 
desire for sound and silence. According to Robertson, “Niedecker is ‘ravenous for 
sound,’ as she has Darwin say it,” but such a hunger requires her to be silent and listen. 
She further contends that the silence of listening is active and involves “techniques of 
reception” (87). 
 
39
 Following Niedecker’s own sense of opposed aesthetic allegiances, several 
critics have offered explanations of her poetics based on her participation in, or rejection 
of, aesthetic programs like Objectivism and Surrealism, often including the folk impulse. 
For critics like Tarlo, Niedecker’s poetics represents a “held tension” between a 
proliferating language of multiplicity and difference, connected to Surrealism, and a 
devotion to the particularity of the real, aligned with Objectivism. Tarlo uses the term 
“vertical” rather than “Surrealist” because, she argues, to use “Surrealism” to describe the 
“semiotic multiplicity” that pulls against Niedecker’s “Objectivist specificity” overstates 
the closeness of her relation to the Surrealist program. However, she does call this 
multiplicity “surrealistic,” and the term “vertical” also describes Surrealist notions about 
states of consciousness. Middleton, on the other hand, reads Niedecker’s folk impulse 
(which is also connected to Surrealism) as a resistance to the universalizing elements of 
Objectivism and the avant-garde more generally. DuPlessis counters models of tension 
and resistance to expand the conversation about the contending literary philosophies in 
Niedecker’s work. She argues that Niedecker was looking for “something more” than 
Objectivism, and she understands Niedecker’s forms as effecting a fusion not only 
between Objectivism and Surrealism but also with the related aesthetics of Projectivism 
and folk forms. I agree with DuPlessis that Surrealism, Objectivism, haiku, and folk 
forms served as correctives to each other (“Fusion” 396).  
Though they suggest significantly different types of relationships between 
conflicting philosophies, all of these critical models take for granted that aesthetic 
philosophies like Objectivism and Surrealism can tell us something useful about Lorine 
Niedecker’s work. In the following discussion, I take that to be true as well. However, I 
do not treat Objectivism and Surrealism as such; rather, I explore Niedecker’s own sense 
of what was important in those movements for her work. 
 
40
 The essays were requested by magazine editor Harriet Monroe and written, 
according to Zukofsky, under some protest. Zukofsky was uncomfortable with the notion 
of a movement; in fact, he insisted on placing the word Objectivist in quotation marks to 
indicate its provisionality. 
 
41
 Niedecker published a poem called “Wasted Energy” in her high school 
yearbook that features a curmudgeonly speaker lamenting the lack of specificity in 
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modern language that erases fine distinctions: “When describing a quail or a sunset or 
whale— / They’re ‘wonderful!’—each of the three” (Condensery 3). Even as a young 
person, Niedecker had no patience for lazy language and admired the search for the right 
word.  
 
42
 DuPlessis argues that folk forms like ballads and “Mother Goose” rhymes often 
leap from event to event and from location to location, focusing on happenings rather 
than motivations. She considers Niedecker’s attraction to these forms a resistance to the 
glut of explanation and part of a poetics of anonymity (“Anonymous”). 
 
43
 In one sense, Niedecker’s first version of the poem is truer to the notion that the 
identity of the poetic object is fundamentally unavailable to the poet because it 
acknowledges the distance between “I” and object and the uncertainty of the speaker’s 
observations.  
 
44
 Niedecker’s first encounter with the French Surrealists was initiated by 
Zukofsky, who advised her to read them. Niedecker’s impression of the Surrealists was 
always colored by Zukofsky’s complex feelings about Surrealism. See especially Golston 
for a discussion of Zukofsky’s relationship to Surrealism. 
 
45
 The Surrealist “Proclamation,” reproduced by Penberthy, was originally 
published in transition. 
 
46
 One of the poems sent with this letter, “Promise of a Brilliant Funeral,” was 
published by Monroe. The other, “Progressions,” was recently located and published in 
Penberthy’s edition of the Collected Works. Both of these poems are at odds with the 
canonical picture of Niedecker in her condensery. 
 
47
 It should be noted, however, that there is also an important similarity between 
what moves Niedecker about both Objectivism and Surrealism: the unrecognizability of 
objects in Niedecker’s version of Surrealism echoes their unavailability to the subjective 
in Objectivism. Similarly, Niedecker quotes Davie on mystery: “if mystery is there you 
can’t express it, it is there through being unable to be expressed” (Between 192). Both 
Surrealism and Objectivism are interesting for what they do not say, but their subject 
matter and their methods of not saying are different.  
 
48
 In Niedecker’s later years, Dahlberg suggested that she try mind-altering 
substances to assist her experimentation with representing the illogicality of the mind, but 
Niedecker scoffed at the recommendation and the idea that she would need such an aid to 
access the stream of consciousness (Between 156). Instead, words were her means of 
reaching an inner landscape that she felt to be the special province of her poetry. 
 
49
 The poem is also included in a letter to Corman. Niedecker did not include it in 
any of her collections, but it was published by Corman in Origin in 1968. 
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50
 My own experience of folk language echoes this image with a song I heard 
often as a young person: “I gotta gal who’s six feet tall / sleeps in the kitchen with her 
feet in the hall.”  
 
51
 Niedecker’s grammatical figuration of the dynamics of marriage recalls 
Dickinson’s syntactic staging of the hazardous allure of conjugal union. 
 
52
 See Clark’s Sentimental Modernism for a discussion of the role of feminized 
sentimentalism in modernism. See also Golston, who reads this gendered dynamic into 
Zukosfky’s rejection of Surrealism, the very aesthetic that emobodied for Niedecker the 
effusive, interiorized, “streaming, sometime screaming” impulses not welcome in 
Objectivism. 
 
53
 As always, Niedecker is ambivalent on this subject. Despite her categorical 
statement “no better poetry than the quiet,” she concludes her letter to Corman: “Funny, I 
can’t get the roaring, ranting, filthy, spiritual Kaddish out of my mind” (Between 103). 
 
54
 Several critics fruitfully read Niedecker’s themes and forms in a feminist 
context. See Jenkins, Tarlo, Clausen, Jowett, Perloff, Upton, Augustine, Peterson, 
Savage, and DuPlessis for a wide range of these readings. 
 
55
 Writing to Zukofsky about a new distance in her correspondence with Corman, 
she mentions that a comment she made about his work may have offended him. She sees 
discussions of the why of poetry, rather than the how, as a nuisance and an unnecessary 
point of contention between friends: “I must write to Cid just to keep in touch—a kind of 
sensitive distance. Awhile back I said to him he used (did I say conversational 
metaphysics no) the metaphysical conversational in his poems and he took slight offense. 
Of course I meant merely metaphysical as all human beings are or can be, nuttn I’d want 
to go into. I wonder if Henry James went into critical discussions. If he did and it 
offended he’d probably bow a little and say softly ‘I shouldn’t have mentioned it, my 
friend” (Correspondence 349). 
 
56
 Her position as a female Objectivist makes it particularly important for 
Niedecker to resist the feminizing and thus deauthorizing effusiveness of the sentence. 
But it also makes it important for her to rethink the masculinist elements of Objectivist 
condensation that seeks to purify the body of the text. 
 
57
 The title of Corman’s Sun Rock Man, a book Niedecker admired, is emblematic 
of this treatment of connectives. The book places objects together but, as with the nouns 
in its title, refuses to delineate how they are together. 
 
58
 See Pinard for a brief investigation of both the biographical and formal 
implications of flood imagery for Niedecker. Pinard raises “an intriguing set of tensions: 
between mystery and clarity, between isolation and connection, between silence and 
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sound” (167). These same tensions inform my exploration of Niedecker’s use of 
prepositions and connectives to both limit and extend language. 
 
59
 Other notable examples include “Some float off on chocolate bars,” which 
aligns flood waters with an alcoholic floating and a terror of something “wild” barely 
held at bay, and “My life is hung up,” which proposes that flood water can erase one’s 
identity or “face” (208, 193). 
 
60
 Surprising juxtapositions were an important tool for Surrealist writers seeking 
access to the unconscious. Niedecker’s attraction for Surrealist models may have 
something to do with the importance of the flood in her understanding of mind and 
language.  
 
61
 See Augustine for an exploration of gender roles in Niedecker’s work. Of 
particular interest is her analysis of Niedecker’s short story “The Evening’s 
Automobiles,” in which the narrator returns to his home on the river and experiences the 
flood as a maternal source and an agent of rebirth. 
 
62
 She compares her new interest in poetry to a bird about to migrate, feeling 
“something akin to pain (and fear)” (Between 149). 
 
63
 Though I have noted that the flood is both destructive and revitalizing, from 
this point I will emphasize the enlivening power of the flood. The strategies Niedecker 
uses to shore her poems against the threat of linguistic flooding—omission, silence, 
condensation—are the same strategies she uses to throw off the shackle of the sentence. 
Thus, though the emotional and intellectual valences of throwing off a shackle and 
fending off a flood are distinct, these two elements of Niedecker’s work are somewhat 
conflated in the following formal analysis.  
 
64
 Though the noun “she” is farther from the verb than the other possible subjects, 
the notion that the “she” can still speak is reinforced by the appearance of direct speech in 
the final three lines, indicated by the pronoun “my.”   
 
65
 While her exploration of longer forms later in her life was in a sense a 
departure, it was also a return. Niedecker’s earliest poems, which she identified with 
Surrealist influence, were also longer than poems in what is generally considered her 
representative condensed style.  
 
66
 It was during this period that Niedecker wrote both “Lake Superior” and 
“Wintergreen Ridge,” which were much larger in scope and which she saw as a departure 
and a challenge. The significance of the turn or return to longer forms has been explored 
by critics like Davie and Penberthy (“Writing”). The formal elements I discuss in “My 
Life by Water” can be extended to both “Lake Superior” and “Wintergreen Ridge,” but I 
chose to discuss this shorter poem because the scope of my work does not allow for a full 
exploration of the longer ones, and I did not wish to give short shrift to their complexity. 
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 The possibility that the final line, “Water,” is the author’s signature supports 
this reading. 
 
68
 Many of Niedecker’s poems use verbs to make unresolvable multiple 
connections that inflect the overall reading of the poem. In poems like “Smile” and “I 
hear the weather through the house,” the key verbs, “lay” and “breathing” respectively, 
can be read both transitively and intransitively (242, 181). Other interesting examples 
include ambiguities created by puns on verbs, such as kin/can in “Grampa’s got his old 
age pension” and the overlapping verb and noun “spoke” in “I walked” (100, 245).  
 
69
 In addition to appearing in earlier poems like “Paul,” “Poet’s Work,” “Spring,” 
and “Wild Pigeon” (156, 194, 211, 235), this stanza is used in a few important poems 
after “My Life by Water,” most notably “Wintergreen Ridge” (247-57). 
 
70
 Niedecker’s poetry tends toward using fewer and fewer periods in her later 
work. She frequently avoids final punctuation in the short poems of her middle years, but, 
since they are so short, many of them composed of a single sentence, this lack of 
punctuation as a separating force is less noticeable. 
 
71
 It is outside the scope of this work to perform a sustained close reading of any 
of Niedecker’s biographical poems. Though I discuss how they illustrate Niedecker’s use 
of ambivalent connectives in general terms, her biographical poems are distinct from one 
another in significant ways.  
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CHAPTER IV 
“SOMEWHAT OF SOMETHING OTHER”:  
ARTIFICE IN THE POETRY OF GWENDOLYN BROOKS 
Criticism of black writing in America has shared with feminist criticism a 
recuperative stance: their charge has been to unearth those voices that were silenced in 
the past and to read the texts of black and women writers as evidence of a resistance to 
that silence or a courageous foray into territory previously denied them as speakers and 
subjects. As a black writer and a woman, Gwendolyn Brooks is often read as just such a 
speaker, breaking racist and sexist silences, and much of the criticism on Brooks’s work 
seems to take as its premise Barbara Christian’s claim that “if there is any persistent 
motif in [African American women’s] literature, it is the illuminating of that which is 
perceived by others as not existing at all” (“Celie” 20). Walter Kaladjian’s reading of 
Gwendolyn Brooks is typical of this tradition in that it understands her poetic voice as a 
response to the dual challenges of representing black and female experience. Kaladjian 
introduces Brooks by describing the place of black women’s poetry in the American 
literary canon more generally:  
The great white canon has not only functioned to exclude and expunge the literary 
history of people of color, but has served to reproduce denigrating stereotypes of 
black experience. Thus, the challenge for Afro-American writers concurs with the 
task of feminism, of retrieving women’s past behind the back of patriarchy’s 
demeaning representations of gender. (174)  
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Brooks’s “task” as a black writer and a woman writer is, in this model, a double retrieval. 
She must rescue black experience and women’s experience from imposed silences and 
the “demeaning representations” of white patriarchal culture.  
However, while much of the criticism of Brooks takes authentic representation of 
black feminine experience as Brooks’s goal, the representational undertakings of feminist 
and African American writers do not always appear to concur. In fact, Kaladjian directly 
follows his statement of concurrent tasks with a recognition of the conflict between 
Brooks’s black and feminist challenges: “Making matters worse for Brooks, postwar 
sexism within the Afro-American community consigned black women to even more 
marginal roles” (174). Racism and sexism, especially as they are entrenched in Western 
feminism and black nationalist aesthetics, have often divided critics of black women 
writers along opposing racial and gender lines, and Gwendolyn Brooks’s critics are no 
exception. Brooks’s much talked-about 1967 black revolutionary awakening at a Fisk 
University writers conference and her subsequent move from Harper’s to small black-
owned presses provide a dramatic skirmish line for those seeking to situate Brooks either 
as a black writer or a woman writer. Black male critics, especially those directly involved 
in nationalist aesthetics like Haki Madhubuti, often argue that Brooks’s most important 
and authentic work primarily illuminates black experience. Such critics tend to favor 
Brooks’s later, post-Fisk, more directly black nationalist work and repudiate her earlier 
work as too personal or pitched for white audiences. On the other hand, white feminist 
critics often argue that Brooks’s most important poems reveal previously unexplored or 
taboo areas of female experience. They tend to hold up Brooks’s earlier volumes as 
feminist, or at least woman-centered, and claim that her feminist consciousness was later 
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subordinated to the masculinist elements of black nationalism. Suzanne Juhasz laments 
what she sees as struggle between identities in which femaleness loses to blackness:  
Over the years Brooks has developed a black consciousness; in her fifties, she 
opened herself to revolution. But she has not developed at the same time a 
feminist consciousness. Blackness came and comes first in her life: because race 
oppression has been the most overt, the most threatening, race identity has also 
been foremost. (150) 
Betsy Erkkila also argues that Brooks’s concerns as a black writer stifle her as a woman: 
“In silencing or glossing over her historical needs, desires, voice, and experience as a 
black woman, Brooks’s later work suggests the problematic place of black women in 
relation to the Black Power movement” (226). Whether these critics value racial or 
gender identity more highly or argue for complex and nuanced ways that these identities 
may cooperate, compete with, or mutually construct each other, they begin from the basic 
assumption that Brooks’s poems are triumphs of speech over silence, and competing 
perspectives on her work almost always agree that Brooks’s poems are part of a larger 
communal search—whether black, female, or both—for a more fully realized voice.1  
Thus, Gwendolyn Brooks’s poetry has been read largely in terms of how it 
succeeds or fails at breaking the silences that have oppressed her as a black woman.
2
 
Brooks herself contributes to this evaluation of her work when she says, in interview after 
interview, that she wishes her poems to develop toward a greater capacity to speak to a 
wider audience of black people. She tells Eugenia Collier in a 1973 interview:  
I am in transition. I want to reach all manner of black people. That’s my urgent 
compulsion [. . .]. It will be a simple-looking poem but there will be subtleties 
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easily reached, I hope, by those who are interested in reaching them—
immediately enjoyable by black people who spend a great deal of their time in 
taverns or the streets, black people who, perhaps, have dropped out of high 
school. I still want to reach and appeal to such blacks. (69) 
Brooks is conscious of her responsibilities to her audience, and she is interested in 
crafting a voice that communicates to readers. The poems themselves attest to this. Their 
constantly shifting speech registers, references to popular music, art, history, local 
landmarks, and neighborhood types, their exhortation and advice, all imply a speaker 
who wants to tell her listener something and expects her listener to understand. This kind 
of accessibility was important to Brooks throughout her life as a poet, a teacher, a 
member of her community, and an advocate for black people—especially the young—in 
Chicago and abroad.
3
  
However, the focus on collective voice in Brooks’s poetry, whether black voices 
or women’s voices, can obscure how important certain kinds of silences are to Brooks’s 
poetics. Criticism of her poetry must take into account the ways that her work speaks out 
and breaks silences, but it must not neglect how and when she chooses not to speak. 
Brooks sought a poetry that could speak to people in taverns, but she also wrote: “He can 
abash his barmecides; / The fantoccini of his range / Pass over” (123) and “Howas I 
handled my discordances / And prides and apoplectic ice, howas / I reined my charger, 
channeled the fit fume / of his most splendid honorable jazz” (389).4 Her strangeness, her 
difficulty, and her obscurity—the gaps and silences that recur in her poems—may be too 
often ignored because they do not seem to advance the vital role she has played as a 
public voice or her maternal position in twentieth-century black poetry, nurturing young 
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writers.
5
 But to hear the voice of Brooks’s poems is also to hear their silences, to attend 
to the ways they both resist language’s power and claim it. Her self-conscious role as a 
representative for black people and black women means that she must speak out, but her 
silences are also a part of the black female heritage she takes up. Voice and its refusal are 
both necessary strategies for empowerment, and Brooks’s poetry avails itself of 
revelatory speech and protective silences. Brooks’s relationship to a contradictory 
tradition that values both speech and silence as strategies for the empowerment of the 
community is complicated by her loyalty to the strange and idiosyncratic, the individual 
expression that is often at odds with the common. These complex overlapping 
allegiances—to speech and silence, to the shared and the singular— 
drive Brooks’s experimentation with form, particularly through artifice, from the level of 
the word to the level of book organization. 
Brooks’s poems participate in a tradition of black women’s writing that is 
concerned with the politics of representation, especially representations of speech or 
voice. As All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave 
announced in 1982, the numerous forces silencing black women’s voices, among other 
things, indelibly shape black women’s literature (Hull). By the very act of writing, these 
writers respond to a history that denied black life as the proper subject of literature and 
denied black people the human capacity to represent that life artfully; they also respond 
to a history that valued women as variously decorative or useful objects, as the subject 
matter of literature, perhaps, but not its speaking subject. Therefore, black women’s 
poetry bears the responsibility of finding a poetic voice in which to speak for the 
silenced, and criticism of that poetry must make that voice heard. Audre Lorde puts the 
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situation thus: “An academic at Tuskegee discovers twenty-five to thirty Black writers 
from the American South who have never been mentioned in any bibliography. Most of 
these unheard artists are women. Black. Invisible words” (xi). Black women writers and 
critics of their work are undeniably invested in making the unheard heard and the 
invisible visible, in part because literary language is emphasized in African American 
history. Henry Louis Gates Jr. signals the importance of literary speech to the formation 
of black identity:  
Slaves and ex-slaves met the challenge of the Enlightenment to their humanity by 
literally writing themselves into being through careful representations in language 
of the black self. Literacy, the very literacy of the printed book, stood as the 
ultimate parameter by which to measure the humanity of authors struggling to 
define an African self in Western letters. (Signifying 131) 
Black writers have been burdened with the responsibility not only of expressing their 
humanity but demonstrating their humanity to a culture that denies it. Finding a voice that 
can break oppressive silences is, in black poetry, a matter of cultural survival. Gates also 
recognizes that a dehumanizing silence falls double on black women writers. He quotes 
Anna Julia Cooper’s 1892 assessment of this doubled silence: “One muffled strain in the 
Silent South, a jarring chord and a vague and uncomprehended cadenza has been and still 
is the Negro. And of that muffled chord, the one mute and voiceless note has been the 
sadly expectant Black Woman” (“Intro” 1). According to Gates, part of the success of 
black women writers is due to the “sheer energy that accompanies the utterance of new 
subject matter, a formalized breaking of the silence of black women as authors” (2). 
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Formerly the “voiceless note” of a “muffled chord,” black women’s writing is 
understandably intent on being heard.  
Brooks’s poems share in the “sheer energy” of “new subject matter” and a 
“breaking of the silence.” From her first book forward, Brooks’s poems take black lives, 
and black women’s lives, unerringly as their subject. Despite discouragement from 
reviewers who felt that poems about black people’s lives were too specialized and not 
universal enough, or the more subtle racism of those who praised Brooks for writing on 
universal human themes “despite” being black and a woman, Brooks voices black and 
female experiences: she writes about white racism, hair straightening, and the vicissitudes 
of color prejudice within black communities, while she also insists that supposedly 
universal human experience—childbirth and war, love, jealousy, murder, and the dreadful 
emptiness of prayer—is central to her portrayal of black men and women’s lives. The 
importance of claiming a communal black voice is evident in Brooks’s choice of subject 
matter and in her devotion to speaking about and to her own people in Chicago. “The 
Wall,” a poem on the dedication of a Chicago mural of heroic black figures, depicts a 
poet who “mount[s] the rattling wood” to address the gathered celebrants: “An emphasis 
is paroled. / The old decapitations are revised, / the dispossessions beakless. / / And we 
sing” (445).6 The multiplicity of black expression—out-spoken “boy-men on roofs,” 
“Val, / a little black stampede” who “fists out ‘Black Power!,’” and the “Heroes of [the] 
Wall”—is summarized by an attainment of voice that has the power to “revise” and make 
“beakless” “dispossessions.” In the end, these voices are gathered into a triumphant 
shared conclusion: “And we sing.” The job of the poet, it appears, is to weave the 
individual voices of the community into a song that is capable of revising a narrative in 
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which they are supposed to remain silent. Such singing takes away the oppressive 
culture’s power to dispossess, making it beakless, ineffectual. This strain runs throughout 
Brooks’s poetry, and silences are frequently figured as something to be resisted through 
empowered voice. In a later poem specifically directed “To Black Women,” Brooks 
enjoins her “Sisters, where there is cold silence— / no hallelujahs, no hurrahs at all, no 
handshakes, no neon red or blue, no smiling faces— / prevail” (502). Brooks’s poetry 
seeks a language that can “prevail” by bringing hallelujahs, hurrahs, and handshakes to 
the “cold silence” that has marked the dominant culture’s reception of black women’s 
voices. 
Perhaps more surprising than the importance of speaking out in Brooks’s work 
and in black women’s literature more generally, however, is the way such speaking out 
takes shape against a backdrop of American national narratives. Twentieth-century black 
aesthetics is closely tied to a black nationalism that rejects American cultural values as 
the tools of oppression and promotes instead a lost or repressed African heritage as a 
form of resistance to the destruction or appropriation of black culture by white. As 
Addison Gayle Jr. explains in his introduction to The Black Aesthetic, “the problem of the 
de-Americanization of black people lies at the heart of the Black Aesthetic” (xxii). Gayle 
traces this de-Americanization back to W. E. B. Du Bois, calling his expatriation to 
France a symbolic “denunciation of America”:  
His act proclaimed to black men the world over that the price for becoming an 
American was too high. It meant, at least, to desert one’s heritage and culture; at 
the most, to become part of all “that has been instrumental in wanton destruction 
of life, degradation of dignity, and contempt for the human spirit.” (xxii) 
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For the descendants of Africans brought as slaves to build the new world, considered 
fractionally human by the nascent American democracy and systematically denied a 
share in the much-touted American dream, American culture is necessarily symbolic of 
oppression and repression.
7
 Thus, black writers often refuse to claim an American 
heritage, opting instead for a definition of black identity that is inherently not American. 
John O’Neal’s “Black Arts: Notebook” announces black opposition to Americanness in 
no uncertain terms:  
We are simply not an American People. America exists as a contradiction to our 
People-hood. America is the historic mentor of the oppression of our People. 
America serves as the bulwark of colonial, neocolonial, and imperialistic forces 
that support and maintain the oppression of our People and other non-European 
Peoples in the world today. (48) 
Black aesthetics, especially as it is influenced by black nationalism, considers black and 
American identities fundamentally opposed. This kind of oppositional structure is also 
evident in literary criticism that posits a clash between African American literature and 
American literature more broadly. Critics of African American literature often argue that 
African formal and thematic elements resist white or American forms and themes in a 
literary struggle for authenticity and a truer, more African, black identity.
8
 The process of 
finding a voice and speaking in an authentically black way, then, is often a process of 
claiming a decolonized language. The disjunction between the American dream and black 
realities is evident in a poem like Brooks’s “Strong Men, Riding Horses,” in which a 
man, Lester, compares his own life to what he sees in a movie Western: “Strong Men, 
riding horses. In the West / On a range five hundred miles [. . .] I am not like that. I pay 
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rent, am addled / By illegible landlords, run, if robbers call [. . .] I am not brave at all.” 
Unlike the “Strong Men” of American Western mythology, Lester does not stride boldly 
across wide-open spaces but rather uses his “mannerisms” as “camouflage” and his 
speech to “word-wall off that broadness of the dark.” The space of the American West is 
dangerous and something to be warded against. The “rentless” men of American 
admiration are just “not like” Lester, and the difference weighs on him (329).9 American 
mythology fails to represent Lester’s life, and it also causes him harm. As Brooks puts it 
in another poem: “The National Anthem vampires at the blood” (383). 
However, despite the importance of de-Americanization to the emergence of 
black nationalism and aesthetics, Brooks’s poems, like much other black writing, often 
speak in a startlingly American vocabulary: in fact, in the very language of pioneering 
exploration that is inapplicable to Lester’s life in “Strong Men, Riding Horses.” Joanne 
Gabbin’s introduction to an anthology of African American poetry praises the collected 
poets in terms that evoke the religious mission of early Puritan settlers: “These poets have 
given voice to the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and 1970s and continue to cry in the 
wilderness of America today” (xx). Gabbin’s formulation aligns black voices with the 
original American civilizing mission. She may revise the terms of Puritan missionary 
rhetoric—making mainstream white culture into the wilderness that awaits the saving 
message of a lone black voice—but she preserves the foundational American narrative of 
culture won from the wilderness by courageous exploration. Houston Baker Jr. also 
affiliates the development of black literature with a pioneer project when he argues for 
Alain Locke’s The New Negro as the work of a “pioneering civilization” made up of 
“Afro-American settlers bringing into existence [. . .] a new American ‘folk hero’” (84).10 
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This kind of language suggests the ongoing appeal of a black American literary identity 
that, rather than relying on opposition or decolonization, inhabits the familiar role of 
explorer. 
American pioneer values are frequently invoked in discussions of black writing, 
and even work that is less directly concerned with Americanness shows an exploratory 
bent.
11
 Audre Lorde celebrates the continuity of black women’s literature in the language 
of territory and cartography: “Black women’s words are testaments that we were there, 
bridges through one another’s realities [. . .] and no matter where we find ourselves to be, 
we can plot each other’s words like roadmaps toward a future” (xii). Here pioneering 
black women writers mark the landscape with their words in order to lead other women 
forward into the new territories they have explored. This kind of language is especially 
common in criticism of black women’s literature. Calvin Hernton’s “The Sexual 
Mountain and Black Women Writers” is an illustrative example of a frequent theme. The 
title of the essay responds to Langston Hughes’s “The Negro Artist and the Racial 
Mountain” and implicitly doubles the territory that black women writers, who scale both 
the racial and the sexual mountain, must cover. It is clear that, for Hernton, black 
women’s writing is a pioneering endeavor; his language combines a miner’s and an 
archeologist’s excitement, delighting in discovery and figuring black women’s 
experiences as untapped resources awaiting an adventurer:   
[Black women writers and critics] are wielding their pens like spades, unearthing 
forbidden treasures buried in old soil. They are bringing forth new, uncut literary 
jewels of their lives, in which are reflected for the first time the truer wages of our 
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history and our conduct. It is an exciting, adventurous literature and scholarship. 
(203) 
Black women’s literature, despite feminist and black aesthetics impulses to resist 
American narratives, also employs those narratives when it takes their experience as 
territory to be explored and their poetry as a journey into the unknown or unsaid. 
However, where the mainstream American pioneer tradition is focused on the success of 
the individual, often exiled or otherwise removed from his community, black and 
feminist literary exploration is valued precisely because it broadens the expressive 
landscape for a group. 
Though Gwendolyn Brooks is most often placed in the pioneering tradition in 
black women’s writing, she also works within a counter tradition that, though sometimes 
overlooked, is crucial to formulations of a black aesthetic: a tradition that values silence 
and resists language as a reifying tool that fixes and appropriates both black and female 
experience.
 
Subversion of dominant language structures is an important part of black 
literary history. The black vernacular tradition, especially in slave songs and folk stories, 
is marked by indirection, misdirection, and coded language. Gates quotes Frederick 
Douglass’s description of slaves singing cryptic field songs to illustrate the importance of 
restricting access to meaning: “the neologisms that Douglass’s friends created, 
‘unmeaning jargon’ to standard English speakers, were ‘full of meaning’ to the blacks, 
who were literally defining themselves in language” (Signifying 67). The songs are 
meaningless to white ears, their words effectively silent, but they communicate strength 
and resistance to hearers who understand their code. Similarly, Barbara Johnson claims 
that euphemism, ellipsis, and understatement, all forms of resisting language, are 
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important elements in the development of African American poetry because they allow 
black writers to delegitimate racist discourse by refusing to acknowledge it (206-08). For 
Johnson, euphemistic passivity in the face of racism is a step toward a later more 
empowered voice, but for others, this kind of silence remains a crucial part of a black 
literary expression that has come into its own.  
Two of the most influential theories of black literary aesthetics, Baker’s 
Modernism and the Harlem Rennaisance and Gates’s The Signifying Monkey, both take 
coded language, misdirection, and language that is silent to white hearers to be significant 
to both the history and current reality of black literature.
12
 This refusal to speak to 
particular audiences by using coded language is doubled when the writing avails itself of 
“codes and symbols which may be understood only within the Veil of Blackness and 
femaleness” (Braxton xxiv). Refusing to speak to or for white audiences is an important 
political aspect of silence in black literature and especially so to black women writers, 
who may also speak in a language silent to many male readers. A poem like “To Those of 
My Sisters Who Kept Their Naturals” is explicitly directed not only to black women but 
to those who cultivate the “natural” beauty advocated by black nationalism. The title of 
the poem itself implies a sort of refusal: by naming its recipients, it also tacitly excludes 
anyone else. The insistence of the second-person “you,” used eighteen times in twice as 
many lines, unremittingly limits the audience to the “sisters” it intimately addresses and 
praises.
13
 Too, the poem deflects readers who do not qualify as the speaker’s “sisters” by 
its use of terms that gain special meaning in the context of black women’s hair. “Sisters!” 
the poem begins, “I love you. / Because you love you. / Because you are erect. / Because 
you are also bent. / In season, stern, kind. / Crisp, soft—in season” (459). The contrasting 
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pair “erect” (which evokes a rigid straightness) and “bent” has layers of meaning for 
those who have had “to look a hot comb in the teeth,” as do “crisp,” “soft,” and “in 
season.” Stephen Henderson calls such words “mascons” (an abbreviation for “massive 
concentration,” coined during the early days of space exploration) and argues that they 
connote a complex of cultural meaning “too flexible for the establishment, too allusive, 
too cryptic, too dangerous” (43-44). Flexibility of meaning is crucial to Brooks, and in 
“To Those of My Sisters” this ability is figured as a function of black women’s bodies, 
particularly their hair. In fact—though allusions to the biblical poem “To everything there 
is a season” indicate that a “natural” black style is appropriate to a particular time as part 
of a cycle of changes—the sisters’ hair equips them to handle all seasons and is not 
limited to the ascendency of a certain style: “You reach, in season. / You subside, in 
season. / And All / below the richrough righttime of your hair” (459). The book of 
Ecclesiastes posits that everything, even opposites like joy and sorrow, is right in its own 
time, but Brooks’s poem argues that the women’s hair is an aegis under which they 
supercede opposing forces, uniting them as “richrough” and transcending them in an 
eternal “righttime.” As Henderson describes, flexibility and allusiveness are useful tools 
for black aesthetics, but they are also cryptic and dangerous to others, refusing 
interpretation by outsiders. For a poem to resist interpretation by white and male 
readers—leaving those without the benefit of “naturals” unaddressed by the poem, 
implying that some readers fit only a single season—is a radical kind of silence: it 
declares allegiances that may incur the disapproval of what Henderson calls the 
“establishment.” Resistance to interpretation by the establishment is a risky move for a 
poet who already has to fight to be given a hearing, but Brooks nevertheless takes 
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advantage of this important political and aesthetic strategy, using silences to declare her 
poetry to be at the service of a black and female community.  
But a limited address or a coded or private language is only silent to those on the 
outside, and silence in black women’s literature and in Gwendolyn Brooks’s poems is 
more than a strategically blank face turned to white or male eavesdroppers; it is also part 
of a tradition of African American literature that resists not only white patriarchal 
language but all language as symbolically oppressive:  
The problem, for [black writers and critics], can perhaps be usefully stated in the 
irony implicit in the attempt to posit a ‘black self’ in the very Western languages 
in which blackness itself is a figure of absence, a negation. Ethnocentrism and 
“logocentrism” are profoundly interrelated in Western discourse as old as the 
Phaedrus of Plato, in which one finds one of the earliest figures of blackness as 
an absence, a figure of negation. (Gates, “Jungle” 7)  
Gates begins here by explaining why Western languages in particular are not suited to 
speaking about black selfhood, but he extends his critique to Western “logocentrism,” the 
primacy of the word, not merely Western words. If ethnocentrism and logocentrism are 
intertwined, then a refusal of meaningful speech may also be a refusal of racist 
epistemologies. Gates’s concept of a figurative free play or indeterminacy of meaning 
rooted in a black folk tradition of competitive language games that is distinctive of 
African American culture, called “Signifyin(g),” is often a coded language used to mock 
master discourses, but he also argues that signifyin(g) refuses discourse altogether: “the 
Afro-American rhetorical strategy of Signifyin(g) is a rhetorical practice that is not 
engaged in the game of information-giving” (Signifying 52). Language that refuses to 
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give information is a form of silence; thoroughly ambiguous speech, often registered as 
nonsense, does not communicate content: it says nothing because it says too many things. 
A tendency toward nonrational or nonlinear uses of language constitutes a resistance to 
language inasmuch as language is tied to what Christian calls “rationalist [. . .] 
intellectual discourse”:  
The usual modes of European/American intellectual production were not 
accessible to or particularly effective for Afro-Americans. That is, the thoroughly 
rationalist approach of European intellectual discourse might have seemed to 
them to be too one-dimensional, too narrow, more easily co-opted than narratives, 
poetry, nonlinear forms where the ambiguities and contradictions of their reality 
could be more freely expressed and that in these forms they could address 
themselves to various audiences—their own folk as well as those readers of the 
dominant culture. (“History” 16-17) 
In Christian’s account of “Afro-American intellectual history,” black literature has 
silenced Western rationality in order to express better the ambiguities of black experience 
and to avoid being co-opted by a narrowing linearity of thought and representation. The 
use of silence to resist the appropriation of black experience into master narratives seems 
particularly important to black women writers, perhaps because, as racial and sexual 
others to dominant white male culture, they have been rhetorically situated as doubly 
nonlinear and nonrational.  
A suspicion of Western discourse and of discourse more generally is evident in 
African American women’s literature despite the importance of speaking out. Even as 
black women’s literature speaks for generations of women who were silenced by racism 
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and sexism, black women writers may also be particularly aware of the limitations of 
language and of the difficulties of speaking for others precisely because the language of 
others has failed to represent or include them. Michelle Wallace responds to Alice 
Walker in just such terms: “the premise [. . .]—that black women writers should speak for 
previous generations of silenced black women—posed certain conceptual difficulties for 
me. First, no one can really speak for anybody else. Inevitably, we silence others that we 
may speak at all” (59). Writers like Wallace do not definitively value speech as a remedy 
to oppressive silencing; instead, as Wallace suggests, language may be ineluctably tied to 
that very silencing, and to use it may implicate the speaker. As Mae Henderson puts it, “it 
is not that black women, in the past, have had nothing to say, but rather that they have 
had no say. The absence of black female voices has allowed others to inscribe, or write, 
and ascribe to, or read, them” (124-25). The process of writing and reading, of language, 
has been a means of oppression and theft and, thus, may be mistrusted and resisted rather 
than claimed as liberatory. Jennifer Cognard Black finds that silence can be a strategy 
that “renounces the charge to bear witness” and can “resist conscription and [. . .] forge 
an intricate and versatile counternarrative” (42). She argues that refusal of language is 
important because “under the slavery of consciousness, if language indicates the power of 
whiteness, then names are suspect, for whites delimit the practices of naming” (48); 
further, “the retelling of the tale [of slavery] solidifies white despotism and, in effect, the 
importance of white record as something that must be acknowledged as well as disputed” 
(49). She invokes a paradoxical relationship to language that she considers fundamental 
to “African American colonialist stories”: “a paradox evolves: speak of a thing, and you 
conventionalize it; leave it unspoken, and you may very well erase it” (54). Where Black 
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discusses narrative silences in African American writing (particularly refusing to pass 
down a history of slavery to new generations), in poetry, the strategies of refusal that 
Black notes become formal ones. If naming and narrative—the foundations of 
language—are tools of oppression, then language itself must be subverted. Brooks’s 
poetry is part of a tradition of refusing speech and employing silences to undo white, 
male, Western, oppressive uses of language by resisting ordinary, communicative 
language altogether. The obscurity and the strangeness that, in some estimations, exclude 
her writing from an authentic communal voice can be reconciled with a shared tradition 
of silence—a strategic multiplicity, difficulty, and undecideability—that plays a principal 
part in a black and female aesthetics of resistance.   
Silence is important in Brooks’s communal poetics not only because of what it 
refuses but because of what it surrounds. In this sense, it again joins with a traditionally 
American concern: the antithesis to the pioneering impulse, that is, the desire to preserve 
untouched wilderness. In black literature, the American tradition of awe before an 
overwhelming natural force is transformed into an awe before an irreducible, even mystic 
blackness that is, by definition, beyond words. Thus, despite the concurrent importance of 
speaking out, words must be recognized as insufficient in the face of an essential 
supralinguistic blackness that authorizes black experience as spiritually vital and 
fundamentally resistant to cooption. Du Bois’s concept that black life is separated from 
white by a veil is often cited as an explanation of the need for black writers to pull that 
veil aside and claim a more fully realized voice for black people. However, the veil also 
confers a kind of mystic power: Du Bois argues that “the Negro is a sort of seventh son, 
born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world” (3, emphasis 
  
220 
 
added). In this metaphor, the veil, or caul, obscures the features of the child, marking him 
as different while also granting him special knowledge or power. Black literature and 
criticism often take advantage of the gift of the veil, claiming that black experience 
inherently exceeds language, even as they pull that veil aside to show the ordinariness as 
well as the beauty and complexity of black humanity. Larry Neal evokes the primacy of 
the supralinguistic when he claims that “Black Arts” are “more concerned with the 
vibrations of the Word, than with the Word itself. Like signifying” (15). Though readers 
and writers of black literature attribute mystery to different sources, they consistently 
invoke silences, vibrations, or unspeakable truths as an essential element of black 
literature.
14
 Like her femaleness, Brooks’s blackness is considered powerful because it is 
unspeakable: to name it is to diminish it and subject it to a rationalization associated with 
violence and oppression. Like the American wilderness, it must remain uncultivated in 
order to retain its spiritual strength.  
Critics of black literature, despite their frequent investment in the rhetoric of 
speaking out, are also sensitive to this strain in black aesthetics, as evidenced by their 
tentativeness to characterize exactly what black literature is or does. If black experience 
can only be hinted at in language that is insufficient to it, then a critical understanding of 
that language of hints and indeterminacy must also cultivate certain silences. For 
example, Stephen Henderson’s influential 1973 book on oral and musical influences in 
black literature is called Understanding the New Black Poetry, but the introduction 
immediately undermines the expository tenor of the book’s title with its own subtitle, 
“The Form of Things Unknown.” This contradictory attitude toward explaining black 
poetry—the need to shed the light of criticism on work that has been ignored or 
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misunderstood while simultaneously maintaining its authority as unknown and 
unknowable—is evident at the close of Henderson’s introduction:  
Finally, I have tried to postulate a concept that would be useful in talking about 
what Black people feel is their distinctiveness, without being presumptuous 
enough to attempt a description or definition of it. This quality or condition of 
Black awareness I call saturation. I intend it as a sign, like the mathematical 
symbol for infinity, or the term “Soul.” It allows us to talk about the thing, even to 
some extent to use it, though we can’t, thank God! ultimately abstract and analyze 
it: it must be experienced. (68) 
Henderson’s use of the capitalized term “Soul” and his insistence on the provisionality of 
any term that describes black “distinctiveness” is mystical in the sense that it posits a 
central, identifying experience that requires recognition but exceeds language. Black 
literature may use a pioneering language to explore the unknown lands of experience, but 
it is also invested in maintaining a fundamental unspeakability of black experience on 
which its distinctiveness depends. Black aesthetics, and by extension black experience, 
must remain unspoken in order to remain dynamic and authentic.
15
 Despite the 
importance of speaking out to Brooks’s place as a progenitor of contemporary African 
American women’s poetry, her work consistently complicates the popular picture of the 
trailblazing outspoken poet who breaks oppressive silences. Though she strives to speak 
of and to a community, silences are also profoundly useful to that community. 
Gwendolyn Brooks has always actively situated her work within a tradition of 
black writing, and her work is marked by both the outspoken and reticent strains so 
important in African American literature and even further emphasized in black women’s 
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literature. Criticism of Brooks has most often focused on her role as trailblazer. Brooks’s 
triumphs are cited in the language of exploration and her poems are maps leading others 
into new lands: “she rose from modest roots to become the first African American to win 
the Pulitzer Prize in poetry and blazed a trail while winning many other honors and 
distinctions” (Mickle 3); “she was a fiercely independent writer who borrowed from both 
European and African American literary traditions to write poetry that would cut her own 
path” (Rugoff 21).16 Cheryl Clarke also reads Brooks’s poetry in terms of the exploration 
of new spaces:  
Her simultaneous rejection of perceived white cultural control and her embracing 
of the new black expressivity opens space for the varied voices of black women 
poets beginning to publish in greater numbers than during the New Negro 
Renaissance, nearly fifty years before. Brooks explores the possibility of new 
space, new speech, and new agency. (46)  
These formulations cast Brooks as a pioneer poet who explores unknown or restricted 
territory; she says a new thing, and she pushes at cultural borders that restrict black 
women’s expression. Significantly, her exploratory successes are not praised as personal 
victories of her poetic language but as survival strategies for black culture in general and 
extensions of the poetic territory for all black women writers.
17
  
In addition, though they are often ignored in criticism that emphasizes her role as 
a spokesperson, Brooks’s silences are also communally inflected. In his biography of 
Brooks, George Kent quotes an early poem as evidence of Brooks’s growing black 
consciousness and connects such a consciousness to her appreciation of silences:  
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Growing in her also was a racial pride for those who walked sturdily, and rebuke 
for those who did not appreciate blacks, including blacks themselves [. . .]. In her 
thoughts of the twenty-one-year-old heavyweight champion boxer Joe Louis, she 
found praise of his silence and seeming coldness, and she expressed contempt for 
men who were afraid to be silent. “Unspoken words are stronger, / Ungiven 
smiles are sweet; / Staid ice is the best cover / For strength’s resourceful heat” 
(“Song for Joe Louis,” June 28, 1935). (Life 36) 
If “unspoken words are stronger” and this unspoken strength is a resource for black art 
and culture, it is Brooks’s paradoxical challenge as a poet to speak out in a “shrill 
spelling of blackness” (Brooks, Part One 83) and to make a space for the “unspoken 
words” of black strength in the language of poetry.18 This doubleness is evident in 
Brooks’s proposal that Western Christmas traditions be supplemented by an African 
celebration that will be more authentically black: “I see, feel, and hear a potential 
celebration as African colors—thorough, direct. A thing of shout but of African 
quietness, too, because in Africa these tonals can almost coincide. A clean-throated 
singing” (Part One 78). Brooks’s vision of authentic celebration is “A thing of shout but 
of African quietness, too,” and it is, for Brooks, a black African heritage that can bring 
together these two impulses. A simultaneous speaking and silence defines a black essence 
in poetry. While she argues that “Every Negro poet has ‘something to say.’ Simply 
because he is a Negro; he cannot escape having important things to say,” this “saying” 
can also be remarkably nonverbal: “His mere body, for that matter, is an eloquence. His 
quiet walk down the street is a speech to the people. Is a rebuke, is a plea, is a school” 
(“Poets” 312). While speaking out seems inevitable in this formulation, a “quiet walk” 
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can also be “a speech to the people,” and this duality is part of what it means to Brooks to 
be a black poet.
19
 The valuation of black experience as resistant to and even unavailable 
to language plays a crucial role in Brooks’s poetics at the same time that she self-
consciously develops a poetics of speaking out to wider audiences.
20
  
A poem like “I love those little booths at Benvenuti’s” shows Brooks poised 
between the “shrill spelling” and the quietness that she sees as equally important to an 
authentically black aesthetic. The poem narrates the experience of white tourists to 
Bronzeville—the predominantly black section of Chicago that figures so prominently in 
her work. The tourists go to Benvenuti’s, a Bronzeville restaurant, to observe “tropical 
truths” about the “dusky folk, so clamorous!” The observers have come to revel in the 
otherness of the “dusky folk” they “dissect” with their gaze. They arrive expecting 
“antics” and “lurching dirt,” which the poem immediately juxtaposes to the “very large 
cabana, / small palace” that the onlookers arrange for in Venice (126). But instead of the 
“knives” and the “ditty— / dirty” with which they come ready to titillate themselves 
(126), they find “a vendor tidily encased” and ordinary “paper napkins in a water glass” 
(127). In this sense, the poem speaks out on behalf of the black community. It describes 
black life in an aggressively ordinary way that ruptures white expectations of difference: 
“The colored people arrive, sit firmly down, / Eat their Express Spaghetti, their T-bone 
steak, / Handling their steel and crockery with no clatter” (127). This descriptive 
outspokenness is matched by a formal emphasis on linguistic performance. In particular, 
the poem uses frequent rhyme and alliteration to call attention to the literariness of the 
language. The first stanza sets the stage for the insistent—if unpredictable—rhymes 
scattered throughout the poem:  
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They get to Benvenuti’s. There are booths 
To hide in while observing tropical truths 
About this—dusky folk, so clamorous! 
So colorfully incorrect,  
So amorous,  
So flatly brave! 
Boothed-in, one can detect,  
Dissect.  
One knows and scarcely knows what to expect. (126) 
The speaker manipulates language with assurance and ease in order to reject the 
reduction of black people to stereotypes and jesters. The self-consciously artistic 
language claims a poetic mastery and authority that mocks white expectations of 
blackness as excessive, clowning, or radically other; this poetically authoritative voice 
articulates a silenced version of black life—the tidily straight, even bourgeois, 
quotidian—that disrupts the fetishization and consumption of a supposedly essential 
black duskiness, tropicality, or savagery. The subject matter of the poem constitutes an 
extension of language’s territory in itself, but the foregrounding of artifice also asserts 
that poetic artistry and virtuosity—literary language, the supposed bastion of the 
universally human—is a useful tool for expressing black life. 
And yet, despite its use of traditionally poetic language, the poem also limits 
language or intelligibility in order to ward off intrusion by outsiders. The white observers 
“stab their stares,” but ultimately “they feel refused.” And, though the tourists attempt to 
access and vicariously enjoy black life through their gaze, the refusal of access is notably 
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about sound. They come expecting music, loudness: “so clamorous,” “not bottled up,” 
“sexual soprano,” “and praying in the bass, partial, unpretty” (126). Though they hear 
music, it is not “tropical” or “incorrect” but decorously middle-class: “They play ‘They 
All Say I’m the Biggest Fool’ / And ‘Voo Me On the Vot Nay’” and “‘New Lester / 
Leaps In’ and ‘For Sentimental Reasons.’” The “subtle treason” of the fact that “The 
colored people will not ‘clown’” is, in the poem, a treasonous quiet that, in turn, silences 
the tourists and, more importantly, thwarts their expectations. This disappointment is 
figured as language trouble: “The absolute stutters, and the rationale / Stoops off in 
astonishment.” The refusal of the black people in Benvenuti’s to make noise also silences 
the racist rationale of difference that is available to those who would dissect them, 
leaving them unable to report what they’ve seen: “But how shall they tell people they 
have been / out Bronzeville way?” Their language is, unlike the language of the poem, 
incapable of reporting black life as it is, only black life as they expected it to be. Their 
words fail, even down to the basic vocabulary they come prepared with: the quotation 
marks around “folk” and “clown” emphasize the inadequacy of these terms to the reality 
of the situation (127). The silences of the folk in Benvenuti’s, their “quiet walk” and 
“staid ice,” cause a crisis of language for the white observers who are no longer certain 
how to represent them. 
In addition, the poem produces disruptive silences in its form. Though it uses 
poeticity to speak out for a group, it also resists such showiness. For instance, rhyme is 
one of the most assertive elements of poetic language here. Though rhyme is, in one 
sense, a marker of literariness, the irregular placement of the rhyming pairs—which 
appear sometimes internally, sometimes ending three lines in a row, and sometimes 
  
227 
 
separated by as many as two stanzas and eight lines—runs counter to traditional literary 
expectations, which are signaled by the relatively conventional rhyme of the opening 
couplet. The poem is noisily musical; it is “clamorous” and “colorfully incorrect” where 
the diners are not, smuggling in the “hot, not bottled up” music that is refused to the 
tourists.
21
 There is some danger here that the form of the poem itself will provide a show 
of “tropical truths” for white readers analogous to the Benvenuti’s tourists. But, in the last 
stanza, this music is abruptly silenced:  
The colored people will not “clown.” 
 
The colored people arrive, sit firmly down,  
Eat their Express Spaghetti, their T-bone steak,  
Handling their steel and crockery with no clatter,  
Laugh punily, rise, go firmly out of the door. (127) 
The poem lands on a strong rhyme, “clown” and “down,” just before ending with its 
longest succession of lines that are not rhymed with any others. The couplet, separated by 
a stanza break, emphasizes rhyme’s absence in the final lines. The conspicuous lack of 
clatter and music, both thematically and formally, shuts a door in the face of the outsiders 
looking in: the poem refuses to make its expected music, ending with relatively 
unadorned language and prosaic cadences. Further, the contrast between the linguistic 
performance earlier in the poem and these firmly plain lines recasts the poem’s 
musicality. It is not the show of essential “dirty, rich, carmine, hot” black musicality the 
spectators and readers may have been looking for but an aesthetic tool that can be picked 
up or set down depending on the task at hand.  
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But Brooks’s relationship to a tradition that makes both speaking out and keeping 
quiet defining features of black and female group identity is deeply complicated by her 
loyalty to the strange and distinctive. The particularity, even peculiarity, of many of 
Brooks’s poems is a fundamental element of her work. Though she often prizes 
accessibility, her poetry is also strange and reticent. These moments of difficulty or 
unintelligibility amount to a remarkable idiosyncracy in poetry so often valued for its 
accessibility and attainment of shared voice.
22
 Though most readers agree that Brooks’s 
poems have a political, or at least a social element, many also observe that her political 
statements—if she can be said to make political statements in her poetry—are often 
oblique, understated, ambiguous, or implied, subordinated to the unique experiences of 
the personages who inhabit her poems and to the style in which they are expressed. Maria 
Mootry considers this “wide-angled, ironic, slanted vision” part of a feminist poetics that 
represents women’s lives without fully subjecting their experience to a broader system of 
discourse in which “women are either misnamed or occulted or totally appropriated” 
(“Slant” 181). Raymond Malewitz also connects Brooks’s difficulty to female identity, 
arguing that “she challenges her readers through a language of what could be called 
motivated ambiguity or, more polemically, a feminine semiotics of black empowerment” 
(533). Critics like Mootry and Malewitz contend that such ambiguity is a feminist refusal 
of appropriation into masculine forms of rhetoric, but the difficulty that they observe is 
also part of Brooks’s resistance to allowing the individual to be dissolved into the group. 
When she speaks out or remains silent about black experience, blackness is the distinctive 
experience that she prevents from being misnamed or appropriated by white 
homogeneity. When she speaks out or remains silent about women’s experience, she 
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prevents it from being swallowed up by male homogeneity. In these cases, her loyalty to 
the particular is also in service of a shared identity. But her resistance to homogeneity 
likewise extends to the singular being, and it comes in conflict with her communal values 
when she resists blackness or femaleness or even ordinary language itself as 
homogenizing forces. Her advice for “Black Woman” clearly separates personhood from 
shared identity:   
Black Woman must remember, through all the prattle about walking or not 
walking three or twelve steps behind or ahead of “her” male, that her personhood 
precedes her femalehood; that, sweet as sex may be, she cannot endlessly brood 
on Black Man’s blondes, blues, and blunders. She is a person in the world—with 
wrongs to right, stupidities to outwit, with her man when possible, on her own 
when not. And she is only here to enjoy. She will be here, like any other, once 
only. Therefore she must, in the midst of tragedy and hatred and neglect, in the 
midst of her own efforts to purify, mightily enjoy the readily available: sunshine 
and pets and children and conversation and games and travel (tiny or large) and 
books and walks and chocolate cake. (Part One 204) 
Though she argues most directly that “personhood precedes femalehood,” her 
reasoning—that a person is primarily responsible to her own “readily available” life as 
distinct from whatever “tragedy and hatred and neglect” she may face—suggests that 
personhood precedes blackness as well. Though this articulation of individual identity 
came late in Brooks’s life, throughout her career Brooks writes for this particular “person 
in the world” as much as she writes for “Black Woman.”23 Indeed, the competing values 
of voice and silence that drive her experiments in search of a publically resonant poetics 
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are also at play in her work to carve out a space for individual experience within—and 
sometimes against—larger group narratives.24 
In addition to blazing a trail for language that can reverse the silencing of black 
and female experience, Brooks also works to craft a language that is better able to express 
discrete identities or experiences that may be silenced or ignored or may be inexpressible 
in ordinary language. This is important to Brooks when she pushes language to express 
black and female experiences that do not have a place in white, male-dominated poetic 
traditions, but she also experiments in order to voice the experiences of individual people 
who do not have a place in the common language more generally. For Brooks, the poet 
must attend to the specificity of experiences and perspectives, prize her own sense of 
language, and not surrender to pressures to speak in the voice of another. This can mean 
black writers avoiding the imposition of white expectations, but it is also important that 
the particular voice remain distinct from exterior impositions of all kinds. Brooks’s view 
that poetry is a search for a singular voice is most clear in her advice to young writers. In 
A Young Poet’s Primer, she exhorts would-be poets to read the work of other writers but, 
above all, to credit their own lives and minds as a source of poetry—what she calls “Your 
Poem.” Though A Young Poets’ Primer is at times aimed explicitly at a black audience, it 
is most concerned with affirming the value of personal experience for young poets. Item 
20 in the list of advisements makes this clear. In it, Brooks gives her students permission 
to write about anything, but, ultimately, what qualifies a subject for inclusion in a 
poem—be it “Malcolm X, Mao, mice, mountains, [or] mercy”—is that it is “what you 
REALLY think and feel. What YOU think. What YOU feel” (12). The authenticity 
emphasized by the capitalized “REALLY” is compromised by thoughts and feelings that 
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do not come from the “YOU” that writes the poem.25 In order to devise a language 
capable of expressing the singular experience, Brooks advocates originality and 
experimentation. The new territory that Brooks pushes language into is, in addition to 
denied or ignored black and female experience, particular personal experience. 
But, like her commitment to attaining communal voice, Brooks’s individualist 
voice coexists with strategic silences. Just as Brooks uses silences to resist the flattening 
out of black experience by racial stereotypes, she also uses silences to refuse the 
disappearance of the strange and idiosyncratic into the common—even when that 
commonality is a valued shared black identity or sisterhood. Her silences are as much 
about shielding the singular as they are about guarding blackness or femaleness, and 
when identity-based poetics require a sacrifice of idiosyncratic expression or a revelation 
of a private self, Brooks resists such shared expression.
26
 In fact, Kent argues that, despite 
her “gift to the reader of a lyric essence,” she also acknowledges “the irreducible measure 
of aloneness borne by man and woman alike.” This essential aloneness resists language 
and requires silences. For instance, Kent argues that a regard for such isolation leads 
Brooks, in her autobiography, to omit many of the details of her life, which reflects a 
belief that is central to Brooks’s poetry: there are some parts of one’s essence that cannot 
be “render[ed] as a message from soul to soul” (“Preface” 34).27 Just as blackness or 
femininity is ultimately unavailable to language, so is the individual.
28
 This is not only 
because language is not able to express the “irreducible measure of aloneness” but 
because the poet guards that solitude by deliberately refusing language.  
Thus, in addition to balancing between communal speaking out and strategic 
silences, Brooks’s poems also balance between pushing language to express the 
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idiosyncractic while also using silences to deflect intrusions on the singular. This is 
perhaps most evident in her portrait poems. Many of these—that is, poems frequently 
named after the single character they describe—praise people for being idiosyncratic. 
Poems like “Memorial to Ed Bland,” “the rites for Cousin Vit,” and “Bronzeville Man 
with a Belt in the Back” memorialize those who do not fit in and who are in some way 
incomprehensible or excessive (79-80, 125, 362): like the bird in “A light and diplomatic 
bird,” they are “admirably strange” (123). But in addition to celebrating their strangeness 
by expressing it, the poems also resist the recuperation of that strangeness into the 
common language of the group. For example, “Naomi” shows Brooks simultaneously 
representing particularity and using silences to sustain such difference against the 
homogenizing of shared language: 
Too foraging to blue-print or deploy!— 
To lift her brother;  
Or tell dull mother 
That is not it among the dishes and brooms,  
It is damper 
Than what you will wipe out of sills and down from the                                          
mouldings of rooms 
And dump from the dirty-clothes hamper; 
 
Or say “Do not bother 
To hug your cheese and furniture” 
To her small father; 
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Or to register at all the hope of her hunt or say what 
It was not. 
 
(It was, by diligent caring, 
To find out what life was for. 
 
For certainly what it was not for was forbearing.) (374) 
Naomi’s exploratory urge is irreconcilable with her family’s values. She is foraging for 
something that can’t be found among her mother’s “dishes and brooms” or her father’s 
“cheese and furniture.” Naomi’s individualist urge “by diligent caring, / to find out what 
life was for” is inexplicable to her family, and the valuation of voice that is normally 
considered part of Brooks’s communal role is here almost anti-communal. The poem 
voices Naomi’s rejection of shared values and her search for what she “REALLY think[s] 
and feel[s]” (Brooks, Young 12). But it also uses silence to prevent Naomi’s “foraging” 
for a different way of life from being appropriated into common language. The poem 
begins by describing her search as “Too foraging to blue-print or deploy!— ”: because 
she is seeking something new, she cannot explain it to others or send them down a similar 
path.
29
 The rest of the poem acts out this inability: it describes what “it” is not, but it 
cannot, until the end of the poem, say what it is. Like mystical revelation, what Naomi 
forages for can only be described by negation. Further, despite the poem’s efforts at 
explanation, Naomi herself is “too foraging” to “register at all the hope of her hunt or say 
what it was not,” emphasizing that experiences exceeding the group’s expectations are, 
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by nature, incommunicable to that community. The final parenthetical statement appears 
to undermine the silence the poem has built around Naomi’s search by baldly stating her 
goal. However, the parentheses imply that the utterance is between the narrator of the 
poem and the reader, not between Naomi and her family. And even that aside works by 
negation more than affirmation. She seeks to find out “what life was for,” but the poem 
ends by describing the answer—the familiar answer—that Naomi does not seek: “For 
certainly what it was not for was forbearing.” The ending turns around a silence, the 
unspoken and perhaps unspeakable answer to Naomi’s question about “what life was 
for,” as if, though it uses language to make a space for the peculiar, the poem itself is 
“Too foraging to blue-print or deploy!” Poems like “I love those little booths” and 
“Naomi” demonstrate that the tension between speaking out and silence is necessary for 
Brooks in both communal and individual contexts.  
The tensions between voice and reticence, as well as between the individual and 
the group, shape Brooks’s formal choices throughout her career as she works out a 
poetics that can achieve both shared and singular voices while also remaining 
strategically silent.
30
 Mootry’s introduction to A Life Distilled, a critical volume on 
Brooks, emphasizes her experimentalism: 
Through the years, Gwendolyn Brooks has experimented with a variety of 
prosodic, syntactic, and narrative strategies. Her writing career has been 
remarkably rich in forms and ideas. Her creative practice has involved the 
ongoing articulation and formation of a variety of texts that express a shifting, 
exploratory, and ultimately performative consciousness. (1) 
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This “shifting and exploratory” attitude and the experimentation that Mootry describes 
are driven by the complex and contradictory nature of Brooks’s goals. Brooks’s particular 
poetic flexibility and her constant revisions of her relationship to form reshape her 
poetics to meet the changing and sometimes conflicting demands of poetry as she sees 
them. In particular, her form changes as her emphasis shifts between individual and 
communal experience and between speaking out and remaining silent. The simultaneous 
necessity of claiming voice and remaining strategically silent is most evident in Brooks’s 
management of the idea that poetic language is capable of expressing and revealing 
identity or essence. A poetics that purports to express the inner life of a speaker or reveal 
the essence of a subject or experience is useful for speaking out for silenced experiences 
that are important to Brooks: black experience, women’s lives, and the particular person. 
But—because Brooks prizes personal reticence as well as black and female traditions that 
value the strategic silences of undecidability, occlusion, misdirection, and outright refusal 
to speak—revelation must also be resisted. Brooks experiments with artifice in order both 
to use and refuse access to essence or identity. She innovates most radically in “In the 
Mecca” because that poem marks the moment in her career when the tension between her 
various loyalties is most extreme. But Brooks’s consciousness-raising experience at Fisk 
University doesn’t change her basic poetic concerns; it raises the stakes on them. 
Throughout her career, the changing role of self-consciously artificial language in 
Brooks’s poetry is shaped by her conflicting goals as a black woman poet to pioneer a 
new poetry, capable of voicing what has been silenced, and to preserve the recalcitrant 
silences that she also considers crucial to black identity. Likewise, her developing 
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relationship to form works to strike a balance between a desire to write of and to a 
community and her own personal devotion to the idiosyncratic. 
 The discussion of artifice in Brooks’s work is frequently limited to her use and 
apparent rejection of traditional forms—most notably the sonnet and the ballad.31 But it is 
also useful to view Brooks’s traditional forms as part of her experimentation with self-
consciously stylized language more broadly. This includes the most obviously innovative 
element of her poetics: her use of what I will call thick language, that is, literary, 
artificial, difficult, obscure, or idiosyncratic diction, syntax, and imagery—language that 
cannot be ignored as the mere vehicle of expression—language that has a presence of its 
own. The role of this kind of language in most of Brooks’s earlier work is not noticeably 
experimental. Though there are moments of strangeness and difficulty, taken 
individually, few of her early poems appear particularly interested in flouting poetic 
convention.
32
 Certainly, Brooks’s early volumes make use of traditional forms like 
sonnets and ballads in formally conventional ways.
33
 And, while her free verse mixes the 
conversational with the carefully wrought, sometimes even the ornate, and is scattered 
with moments of regular meter and frequent rhyme, none of these formal or stylistic 
choices is especially innovative considered among the range of poetic forms available to 
Brooks and her contemporaries. Her earlier work nonetheless reveals her foregrounding 
style as a means of simultaneously speaking out and retaining guarded silences.  
In the first part of Brooks’s career, this use of poeticity is most pronounced in her 
Pulitzer Prize-winning Annie Allen.
34
 Annie Allen is, in several important ways, invested 
in the revelation of essence.
35
 As the detailed picture of the life of Annie Allen, a black 
woman, it is concerned with revealing blackness, femaleness, and Annie-ness. Its 
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revelatory moments are many as the book traces Annie’s development in three major 
sections: “Notes from the Childhood and the Girlhood,” “The Anniad,” and “The 
Womanhood.” The first and last sections, however, are less directly focused on Annie 
than the second, introducing other characters and ideas that are often not self-evidently 
related to Annie’s life. These more varied sections frame the centerpiece of the book, the 
“Anniad,” which treats Annie’s love and disappointment with the “man of tan” who, after 
returning from war, leaves her. The poem narrates her devotion to and even deification of 
her lover, along with sex, love, the effects of war on them both, the pain of betrayal and 
jealousy, and the despair of abandonment. The story reveals Annie’s most intimate 
experiences, but it is by no means plain or direct. “The Anniad,” in part because it 
represents Brooks at her most revelatory, is also highly artificial. The title of the poem 
harks back to an epic tradition with its reference to the Aeneid, and its aabbccc rhyme 
scheme echoes both the rhyming couplets of epic verse and the traditional English seven-
line rhyme royal stanza, adapting them to create a new form for her black woman’s epic. 
Further, the register is elevated, the syntax often inverted, and its vocabulary complex 
and strange. In short, the language draws attention to itself as poetic. For example, the 
stanza that describes Annie’s lover being called off to war is representatively complex 
and self-consciously linguistic:  
Doomer, though, crescendo-comes 
Prophesying hecatombs. 
Surrealist and cynical. 
Garrulous and guttural. 
Spits upon the silver leaves. 
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Denigrates the dainty eves. 
Dear dexterity achieves. (101-02) 
The status of the words as carefully crafted language is emphasized by consonance and 
assonance, rhythm, rhyme, and register. The words appear to be chosen at least as much 
for how they sound as for what they say, and their references are often uncertain. We 
can’t be sure what a “doomer” is, but it echoes the vowel of “hecatombs,” itself an 
uncommon word meaning a ritual sacrifice. It is not clear whether the “doomer” or the 
“hecatombs” are characterized as “garrulous and guttural,” but the sounds of those words 
create a sense of babble or chaos in addition to suggesting the sounds of artillery. What it 
means for a doomer or hecatombs to carry out any of the actions of the last lines is 
unclear, but the strong triple rhyme of “leaves,” “eves,” and “achieves” conveys a sense 
that these actions are coming in quick succession, piling unstoppably one atop the other. 
In these lines and throughout the collection, the decorative or artificial aspects of the 
language are not only added to the communicative function but sometimes obscure that 
function. This emphasis on language as medium serves two contradictory purposes. The 
poem accentuates its linguistic virtuosity in order simultaneously to speak out for black 
women’s experience and to deemphasize the communicative aspects of language, 
creating an ironic distance that undermines the notion that language can render 
experience.  
This emphasis on the ornate serves the revelatory ends of the poem in that it 
produces strangeness and idiosyncracy, innovating a language that is capable of 
expressing the peculiar personality of Annie.
36
 The “Childhood and the Girlhood” section 
paints young Annie as naïve and romantic, bookish and unsatisfied, desiring an unknown 
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“somewhat of something other” that “she did not know; but tried to tell.”37 The “ballad of 
late Annie” elaborates Annie’s life and thoughts, establishing her fascination for the 
florid and embellished (90).
38
 The poem signals the lure of a certain poeticalness with its 
archaic first line, “Late Annie in her bower lay.” But, in sharp contrast to Annie in her 
bower, admiring her own “blush-brown shoulder” and “blush-brown lip,” comes the 
“shriek” of her mother’s demand that she get up and do her chores. Annie’s wants are 
defined in contrast to those of her family, as is her ornate style. Her mother’s words are 
relatively unadorned and practical: “Be I to fetch and carry? / Get a broom to whish the 
doors / Or get a man to marry.” But Annie’s thoughts are articulated in language that is 
more elaborate, revealing her hopes for richness and her delight in the highly wrought. 
She describes the man who would be “chief enough to marry [her]”: “Whom I raise my 
shades before / Must be gist and lacquer / With melted opals for my milk, / Pearl-leaf for 
my cracker.” The literary tone of these lines, with their inverted syntax, rhythmic 
regularity, and heavy rhyme, foregrounds poeticity in order to develop a language 
appropriate to revealing the thoughts of a young girl who craves “melted opals” and 
“pearl-leaf” and a man who “must be [. . .] lacquer.” In “The Anniad,” this style is 
heightened and sustained for 43 stanzas. The elaborateness of the language serves the 
portrait of Annie’s individuality and difference. In this sense, it is a means of speaking 
out: it reveals the particularity of Annie in a way that plain-spoken lines would not. The 
poem begins by speaking directly to the reader, “Think of sweet and chocolate,” and it is 
framed by repeated injunctions to “think of” various things that will help one to imagine 
Annie and her life: “Think of ripe and rompabout, / All her harvest buttoned in, / All her 
ornaments untried” (99). This casts the speaker of the poem as Annie’s explainer and the 
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reader as someone who is trying, or who ought to be trying, to understand Annie. The 
artifice of the poem promotes that revelatory stance by enacting Annie’s longing to try 
her ornaments or to “print [. . .] roses” on “the unembroidered brown” that she sees in her 
mirror. The thick language of “The Anniad” speaks out for Annie’s silenced yearning for 
embellishment and beauty and reveals her difference from the plain and plain-speaking 
lives of her parents and those around her.
39
 
However, even as poeticity expresses Annie’s particularity, it also creates an 
ironic distance that preserves the dignified silence of the “precious” self: it often refuses 
language and leaves the “something somewhat other” of Annie’s essence strategically 
undefined. The poem ends with Annie abandoned and alone in her kitchen. It tells us 
what she feels and thinks of when her “tan man” leaves her for good. But the poem 
undermines the idea that poetic language can capture Annie’s inner reality by pointing up 
the artificiality of language:  
In the indignant dark there ride 
Roughnesses and spiny things 
On infallible hundred heels. 
And a bodiless bee stings. 
Cyclone concentration reels. 
Harried sods dilate, divide,  
Suck her sorrowfully inside.  
 
Think of tweaked and twenty-four. 
Fuschias gone or gripped or gray,  
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All hay-colored that was green. 
Soft aesthetic looted, lean. 
Crouching low, behind a screen,  
Pock-marked eye-light, and the sore 
Eaglets of old pride and prey. (109) 
Some of the imagery of this passage is concerned with the hidden or unknown: the bee 
that stings is bodiless, Annie is buried under “harried sods,” and the “pock-marked eye-
light” and “sore / Eaglets” that harass her are hidden “behind a screen.” But it is the style 
of the passage that creates the most significant silence. The difficulty of the language, its 
uncertainty of reference, and its self-conscious literariness are all reminders that any 
access to experience language may provide is always mediated by that language. Despite 
its close look at Annie’s life, the poem is also reticent, demonstrating at every turn the 
distance between experience and revelation. Brooks’s style here mutes signification in 
favor of the sumptuous sign. Language, it reminds us, is not experience, and the poet, like 
Annie, may have her own appreciation for pearls and lacquer, for words that are 
satisfying in themselves, independent of their communicative functions.
40
 In “The 
Anniad,” and in much of Brooks’s other work, thick language is a means of articulating 
singular perspectives or experiences—a kind of “lyric essence”—while, paradoxically, 
revealing the divide between language and life. The voice and the silence that artifice 
simultaneously accomplishes in Annie Allen are largely individualistic or idiosyncratic, 
but Brooks’s work, on the whole, is concerned as well with that individuality as part of a 
black community.  
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“The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith,” the longest poem in Brooks’s first volume, A 
Street in Bronzeville, foregrounds artifice to balance between speech and silence that 
serve both shared and singular purposes and, more, to manage conflict between those 
purposes (42-47).
41
 “Satin-Legs” is, in large part, concerned with speaking out. It 
describes a poor black man who, on his day of rest, decks himself with strong scents and 
elaborate clothing. The poem reveals Satin-Legs in front of his mirror, inspects the 
“innards” of his closet, narrates his walk down the street, dinner and a movie, and, in the 
final lines, recounts sex with his anonymous and interchangeable date, as extravagantly 
dressed as he. The narrator makes much of showing the reader something he or she has 
not seen before. In fact, she directly addresses an observing “you” who is an outsider to 
Satin-Legs’s life and likely to misunderstand him, speaking back to that observer and 
seeking to explain Satin-Legs and his extravagance, which may seem to an outsider mere 
bad taste:  
Now, at his bath, would you deny him lavender 
 Or take away the power of his pine? 
 [. . .] might his happiest  
Alternative (you muse) be, after all,  
A bit of gentle garden in the best  
Of taste and straight tradition? Maybe so.  
But you forget, or did you ever know,  
His heritage of cabbage and pigtails,  
Old intimacy with alleys, garbage pails (42-43) 
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The poem presents Satin-Legs at his bath to an unsympathetic observer in order to speak 
out about his life, about the realities of poverty that may be invisible to those accustomed 
to “the best / of taste and straight tradition.” It seeks to rectify an ignorance about Satin-
Legs, articulate the previously unknown “heritage of cabbage and pigtails” to the 
observer, and thus expose good taste as a racist and classist construction, a privilege born 
out of inequality rather than an achievement. In this sense, the poem speaks out on the 
part of a community that is systematically denied such privileges. But it also speaks on 
behalf of the individual, describing a person who cannot wholly be understood as an 
emblem of his race. He is defiantly and strangely his own, and this too is disclosed. Satin-
Legs appears in the deeply private act of regarding himself in the mirror, and what he 
admires is his own particularity, not his place among a people: “He looks into his mirror, 
loves himself— / The neat curve here; the angularity / That is appropriate at just its place 
/ The technique of a variegated grace” (44). Brooks exposes the effects of poverty on a 
group of people, but she also unveils the private life and “variegated grace” of a 
particular person, Satin-Legs Smith. His angularity is “appropriate at just its place” and 
no other. Like many of Brooks’s portrait poems, “Satin-Legs” voices both a version of 
blackness and the particular person as part of a poetics that illuminates the ignored or 
oppressed. 
The foregrounding of artifice in the poem helps Brooks to achieve this revelation 
because the thickness of the poem’s language expresses the idiosyncratic individual in 
addition to modeling an outspoken black aesthetics. The first lines of the poem 
demonstrate Brooks’s attraction for dense, copious, self-conscious, even baroque 
language: “Inamoratas, with an approbation, / Bestowed his title. Blessed his inclination” 
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(42). And this kind of carefully wrought language—high-register vocabulary like 
“approbation,” antiquated imported words like “inamoratas,” insistent rhythms, and 
strident rhyming—is intimately tied to Satin-Legs both as a member of his community 
and as a distinctive person. As Satin-Legs, waking, “unwinds, elaborately,” so do these 
first lines and much of the poem (42). Like the poet, Satin-Legs undertakes the task of 
decoration with deliberate care: “He waits a moment, he designs his reign, / That no 
performance may be plain or vain” (42). The extravagant language used to describe 
Satin-Legs distinguishes him from the “men estranged / From music and from wonder 
and from joy” who make up the background of his life as much as his zoot-suits distance 
him from the disapproving onlookers to whom the poem ostensibly speaks (45). As in the 
“Anniad,” linguistic ostentation is a means of pushing language to be more capable of 
expressing particular identity. But, like Satin-Legs’s careful show of beautiful 
extravagance, Brooks’s use of embellishment also speaks for a group denied beauty, 
innovating a language that reaches toward “the gold impulse not possible to show” (44). 
In addition, when the opulence of the poem appears to exceed the bounds of the “best of 
taste and straight tradition,” it aligns the poet with the mocked excessiveness of Satin-
Legs and others like him. In this sense, artifice in the poem serves a communal voice that 
talks back to the observing and disapproving “you” in defense of black performativity 
dismissed as bad taste. Indeed, when the speaker invites the censorious onlooker to 
investigate Satin-Legs’s wardrobe, “Let us proceed. Let us inspect, together [. . .] The 
innards of the closet,” the lines that follow not only describe the flashiness of the zoot-
suits that he wears but call attention to the artful embellishment available to Brooks as 
well: 
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[. . .] wonder-suits in yellow and in wine,  
Sarcastic green and zebra-striped cobalt.  
All drapes. With shoulder padding that is wide 
And cocky and determined as his pride;  
Ballooning pants that taper off to ends 
Scheduled to choke precisely. 
    Here are hats 
Like bright umbrellas; and hysterical ties 
Like narrow banners for some gathering war. (42-43) 
These lines emphasize style with neologism (“wonder-suits”), odd synaesthetic locution 
(“sarcastic green”), and obvious and insistent literariness (rhymes like “wide/pride”). We 
also see the “architectural design” that the poem attributes to Satin-Legs in the way the 
line break after “scheduled to choke precisely” creates syntactic division while 
maintaining the regular rhythm of the iambic pentameter. Though the speaker of the 
poem casts herself as a guide to outsiders, the performativity of the poem positions the 
speaker in opposition to those onlookers, affirming the value of extravagance.  
Though the speaker of the poem appears to revel in both Satin-Legs’s art and her 
own, there are moments of irony that trouble that stance. The poem’s style creates an 
ironic distance that directly opposes the speaker’s stated intention to act as a tour guide: it 
shields the subject of the poem from the outsiders looking in, both the arbiters of taste 
and the writer herself. Just when the view is most intimate—as observer and poet 
“inspect, together” “the innards of his closet”—the poem is decorative, the language 
artificial. The thickness of the language reminds us that this view of Satin-Legs, though it 
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purports to reveal his “innards,” is mediated. As it does in a poem like “The Anniad,” 
artifice emphasizes the distance between language and experience in order to prevent the 
poem’s revelatory push from impinging on the individual. But, in “Satin-Legs,” it also 
screens a particular aspect of black identity from white audiences. While the poem opens 
a black man’s closet to white viewers and invites them to look in, knowing that they will 
sneer at what they find, it also reminds those readers that what they are seeing is a piece 
of art, a made thing with its own motives, not naked essence. The very act of addressing 
the audience with phrases like “Let us proceed. Let us inspect, together” heightens the 
theatricality of the revelation, emphasizing the act of reading and writing, rather than 
creating an illusion of direct access. Just as Satin-Legs’s ablutions are the result of a 
heritage that his white observers do not understand, this use of poeticity echoes a 
tradition of rhetorical richness and multiplicity rooted in a strategic refusal, a blank face 
or a silent mask—often achieved by a show of volubility—turned to white interlocutors. 
Thick language creates a kind of silence, a reminder that experience is separate from and 
inaccessible to language, hiding Satin-Legs from the judgment of the unsympathetic 
white reader and arguing for an irreducible selfhood that eludes shared expression.  
Artifice thus serves the simultaneous urge to speak out and resist language for 
both the community and the individual. This is complicated, however, by negotiations 
between the conflicting needs of the group and the private person. Satin Legs is both of 
and not of his people, and his art is simultaneously the source of his connection to and 
separation from them. Even though he emblematizes some of the strategies available to 
artists working within an African American tradition, he is also stubbornly unique, 
defined apart from his own community by his idiosyncratic and self-focused art. While 
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dressing, “he looks into his mirror, loves himself—,” and he “judges that he walks most 
powerfully alone” (44, emphasis added; 46). Satin-Legs’s style—rooted in self-regard, an 
admiration for his own curves and particular articulations and techniques—entails a 
smearing of the people around him into a “unit” that he “hears and does not hear” and a 
blur that “he sees and does not see” (45). Further, his embellishment involves a lack of 
political awareness or agency: Satin-Legs’s contentment with self-decoration, his “lotion, 
lavender, and oil,” indicates his failure to attain political and racial awareness. Thus, 
addressing the white onlookers, the speaker makes their anticipated criticism and Satin-
Legs’s extravagance sops that take the place of real change: “You might as well— / 
Unless you care to set the world a-boil / And do a lot of equalizing things / [. . .] Leave 
him his lotion, lavender and oil” (43). His self-fashioning obscures his participation in a 
group and the place of that community in the world. Therefore, it may appear that artifice 
is primarily a tool of individual, even anti-communal, resistance to dissolution into shared 
modes of expression. However, it cannot ultimately prevent Satin-Legs from being 
subsumed into a common voice, and his particularity is blurred by a crowd of ancestors 
who are just as “dexterous” as he is: 
The pasts of his ancestors lean against 
Him. Crowd him. Fog out his identity. 
Hundreds of hungers mingle with his own,  
Hundreds of voices advise so dexterously 
He quite considers his reactions his, 
Judges he walks most powerfully alone,  
That everything is—simply what it is. (46) 
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These lines argue that ancestral voices both silence individuality and create individual 
identity; it is naïve for Satin-Legs to believe that he is “powerfully alone” and that 
“everything is—simply what it is.” Instead, everything, including his own reactions, 
belongs to a shared past he does not see at work. Like the people and events in his 
neighborhood blurred by his inability to distinguish them, Satin-Legs’s own particularity 
is smeared by history. Ornamentation does not create a personal voice, nor does it 
effectively resist being fogged by the collective, since it is one of the “reactions” that is at 
bottom the dexterous advice of “hundreds of voices.” This struggle between the 
individual and the group muddles Brooks’s foregrounding of poeticity to extend and limit 
the reach of language. Artifice represents both apolitical self-indulgence and “banners for 
a gathering war”; it is suspect because it separates Satin-Legs from his community and 
because it fails to do so.  
In many of Brooks’s poems, self-conscious language expresses and occludes 
individual and group identity in mutually supportive ways, but her style changes when 
the individual and the group come into conflict. Elaborate language plays contradictory 
and contentious roles in negotiating individual and shared identity, which makes 
Brooks’s use of it to balance between speech and silence problematic. She does not, 
however, merely abandon artifice as self-centered or anti-communal. It is too important 
to her own sense of what poetry is and does. Instead, the tension between singular and 
collective needs motivates her innovation of composite forms that can continue to employ 
self-consciously stylistic language usefully: her multiplication of forms allows her poems 
to speak out and refuse speech while also questioning the appropriateness of artistic 
excesses. 
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This kind of innovation is most evident in “In the Mecca,” but friction between 
the group and the people who constitute it drives similar experimentation even in an early 
poem like “Satin-Legs.” The various forms of the poem’s ending prefigure the formal 
multivalence of “In the Mecca,” and it’s no coincidence that the poems share a concern 
with singular and collective voices in conflict and the oppressive and defiant silences 
such conflict generates. When Satin-Legs and his date return home, the poem appears to 
abandon a particular sort of artifice along with the showy clothing of the pair. The word 
“mignonette” stands in as the only reminder of the type of language that has been shed in 
favor of simple, plain-spoken, lyrical language like “Her body is a honey bowl / Whose 
waiting honey is deep and hot” (47).42 These last lines—contrasted to the rest of the poem 
by indentation and italics, in addition to their easily musical rhythms and understated 
vocabulary—are juxtaposed to the thick language of the rest of the poem without 
transition. Though they use the kind of language that might be considered natural to 
poetry, quiet lyrical revelation in the “best of taste and straight tradition,” that style is 
also denaturalized by its presence in a poem that otherwise argues for a more garish and 
performative poetics.
43
 The coexistence of two entirely different styles emphasizes that 
both are aesthetic choices, not natural or authentic. The poem need not choose between 
language like “An indignant robin’s resolute donation / Pinching a track through apathy 
and din” and “her body is like summer earth” but can easily wield both and move 
effortlessly and unapologetically between them (45, 47). It also creates resistant silences 
around both shared and singular experiences by implying that full revelation is 
impossible; even language that intimates revelation and purports to dispense with 
mediation and lay the subject bare is a device. In addition, casting the poem’s revelatory 
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moment in the language of good taste and literary tradition is a strategic use of silence on 
the part of the community, much like the decorousness of the diners in “I Love those 
Little Booths at Benvenuti’s.” The poem offers taste to readers who disapprove of 
extravagance, but it also questions the authenticity or naturalness of such language by 
revealing it as only one option among many. That the adoption of this style is, in one 
sense, a mask is reinforced by the line preceding the final section: “the end is, isn’t it, all 
that really matters” (47). This hints that the poem’s aloof interlocutors are fooled by an 
ending more to their liking into ignoring the way the rest of the poem resists their desires. 
Thus, the emphasis on artificiality achieved by juxtaposing disparate forms operates 
similarly to other uses of artifice, balancing between speech and silence for both 
communal and individual purposes. 
Most importantly, however, the mixture of registers at the conclusion of the poem 
explores divergent and even contradictory responses to the conflicts between discrete and 
shared identity. Because the majority of the poem is connected to the artists’ (Satin-
Legs’s, his date’s, and the poet’s) focus on self-indulgent decoration, the abandonment of 
that style at the close of the poem constitutes a rejection of idiosyncratic ornamentation in 
favor of a more direct or authentic public language. But the artistic range of the poem 
also creates a counterpoint. These lines depict a shedding of artifice, particularly as 
represented by shedding clothing, but that apparent revelation of what is beneath the 
poem’s art is, itself, shown to be an artistic choice. The poem, like its characters, discards 
its clothes only to reveal more embellishment and decoration beneath them. Even though 
the poem stages a stripping bare, it maintains a shield between reader and subject as long 
as it uses language. The persistence of performativity in this sense advocates for the 
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sovereignty of the singular being, but it also intimates that this persistence is a fatal flaw. 
The concluding image is richly romantic but tinged with death: the revealed body of 
Satin-Legs’s lover becomes a tomb of “summer earth / receptive, soft, and absolute” (47). 
Satin-Legs is buried in the closing lines of the poem, but the composite form makes 
contradictory readings of that burial possible. It may be that the poem has shed its thick 
language, thus allowing Satin-Legs to disappear into the communal. But it may also be 
that Satin-Legs is lost because the poem fails to transcend artificiality, continuing to 
isolate the individual from the community by focusing on his or her artistic agency. What 
we can say is that the role of stylized language becomes more complex when the person 
and the group are in conflict, leading Brooks to invent a composite form that 
simultaneously uses and refuses artificiality, articulating her conflicted position regarding 
the place of the idiosyncratic among the people. This strategy, which only appears at the 
end of a largely formally consistent poem, becomes even more useful to Brooks in “In the 
Mecca,” where the nascent conflicts of “The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith” are a primary 
concern. 
Though “In the Mecca,” the title poem of Brooks’s first post-Fisk volume, is a 
formal departure for Brooks, it uses similar strategies to her earlier work, emphasizing 
style in order simultaneously to claim voice and remain silent. “In the Mecca” can be 
considered part of a tradition of speaking out most simply because it articulates ignored 
or erased black female experiences. The poem hinges on the disappearance and murder of 
Pepita, the youngest of the nine children of Mrs. Sallie Smith, an inhabitant of the Mecca 
building, first an architectural showpiece of Chicago, then a slum.
44
 The setting of the 
poem is distinctly black, its characters are black, and its unifying action is the domestic 
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and local response (or lack of response) to violence against a young black girl. But the 
poem goes further than this thematic breaking of silence: the experimentalism of “In the 
Mecca” betrays an urgency not just to claim that black women’s lives are the suitable 
subject of poetry but to push poetry to become more suitable to black women’s lives.45 
However, “In the Mecca” does not unreservedly lend itself to giving voice. In 
fact, an early review of the poem was disturbed by its refusal of direct language and 
considers Brook’s poeticity a shirking of her responsibility to reveal her people’s 
wounds:  
This tale of the murder of a little black girl in the Chicago ghetto ought to have 
the unrelenting directness of Crabbe’s “Peter Grimes” but is overwrought with 
effects—alliterations, internal rhymes, whimsical and arch observations—that 
distract from its horror almost as if to conceal the wound at its center [. . .]. 
Except in isolated passages, we are held off from the pain at the center almost as 
if the author were an old-fashioned local colorist commenting from a distance. 
(Rosenthal 27-28)  
The reviewer’s “ought to” puts him on the side of revelation and against concealment and 
distance, against the ornamentation that Brooks employs in “In the Mecca.” But these 
silences are not a failure of nerve on Brooks’s part or a lack of dedication to writing 
about and to black people; they are an integral part of a poetics that strives to realize her 
newly articulated vision of herself as, first and foremost, a member of a black 
community, shaped by a shared heritage and struggles. Brooks’s autobiography records a 
plan for the poem marked from the beginning by the double pull of reserve and 
articulation: “WORK PROPOSED FOR ‘IN THE MECCA’ A book-length poem, two 
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thousand lines or more, based on life in Chicago’s old Mecca Building. This poem will 
not be a statistical report. I’m interested in a certain detachment, but only as a means of 
reaching substance with some incisiveness” (Part One 189). The poet here wants an 
incisive and reaching language, capable of taking on the huge and intimidatingly varied 
task of representing life in the Mecca building, but such a language must involve 
distance. As in her earlier work, artifice is a primary means for Brooks of both exactness 
and detachment, of elaborating a subject and gesturing toward the gulf between subject 
and language.  
The opening of “In the Mecca” continues to emphasize style to claim poetic voice 
for silenced experiences and simultaneously create ironic distance. The self-consciously 
poetic, even mannered tone in which Mrs. Sallie Smith is described breaks the silence 
that characterizes her life as a domestic worker by claiming poetic language as 
appropriate to that life. In the opening description, she is a “low-brown butterball” behind 
which “suns that have not spoken die.” She has spent her day in silence and returns home 
silently trudging under a silent sun. But the description itself undoes this imposed quiet 
with Brooks’s characteristic thick language: here, archaic and heightened diction, “hies 
home to Mecca, hies to marvelous rest”; alliteration, “this / low-brown butterball. Our 
prudent partridge”; and hermetic phrasing, “fugitive attar and district hymn” (407). The 
language refuses to be restricted to infirmity or prudence. However, silence here is more 
than something imposed from the outside to be broken. Though to call Sallie a “coma” 
supports the foregoing description of her as passive, mute, and unable to act on her life, 
“armed coma” casts doubt on that characterization. Sallie’s reticence and non-
participation in her life are converted, in this strange turn of phrase, to something militant 
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and self-defending. The style of these lines also reflects this attitude toward silence: it is 
an armed coma, protecting Sallie and her experiences from the speaker and the reader 
who would possess her, would make her “Our prudent partridge.” As in “Satin-Legs” and 
“The Anniad,” the speaker of the poem addresses an outsider to whom she is explaining 
or revealing the subject, but she also uses language that reinforces the distance between 
observer and observed rather than remedying it. While a phrase like “armed coma” 
describes the importance of a resistant muteness, a phrase like “fugitive attar” 
exemplifies that importance by refusing easy intelligibility. As in this first section, 
Brooks’s strategies throughout “In the Mecca” are reminiscent of earlier poems, but the 
poem as a whole becomes more dramatically experimental because it must also negotiate 
an increasingly charged relationship between a black communal identity and particular 
personality. 
The role of artifice is fraught for Brooks in “In the Mecca” because it can no 
longer serve both shared and individual goals in the relatively unconflicted way it did in 
her earlier work. Brooks’s relationship to poeticity changes in “In the Mecca” in part 
because of a sense of purpose instilled by her experience at Fisk.
46
 George Kent discusses 
the effect that her shift in political perspective had on her poetic strategies in In the 
Mecca:  
The title poem in the company of the others marks Brooks’ turn from Christianity 
and the hope of integration to that of nationalism. Obviously the situation means 
that motives different from those of the preceding works will place at the 
forefront the necessity for new stylistic developments. The language must 
emphasize Blacks developing common bonds with each other instead of the 
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traditional “people are people” bonding. For a poet who has so intensively 
devoted herself to language, the situation means a turn to ways of touching deeply 
an audience not greatly initiated into the complexity of modern poetry and yet 
retaining a disciplined use of language. The challenge would seem all the greater 
since to acquire such brilliant command over so wide a range of poetic devices as 
Brooks had done over the years was also to build a set of reflexes in 
consciousness which, one would think, would weight the balance toward complex 
rendering [. . .]. In the Mecca thus represents, on the one hand, the poet at the very 
height of her command and utilization of complex renderings. On the other it 
represents change of concern and expansion of the use of free verse. (“Realism” 
98) 
Kent describes a tension between Brooks’s earlier formal strategies as “complex” and 
“disciplined” and a new aspiration to “emphasize Blacks developing common bonds with 
each other.” His formulation of these things as conflicting implies that, in order for 
Brooks to emphasize black community, she must abandon or revise her “complex 
renderings” and instead favor free verse, which is assumed to be simple. This perceived 
distinction of poeticity from black voice was central to Brooks’s reevaluation of her role 
and methods.
47
 From the mid-40s to the mid-60s, Brooks built her reputation on 
complexity, pioneering a new language for black and female experience while 
simultaneously resisting the reduction of inexpressible identity to insufficient or 
oppressive language. But her experience at Fisk suggested that foregrounding style was 
harmful to achieving an authentically black poetry.  
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The new aesthetic to which Brooks was drawn placed her use of traditional forms 
and decorative or self-consciously poetic language on the side of a regressive, white-
identified individualism. In his introduction to Brooks’s first autobiography, Mahdubuti 
(then Don L. Lee) describes “In the Mecca” as a transition piece between Brooks’s earlier 
work, conditioned by white formal expectations, to a more authentically black poetics 
that is pared down, direct, free of “fat.” He concedes that “there were still a few excesses 
with language in In the Mecca” (22), but he argues that such excesses signal a 
transitional moment in Brooks’s progress toward an art that values the collective over the 
individual and abandons “art for art’s sake” for an art that is “used in the liberation of his 
[sic] people” (26). The narrative with which Madhubuti introduces Brooks’s 
autobiography argues that artifice, especially when it reflects the “conditioning” of black 
poets to use traditional forms associated with white culture, must be repudiated in the 
attainment of a more authentic black voice. And, in some ways, Brooks shares this sense 
of the progression of her work. She must certainly have consented to Madhubuti’s 
account as an introduction to the story of her life, and her constant reiteration in 
interviews of her intention to develop a poetry that can speak directly to black people in 
taverns supports the notion that she wishes to reject language that is not accessible. 
Indeed, her poetry after In the Mecca is often, in Madhubuti’s words, “streamlined and to 
the point” (22). But the “few excesses with language” that he notes in In the Mecca are 
not simply regrettable remainders of a white tradition that will later be fully excised. 
Formal complexity does indeed serve an individualistic purpose in “In the Mecca”; it is a 
form of resistance to a shared black voice that is newly threatening to Brooks’s notion of 
particular selfhood. Embellishment articulates particular, especially female, experience 
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that is silenced by the masculinist elements of black nationalist aesthetics while 
simultaneously preventing the appropriation of singular experience into a collective 
voice. But Brooks also continues to employ artifice, and its simultaneous advancement 
and refusal of language, for communal goals. In “In the Mecca,” Brooks creates a 
composite form by which she continues to advance artificiality as a means of both 
extending and limiting language while she negotiates a newly conflicted relationship 
between the person and the group. This innovation disassociates poeticity from whiteness 
and regressive individualism in order to use it as a tool for both collective black 
expression and silences, while it simultaneously allows her to continue to voice particular 
experiences and, especially, to celebrate a feminine artistic agency that will not be 
dissolved into a common voice, which, in some respects, endangers it. 
The tension between personal and mutual needs is a recurring theme in “In the 
Mecca.” Perhaps most importantly, that strain underlies the narrative of Pepita’s 
disappearance at the center of the poem: the private obsessions and self-indulgences of 
the inhabitants of the Mecca building distract them from protecting one of their own. 
Meanwhile, the family’s search for their missing member necessitates that they leave 
behind their own preoccupations: “Yvonne upends her iron,” and “Melodie Mary / and 
Thomas Earl and Tennessee and Briggs / yield cat contentment gangs rats Appleseed,” 
and “Emmett and Cap and Casey / yield visions of vice and veal” and everything else 
they wish for, and “they are contrained. All are constrained” (416). Each must yield up 
her or his personal delights, contentments, and resentments in order to help search for 
Pepita. The other inhabitants of the Mecca, because they are not “constrained” by family 
ties to leave their own memories or sadnesses or little joys, cannot serve the needs of the 
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community. When asked about Pepita, they can only answer about themselves. In this 
sense, the overarching narrative of “In the Mecca” supports the view that a focus on the 
individual can be a hindrance to the achievement of broader goals. However, the 
“constraint” that pulls the Smith family out of their private thoughts and into the halls of 
the Mecca in search of their sister is also depicted as a thing to be resisted. The poem has 
an anxious affection for the small, the overlooked, and the personal that is a constant 
counterpoint to the injunction to step out of the “privacy of pain” that undermines the 
group. In effect, the very event that calls for joint action is the “constraint” of a 
vulnerable person, “Pepita the puny—the halted, glad-sad child” (419). Like Melodie 
Mary, who “likes roaches / and pities the gray rat” and to whom the headlines about the 
suffering of Chinese children are secondary, the poem argues, at times in spite of itself, 
that the struggles of the individual are also “importances” (412). Though the poem 
indicates that too exclusive a focus on one’s own sufferings makes one civically 
ineffectual, it also recognizes those like Marian, who wishes to “pop / the slights and 
sleep of her community / her Mecca” (431). Marian “Craves crime: her murder, her deep 
wounding [. . .]. A Thing. To make the people heel and stop / and See her”; she craves 
something that will get the attention of her people and the family who “never said / her 
single certain Self aloud” (431-32).  
The treatment of the character Alfred, “who might have been a poet-king,” 
demonstrates that this conflict between the individual and the communal is realized in 
language, particularly in poetic style (422). Alfred is perhaps the most dynamic character 
in “In the Mecca”: he moves from an obsession with “Horace” and “Hemingway” and a 
language that fixes experience by finding the right “coats in which to wrap things” (409), 
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through the “line of Leopold” and an African aesthetic (422), to recognizing the 
“substanceless” call of the Mecca (433). The beginning of the poem identifies Alfred 
with a traditional idea of poetic creation, a belief in the power of language to fix and 
understand experience. And, as D. H. Melhem observes, in the person of Alfred poetic 
creation is rendered ineffectual:  
The Mecca will not be improved by Darkara’s imported Vogue, by Alfred’s 
amiable dabbling in the arts, his reduction of literature to an obsession with 
language and his knowledge of Senghor. Reiteration that Alfred has not seen 
Pepita, though he can describe the Mecca and praise the poet-president, 
emphasizes his well-meaning yet ineffectual nature, his inability to relate actively 
to his own environment. (172)  
It is not only Alfred who is ineffectual but the kind of language he employs, which can 
“describe” and “praise” but cannot find or save Pepita. From this language, Alfred seeks 
“the joy of deciding—successfully— / how stuffs can be compounded or sifted out / and 
emphasized; what the importances are; / what coats in which to wrap things” (409). The 
description of his words as “coats in which to wrap things” emphasizes the artificiality of 
his language: it is a constraining, almost violent, poetics that interacts with the world as 
“stuffs” to be “compounded,” “sifted,” or “wrapped.” But artifice fails for Alfred, 
reduced to a drunken mirage, because his experience is beyond that power; it refuses to 
be wrapped up in its coat of words.
48
 As Alfred’s poetic vision develops away from 
reminiscing about Horace and Hemingway and toward a more militant black nationalism, 
he also moves away from the idea that language can unify and express a singular 
experience. In the following lines, poeticity is insufficient for Alfred’s task:  
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Says Alfred: 
To be a red bush! 
In the West Virginia autumn. 
To flame out red. 
“Crimson” is not word enough, 
although close to what I mean. (424)  
Silencing the Western tradition of poetic style, signaled by the inadequacy of the 
antiquated and poetical “crimson,” is part of Alfred’s development toward a language 
responsive to the Mecca. The particularities of black experience in the Mecca elude the 
art of the white-identified language in which Alfred previously wished to express them, 
and even a black aesthetics can be implicated in a stylization that separates it from the 
truth of black experience. Though Alfred can speak of “the line of Leopold” who “sings 
in art-lines / of Black Woman,” he “has not seen Pepita Smith” (422). This development 
argues for a repudiation of white assimilation but also of the artifice inherent in all 
poetry, even the African-identified aesthetics of Leopold Senghor, poet and first president 
of Senegal.
49
 Only when Alfred abandons his obsession with the right word or the perfect 
phrase, whether Hemingway’s or Senghor’s, can he become aware of the “substanceless” 
“something, something in the Mecca” that “continues to call” and which carries the poem 
to its evocation of “an essential sanity, black and electric” (433). Alfred’s movement 
away from literariness and toward a greater understanding of the Mecca indicates that for 
a black poet to develop a poetry responsive to the needs of her community is to abandon 
the highly wrought and, indeed, to eschew language itself as insufficient to the expression 
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of the realities of black life. In light of this claim, the poem’s experimentalism and 
performativity are striking.  
Brooks’s continued use of artifice is due in part to its association with individual, 
especially female, identity. In her earlier portrait poems, as we saw in “Satin-Legs,” style 
often stands as an act of rebellion against oppressive systems that deny people small 
beauties or pleasures. Over and over, we see people, particularly women, indulging in 
aesthetic acts that represent their recalcitrant peculiarity.
50
 Thus, Brooks’s acceptance of 
a black aesthetics that rejects stylistic excesses is complicated by her admiration of 
extravagance. For example, when Mrs. Sallie arrives home, she confronts her kitchen and 
finds it “bad.” Contemplating its badness, Mrs. S. rules out decoration by making a 
programmatic statement that would seem, at first, to echo the attitude underlying Alfred’s 
development: “First comes correctness, then embellishment.” But the context of the 
statement conveys a certain irony: 
Now Mrs. Sallie 
confers her bird-hat to her kitchen table,  
and sees her kitchen. It is bad, is bad,  
her eyes say, and My soft antagonist,  
her eyes say, and My headlong tax and mote,  
her eyes say, and My maniac default 
my least light.  
“But all my lights are little!” 
Her denunciation  
slaps savagely not only this sick kitchen but 
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her Lord’s annulment of the main event. 
“I want to decorate!” But what is that? A 
pomade atop a sewage. An offense.  
First comes correctness, then embellishment! 
And music, mode, and mixed philosophy 
may follow fitly on propriety 
to tame the whiskey of our discontent! 
“What can I do?” (410) 
Though Sallie may be experiencing a genuine internal quarrel about the appropriateness 
of her love of embellishment, the voice of reproach is connected to patriarchal denial. 
The programmatic statement, “First comes correctness, then embellishment,” appears to 
come from a “Lord,” presumably her husband and undoubtedly a figure of authority. The 
idea, whether internal or external to Sallie, that correctness must precede embellishment 
clearly has power over her, but she also resists it. Mrs. Sallie denounces her kitchen, the 
evidence of her poverty, but she also denounces the attitude that would deny her the joy 
of decoration: “Her denunciation slaps savagely [. . .] her Lord’s annulment of the main 
event.” This resistance is rooted in embellishment despite the impossibility of 
correctness. Though she does not decorate the kitchen itself, the words that describe it 
embody the “music, mode, and mixed philosophy” that Sallie is enjoined to put aside. 
“Her eyes say” the lines repeat, emphasizing her thoughts as words, and those words are 
embellished rather than plain-spoken and “correct.” The lines use repetition, line breaks 
that work against “natural” speech patterns, alliteration, and idiosyncratic phrasing, 
calling attention to themselves as language. These lines purportedly reveal Sallie’s 
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innermost thoughts, but the glimpse of her essence is clearly decorated. The statement 
that correctness comes before embellishment may be intended sincerely, but it is 
undermined by the music and elaboration of what her eyes say and even by the “bird-hat” 
she “confers [. . .] upon her kitchen table.” A bird-hat is an unnecessary extravagance, an 
indulgent piece of beauty, and she doesn’t merely set it upon her kitchen table but 
“confers” it. The verb “confer” transfers ownership of the hat to the table, possibly as an 
award or honor, decorating the imminently practical furniture despite her lord’s 
annulment.  
Sallie defiantly embellishes as does the poem itself. In this sense, ornamentation 
is a form of feminine resistance—reinforced by the feminine locale of the kitchen and the 
classically domestic urge to decorate the house—to masculine restrictions. Further, 
artifice prevents Sallie as an individual from being entirely consumed by the demands of 
public roles she plays, such as domestic worker, mother, and woman. Thus, though 
Brooks at times argues that artists must move past poeticity that is part of an oppressive 
or insufficient system of representation, ornamentation is also an important strategy for 
preserving the idiosyncratic. In fact, Brooks herself embellishes—wears her own bird-
hat, if you will—in the face of various annulments: she continues to value her “G. B. 
voice” despite pressure, some of it self-directed, to adopt a more correct style and to play 
a particular role (Part One 183). The distinction between a person and her community, 
compounding the contradictory desires both to speak out and remain silent, drives 
Brooks’s experimentation in “In the Mecca,” particularly her use of a flexible poetics that 
combines widely disparate poetics and speech registers.  
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Brooks’s composite form recuperates artifice from a reductive association with 
assimilation to white culture and anti-communal self-indulgence so that it can continue to 
be useful for writing that expresses and deflects constructions of black identity. “In the 
Mecca” foregrounds style even more dramatically than Brooks’s use of traditional forms 
and dense language in her earlier work: it emphasizes the artificiality of all language, not 
only particularly poetical or self-conscious language. “In the Mecca” is by turns baroque 
and plain-spoken, and it employs a variety of formal strategies from traditional ballad 
measure to conversational free verse. While the styles Brooks employs may be perceived 
as existing on a spectrum of artificiality—with the noticeably formal and self-consciously 
literary on the artificial end and free verse and plain diction on the authentic end—the 
multifariousness of the poem posits all form as choice, denaturalizing and rendering 
artificial each of those choices by emphasizing the possibility of others. The authentic or 
direct feel is an affect—a result of artistic manipulation—just as a poetic or literary feel is 
an affect.
51
  
This composite form simultaneously works toward communal expression and 
resistant silences. “In the Mecca” employs a virtuosic, disorienting, and sometimes 
violent combination of traditional poetic meters, folk forms, musical rhythms, and wide-
ranging speech registers, from Chicago south-side black dialect to Emersonian 
philosophical grandiosity. Brooks’s concatenation of voices and forms ignores generic 
divisions and abjures transitions or gestures toward stylistic harmony, trusting instead to 
place, the Mecca, as the primary force for coherence. Despite the black arts rejection of 
the “excesses” of literary language and, especially, traditional Western forms, artifice in 
“In the Mecca” expands the expressive possibilities of a collective black voice.52 The 
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diversity of styles used in “In the Mecca” argues for a multiple black identity that is 
capable of making room for difference without sacrificing unity. There are no separating 
devices to make distinctions: they all exist together under the sign of the Mecca. The fact 
that the artificiality of these means of expression is emphasized does not weaken their 
power as black expression. Instead, it argues for expressive agency on the part of black 
speakers of all kinds. The Western formal tradition is available to black speakers in a 
section like Edie Barrow’s ballad to express the anguish of racism compounded with 
sexual expression and oppression (425); poetic diction and rhyme articulate the tragic 
appeal of gangs to boys like Briggs Smith or the careful contentment of his brother 
Tennessee (412-13); and plain diction and free verse capture the sensual, irreverent 
religion of a woman like St. Julia (407-08). The juxtaposition of various registers and 
forms refashions tools that have been considered the province of white writers because it 
makes each style it uses—even supposedly unconsciously authentic plain-spokenness—
an available choice for black speakers.  
This variety also creates a protective silence because it suggests that no language 
allows direct access to the experience of life in the Mecca: the poem has recourse to 
almost limitless means of expression, but this also serves to emphasize the “something 
somewhat other” that wriggles out from under language. The poem dexterously explores 
the possibilities of language, but black experience exceeds them all, as when Alfred tries 
on new forms and new attitudes and finds that all of them—“chaste displeasure,” “the 
brilliant British of the new command,” “the counsels of division”—are “not enough” 
(414). Though the poem avails itself of rhyme and meter, free verse, complex diction, 
philosophical abstraction, fine detail, and familiar music, even in the exhaustiveness of its 
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linguistic capabilities it points toward a silence: “What else is there to say but 
everything?” (415). This silence reflects both an incapacity of language and a purposeful 
use of language that refuses to reveal essence to non-residents of the Mecca and casts the 
very idea of essence into doubt. Rather than assimilating to white culture or indulging in 
a regressive individualism, the formal diversity of “In the Mecca” highlights artifice 
simultaneously to express and occlude black experience. 
But, as we have seen, communal goals are sometimes at odds with the 
individualism that is so important to Brooks both personally and aesthetically. Thus, the 
multiform style of “In the Mecca” also expresses the peculiar, at times resisting collective 
voice by crafting integral and idiosyncratic portraits of particular denizens of the Mecca 
building. These disparate poetic identities refuse to be dissolved into a “joining thing” 
that erases their difference (410). The lack of transitions or smoothing structures between 
the various modes that “In the Mecca” explores reflects the coherence of the idiosyncratic 
selves it depicts; it argues for possibility, power, and choice on the part of the specific 
person, regardless of group membership and sometimes counter to the needs or wants of 
the group. One of the most jarring juxtapositions in “In the Mecca” demonstrates how 
Brooks’s combinational form asserts the individual voice, even when it does not fit in 
with kinds of speech considered authentically black. The section of the poem that is most 
in line with the politically motivated aesthetic advocated by people like Madhubuti is 
Amos’s prayer for America:  
Bathe her in her beautiful blood. 
A long blood bath will wash her pure.  
Her skin needs special care.  
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[. . . ] 
Great-nailed boots 
must kick her prostrate, heel-grind that soft breast, 
outrage her saucy pride,  
remove her fair fine mask. 
Let her lie there, panting and wild, her pain 
red, running roughly through the illustrious ruin— (424-25) 
The poem opposes Amos’s prayer to Alfred’s ineffectual search for the right word or to 
tame “that recalcitrant little beast, the phrase”: “And Amos / (not Alfred) prays, for 
America prays” (424). In contrast to Alfred’s poeticisms, Amos’s words are relatively 
plain, and he uses few obviously literary devices. In fact, Madhubuti’s introduction to 
Report from Part One singles out this section as representative of the good, clean, pared-
down work that Brooks was doing and contrasts it to her lamentable excesses elsewhere 
in In the Mecca. By contrasting Amos’s powerful speech to Alfred’s ineffectualness, the 
poem appears in this section to advocate for the direct style in which Amos’s prayer is 
delivered and for the militant, even violent, solution to racism that he proposes. 
Significantly, though Amos’s prayers for America are anti-racist, they are also anti-
female, personifying America as the Great White Bitch. The violence that Amos prays 
for conflates black power with male power and figures white oppression as an insidious 
female force; thus, the powerful black voice here depends on images of female 
degradation. The clean, blunt plain-spokenness Brooks and others align with political 
effectiveness in poetry is also aligned with a rejection of a female and feminizing 
America. This is a difficult position for a woman writer drawn to highly wrought 
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language and elusive artificiality, but Brooks’s use of composite form allows statements 
like Amos’s to coexist with entirely different ways of using language. Indeed, the 
following section immediately contrasts both the form and the content of Amos’s speech 
with a traditional ballad focused on intimate feminine experience: “The ballad of Edie 
Barrow” uses ballad measure—alternating four- and three-stress lines, rhymed abcb—to 
tell the story of a black woman whose white lover left her to marry a white woman. She 
laments: “He will wed her come fall, come falling of fall / And she will be queen of his 
rest. / I shall be queen of his summerhouse storm. / A hungry tooth in my breast” (425). 
Coming directly after the strident free verse of Amos’s prayer, the traditional literariness 
of the ballad of Edie Barrow is emphasized. Though Amos advocates for stomping the 
breast of America, Brooks continues to write in a form that has a long American 
tradition.
53
 The ballad of Edie Barrow has no place in a black aesthetics that depends on 
distance from that tradition, and the type of writing that Don L. Lee advocates for earlier 
in the poem—“a new music screaming in the sun”—would silence Edie Barrow’s ballad 
(424). The abrupt shift to ballad form (and between disparate techniques and forms 
throughout the poem) implies that Edie Barrow and her experience cannot be integrated 
into Amos’s vision but that her experience nevertheless must be voiced to report life in 
the Mecca. Edie Barrow’s lament mourns the loss of the love of a white man, exactly the 
kind of women’s experience that may be rejected as anti-communal by masculinist black 
aesthetics of the kind represented by Amos’s diatribe. The aggregation of styles allows 
Brooks to express a call for a collective voice while also speaking out for those who may, 
paradoxically, be silenced by it.  
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In addition to making language more capable of expressing the singular, Brooks’s 
compound poetics defends the particular both from being subsumed into white culture 
and appropriated or misrepresented by certain models of blackness. While the fact that 
the various sections of the poem dealing with discrete characters and themes are all 
joined under one title makes them all part of the same utterance, the spaces between 
sections and the poem’s refusal to smooth transitions divides them into separate parts. 
The poem avoids transitional language and is silent about the relationships not only 
between characters but among linguistic modes. Though these characters and styles may 
inherently conflict, the silences created through juxtaposition permit them to coexist 
without requiring them to articulate or resolve their differences. This allows unique 
experiences and incompatible aesthetic choices to exist in and of themselves rather than 
requiring them to reconcile themselves into one poetics, agree on a position, or even 
share the same basic concerns. Such use of silence is apparent in the abrupt transitions 
framing the ballad of Edie Barrow section. Again, there are significant stylistic 
differences between the foregoing Amos section and Edie’s. Their proximity places them 
in conversation with one another, but the ballad clearly signals its separation. For 
instance, it is the only section of the poem to use a title; where others begin without 
introduction, it begins, “The ballad of Edie Barrow: / I fell in love with a Gentile boy” 
(425). The introduction does not serve as a transition, however, just the opposite: rather 
than framing Edie Barrow’s story as a response to the Smith family’s or the Law’s search 
for Pepita, thus signaling its integration into the larger theme of the work, the lack of 
transition refuses to articulate exactly how Edie Barrow’s experience fits into the Mecca. 
Quotation marks intensify the ballad’s isolation from the surrounding sections. Though 
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quotation is a common feature of ballads, including this one, here quotation marks, in 
addition to the white space that follows and proceeds them, separate the speech of the 
ballad from the other kinds of speech around it.
54
 Even as “In the Mecca” pushes 
language to represent the variety of individual black experiences it also guards that 
individuality with silences.  
The heightened degree of conflict between individual and collective voices and 
silences leads to intensified experimentation with form throughout the poem. And, as in 
“Satin-Legs,” this kind of innovation underpins the poem’s inconclusive conclusion. “In 
the Mecca”’s ending is often the source of critical concern, and interpretations vary 
widely, in large part because each ending portrays its central conflict, the disappearance 
of Pepita, in contradictory ways.
55
 The last three sections appear to offer different 
interpretations of both the fate of Pepita and the significance of life in the Mecca 
building, and each deploys a different style for this; the penultimate section alone 
explores three distinct responses to the community’s relationship to the missing girl. 
Throughout the poem, the coexistence of poetic stances often considered to be working at 
cross-purposes articulates a version of communal aesthetics that refuses easy solutions: it 
will not ignore the richness of individual experiences—even when some experiences do 
not fit easily within a black nationalist program—but neither will it allow personal 
idiosyncracies to stand in for or stand in the way of a shared, politically aware, activist 
black identity. But in a poem based largely on refusing to choose among options, the 
sense of decision inherent in ending makes concluding problematic. Because the 
conclusion is the first time that the missing Pepita is given a voice, it is particularly 
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important that the poem not abandon its primary resource for managing tension between 
the individual and community: multiplicity of form. 
The first of the poem’s three endings is consistent with the role of “In the Mecca” 
as Brooks’s first post-Fisk publication. Most of the section is attributed to Alfred, the 
poet who has undergone a race-identified awakening that has led him away from the 
showiness of the Western tradition’s “dismay-with-flags-on” (429). Alfred’s murmuring 
is, compared to his style in much of the poem, relatively direct. And, consistent with 
black nationalist aesthetics, the section’s idiosyncracies are not personal quirks but 
hortatory declamations signaling a shared, if mysterious, experience: 
I hate it.  
Yet, murmurs Alfred— 
who is lean at the balcony, leaning— 
something, something in Mecca 
continues to call! Substanceless; yet like mountains, 
like rivers and oceans too; and like trees 
with wind whistling through them. And steadily 
an essential sanity, black and electric,  
builds to a reportage and redemption.  
 A hot estrangement.  
 A material collapse 
that is Construction. (432-33) 
Alfred’s new race-consciousness turns his poetic eye toward the Mecca, rather than 
England or Africa, and thus his language is newly useful to his community: Brooks uses 
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this style both to voice a certain kind of black identity and to remain strategically silent 
about it. The tone hints that Alfred discovers something essentially true and redemptive 
about the Mecca and the people it houses. His new-found language, with koan-like 
paradoxical flexibility, can recognize the “material collapse” that characterizes many of 
the lives narrated in the poem and yet redeem it as “Construction.” Thus, Alfred’s style 
pushes language to represent a previously unreported vision of Meccan life. But it also, in 
its very reliance on paradox, suggestion, and indirection, refuses the “reportage” it claims 
to build toward. The repetition of “something, something” and the insistence on that 
something’s insubstantiality recall Neal’s “vibrations of the Word” and Henderson’s 
“The Form of Things Unknown.” Alfred’s revelation simultaneously occludes what it 
purports to reveal, safeguarding the “something” from the limitations of linguistic 
articulation and appropriation—by the unsympathetic Law, perhaps, or by readers who 
are outsiders to the Mecca. Thus, Brooks arrives at a poetics inflected by a black 
nationalist aesthetics of communal voicing, but she also highlights an often-overlooked 
aspect of that poetics that depends on a defensive silence, an “armed coma,” which 
refuses accessibility. This section rings with finality and, if it were the end of the poem, it 
would offer a compelling argument for Brooks’s whole-sale conversion to black 
nationalist aesthetics, as well as a demonstration of her techniques for investing that 
poetics with her own regard for defensive silences. However, though the section proposes 
a black aesthetics that, despite its “hate” for some aspects of black experience, is 
ultimately capable of a constructive vision, it also circumscribes that solution as 
belonging to one man.
56
 The entire section can be read as attributed specifically to 
Alfred’s murmuring, and, signficantly, it does not include Pepita. Perhaps if Alfred’s 
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evocation of collapse and construction came last, it would indicate that Pepita is included 
in the redemption he offers. Instead, the poem keeps going, almost compulsively, to 
reveal the missing Pepita, suggesting that Alfred’s vision, however useful, is insufficient 
to some of the Mecca’s “importances.” 
Turning from Alfred’s mystical oratory, the penultimate section begins in a 
conversational, almost folky tone with its aphoristic opening lines and its allusion to the 
gospels: 
Hateful things sometimes befall the hateful 
but the hateful are not rendered lovable thereby. 
The murderer of Pepita 
looks at the Law unlovably. Jamaican  
Edward denies and thrice denies a dealing  
of any dimension with Mrs. Sallie’s daughter. (433) 
Though the style of this passage is distinctly different from Alfred’s pronouncements, it 
also uses a communally inflected form. Both aphorism and biblical allusion are types of 
shared expression that Alfred ignores, if not repudiates, in his search for an aesthetics 
appropriate to the Mecca. But folk wisdom about “hateful people,” as well as the story of 
Peter’s denial of Christ, are useful in ways that Alfred’s language is not: they can 
recognize and condemn Jamaican Edwards’s violence against Pepita as “unlovable,” 
despite whatever “hateful things” may have befallen him. Perhaps Alfred’s vision of 
construction, coming as it does after the sections portraying black political consciousness 
as involving violence against and disregard for women, does not allow for the communal 
disapprobation of the actions of a black man against a black girl. Thus, Brooks puts 
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forward an alternative kind of shared black expression that can hold black people 
accountable for “hateful things,” particularly those committed against women in their 
own community. But the poem immediately narrows its focus from communal response 
to Jamaican Edward to a more private treatment of Pepita herself. In an almost cinematic 
move, this section turns to intimate revelation, disclosing Pepita’s fate. Here, the poem’s 
language is at its plainest and most direct: 
 Beneath his cot 
a little woman lies in dust with roaches. 
She never learned that black is not beloved.  
Was royalty when poised,  
sly, at the A and P’s fly-open door. 
Will be royalty no more. (433) 
Where oracular, hortatory language seems inadequate for censuring Jamaican Edward, 
folk wisdom and aphorism appear unable to articulate what happened to Pepita. Though 
this language appears in the same stanza as the judgment of the murderer, the indented 
line “Beneath his cot” emphasizes the shift to a new style: the sentence structure is direct, 
the meaning of the statements unmistakable. The poem appears to have little recourse to 
artifice and, though the reference to “royalty” recalls late Annie in her bower, the 
language here has none of Annie’s opulence. Even the strong rhyme “door” and “no 
more” does not seem to indicate a richness of language but a lack: it is not aurally 
delightful or challenging but, instead, slams the line shut, closing off Pepita’s potential 
for royalty with a decided absence of verbal fanfare. Though Brooks often foregrounds 
  
275 
 
artifice as a means of individualist expression, here it is direct, unflinching language that 
speaks out for individual experience drowned out in communal voicing.    
However, the poem once again undoes its own apparent conclusiveness. 
Contained within this section, framed by plain language and quotation marks and 
interrupted by a narrator, is a short couplet attributed to the dead girl: 
“I touch”—she said once—“petals of a rose.  
A silky feeling through me goes!” (433) 
In stark contrast to the pared down language describing Pepita among the roaches, 
Pepita’s own voice does retain something of the royalty the poem has just told us will “no 
more” be present.57 Once again, Brooks links artificial language—here a lyrical, sensual 
couplet, complete with inverted syntax to create rhyme (“through me goes” rather than 
“goes through me”)—with the idiosyncratic individual. Though the poem reports Pepita’s 
murder and, in a sense, argues that, to attain an “essential sanity,” the kind of Western-
identified poeticity she uses must be excised, it also refuses to let her voice, despite its 
failure to fit with a vision like Alfred’s, be entirely silenced. As we have seen, however, 
Brooks uses artifice not only to voice individual experiences but to destabilize their 
appropriation in language. There are several poetic effects here that prevent a too-easy 
equation of this couplet with the voicing of a feminine lyrical essence excluded by 
masculinist black nationalism. We are forcibly reminded that the poem is not revealing 
the real Pepita. Though Pepita’s voice does appear in the poem, it is set off clearly by 
quotation marks, which are rarely used in the poem. Further, the narrator’s interruption 
“she said once” mediates Pepita’s speech by report; Pepita is already dead when we hear 
her voice.
58
 In fact, it is the narrator’s interruption that makes Pepita’s utterance poetic. 
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Without it, the lines would read “I touch petals of a rose / A silky feeling through me 
goes.” The first line loses its iambic rhythm and its pentameter is truncated. It is not 
Pepita’s voice alone that constitutes the poeticity valued in this version of the poem’s 
ending. The artifice of these lines reveals Pepita at her most individual, refusing to let her 
singular style be erased entirely in the poem’s communal voice, but it also signals the 
unavailability of essence, making the moment of voicing itself into a composite form 
combining past and present, individual and communal, poeticity and reportage. This 
embedded ending within an ending is further destabilized by the conclusion to the 
section: “Her mother will try for roses.” These lines return to the plain-spoken style of 
“She never learned that black was not beloved” to counter the potentially naïve 
conclusion that moments of beauty can redeem the violence done to Pepita; they 
highlight the difference between the poetic images Pepita uses and her own reality, in 
which roses are expensive and difficult to obtain. In one sense, poetic artifice allows her 
access to a beauty denied her, but the return to the present, in which Pepita is dead and 
can no longer speak of roses, also points to the inadequacy of that artifice to save her.
59
  
But again the note of finality is subverted by another ending. And this, the poem’s 
actual ending, is even less decisive. While the previous conclusions offer competing—
and mutually exclusive—visions of how to understand and speak about the Mecca, each 
seems to come to a kind of rest, at least until it is disturbed by the next ending. But the 
poem must, at some point, end. If Brooks is to avoid a sense of stylistic culmination, the 
last section of the poem has to undermine its own definitiveness. Again, the poem returns 
to Pepita: 
She whose little stomach fought the world had 
  
277 
 
wriggled, like a robin! 
Odd were the little wrigglings 
and the chopped chirpings oddly rising. (433) 
This time, Pepita’s voice is not given to us in a lyrical moment of strong feeling but as 
“chopped chirpings.” The style shifts to a characteristically Brooksian syncopation and 
repetitiveness, an oddness connected to Brooks as a poet more strongly than Pepita’s 
lines on roses. Some readers have taken this to mean that Brooks concludes by arguing 
for a triumphant individuality or a resurrected, “rising,” female power that survives and 
transcends the violence done to it in order to sustain a renewed black community.
60
 In a 
sense, by ending with “oddness,” the poem does argue for a revision of models of black 
aesthetics or political action that cannot express or address the needs of “importances” 
like Pepita. But the effect of the style of the closing section is also to undermine this 
conclusion. In particular, its repetitiveness signals the inadequacy of its poeticity.
61
 The 
comparison to a robin creates an immediate animal fragility, and the idiosyncratic 
descriptions may indicate that the poem has some insight into Pepita’s individual 
experience; but the reuse, in only a few short lines, of words like “wriggle” and “odd” 
and the stuttering alliteration of “chopped” “chirpings” also indicate that the richness of 
language has been exhausted. There are no synonyms available to the speaker as she 
reports on Pepita’s last moments: she returns obsessively to the same image, the same 
sounds, the same words. Like a rising inflection at the end of a sentence, the odd rising of 
Pepita’s chirps does not convey finality but uncertainty.62 
The refusal of a definitive ending reflects a deep ambivalence about the place of 
the individual, particularly the female individual, in a communal voice, but it is not solely 
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the product of doubt or hesitation. The poem’s contradictory endings help to preserve the 
core aesthetic project of the work, the development of a composite form that allows 
conflicting purposes to coexist: Brooks combines the particular lyric focus and intensity 
of the ballads, sonnets, and family portraits of her earlier work into the multipart 
expression of a larger black identity without allowing them to be reduced to a single 
voice, a single way of speaking, or a totalizing epic of national meaning. This 
simultaneously individualist and multiple form serves a black nationalist desire for 
communal black expression while also preserving Brooks’s talent for creating 
idiosyncratic black voices. To allow any particular style to resolve the tensions of the 
Mecca would undo that work.  
The coexisting, disparate styles of “In the Mecca” achieve on a grander scale the 
kind of balancing of speech and silence that marks Brooks’s relationship to poetic artifice 
throughout her career. Artifice pushes poetic language to express the strange and elusive 
parts of experience, but it also signals an inadequacy of language, a distance between 
words and experience that refuses to be “captured.” Some experiences demand linguistic 
contortions; they call forth attempt after attempt and exhaust the capabilities of even the 
most deft wielder of language. Ultimately, as in the death of Pepita, there is no style, no 
use of language—whether poeticisms, straight talk, idiosyncratic “chirpings,” or 
communally powerful oratory—that is capable of accessing and conveying experience. 
The proliferation of language forms simultaneously makes various kinds of expression 
possible and points to what is inexpressible. Throughout Brooks’s work this 
inexpressibility leads to repetition, turning around a “something” that remains unworded. 
We can see that reiterative return in the several endings of “In the Mecca” and in Alfred’s 
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“Something, something in the Mecca continue to call” (433). That same slipperiness 
appears in “The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith” when “He hears and does not hear / The 
alarm clock [. . .] He sees and does not see the broken windows” (45). The white tourists 
at Benvenuti’s are similarly thrown back on repetition when they attempt to reduce black 
expression to their expectation of clowning: “One knows and scarcely knows what to 
expect” (126). The speaker in “Maxie Allen,” Annie’s explainer, also finds, despite her 
obvious depth of linguistic resources, a paucity of words: “Sweet Annie tried to teach her 
mother / There was somewhat of something other” (84). And, while many narratives of 
Brooks’s development as a poet, including her own, would have us read her poems after 
“In the Mecca” as unconflicted in their dedication to communal expression, jettisoning 
both individualist quirks and strategic silences, many of her later poems foreground the 
medium and its inadequacy using a similar repetitiveness. For example, in “Whitney 
Young,” a late poem describing a civil rights leader who “confounded and offended them 
out there,” Brooks expresses a version of essence while simultaneously confounding 
those who seek it: “”They saw you, / arch and precise. / They saw that you were wise, 
arch, and precise / They did not like it, Whitney” (505). The repetition suggests both that 
the speaker and those who “saw” Young possess precisely the right words to describe 
him and that something about Young exceeds language. Though a phrase like “They saw 
that you were wise” is a far cry from the Anniad’s “Think of ripe and rompabout / All her 
harvest buttoned it” (99), Brooks’s poetry continues to emphasize artificiality as a means 
both of experimentally stretching the capacity of poetic language and signaling its limits. 
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Notes
 
1
 Chapman’s “Sweet Bombs” is an interesting exception. She calls Brooks’s 
poems “conversational” and “staunchly impersonal” and laments the loss of this style in 
her more revolutionary poetry (93). Thus, she agrees that Brooks’s style is divided into 
pre- and post-Fisk eras, but she does not prefer the earlier style based on its attainment of 
a more authentic voice rather a more impersonal one. 
 
2
 Even when a critic like Washington notices silences in Brooks’s work, as she 
does in her article on Maud Martha, she reads them as waystations in the development 
toward writing that is better able to reveal or expose black women’s anger and rage at 
being silenced. 
 
3
 Though Brooks’s sense of communal voicing is largely focused on blackness, 
she also spoke for female experience in a ways that could be considered communal 
speaking out, particularly in poems like “The Mother” (21) or “Mrs. Small” (341), which 
are often held up as examples of Brooks speaking out for silenced femininity.  
 
4
 Page numbers for poems refer to Blacks, which selects from Brooks’s major 
volumes. 
 
5
 Brooks published books of poems for children, including Aloneness and two 
books of writing instruction for young readers, Young Poets Primer and Very Young 
Poets. Many black writers have publically lauded Brooks as a mentor and inspiration. 
Poems are frequently dedicated to her and, even as early as 1971, Brown, Madhubuti, and 
Ward edited a volume called To Gwen With Love: An Anthology Dedicated to Gwendolyn 
Brooks. She has endowed poetry prizes with her own money, and several Illinois schools 
and a library have been named in her honor. She was also depicted in the “Wall of 
Respect,” a Chicago mural celebrating black culture heroes, the dedication of which she 
describes in her poem “The Wall,” discussed later in this chapter (444-45).  
 
6
 The heroes depicted included Brooks, and Brooks read some of her poems at the 
dedication, making it likely that the poet figure represents Brooks herself. 
 
7
 This is not to say that oppression and repression are the only things that 
American symbols represent for black writers. 
 
8
 The argument over whether writing in traditional forms constituted assimilation 
to white culture was especially important during the Harlem Renaissance. Later, the 
Black Arts Movement also considered certain forms racially significant. Fuller, for 
example, argues that a black aesthetic “cannot, by definition, lead through the literary 
mainstream” (3). He argues that the rejection of traditional forms is analogous to the 
popular “black is beautiful” rejection of white beauty standards: “After centuries of being 
told, in a million different ways, that they were not beautiful, and that whiteness of skin, 
straightness of hair, and aquilineness of features constitute the only measures of beauty, 
black people have revolted” (8). DuPlessis has more recently argued that modernist 
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experimentation formally excludes blackness: “there is for white writers an aborted 
dialogue with African-American culture in which, after some acknowledging of the 
presence, and sometimes the speech, of one’s fellows, Euro-American writers construct 
their whiteness by refusing to imagine dialogue and thus invent a black semisilence in 
which they could ‘darken their speech’” (43-44). Similarly, Nielsen uses an evocative 
image from Ralph Ellison’s The Invisible Man—the grandfather’s advice to “let ’em 
swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open”—to illustrate the relationship of white 
literature to black literature. He argues that the appearance of black dialect or jazz forms 
in literature might be the result of the swallowing of black culture by white, that it might 
be the “preliminary signs of an imminent busting open, a series of hiccups, a pattern of 
convulsive explosions, a poetic of indigestion” (15-16). These formulations imply that 
there are identifiably white and black literary forms and that such forms are often 
opposed, mirroring cultural conflict.  
 
9
 Kent observes a similar dynamic, though he does not discuss the particularly 
American resonances of the “fictitious model” with which Lester fails to identify: “The 
images of the movie run an allegory before him: Strong men in vast spaces, always ready 
to confront Rough Man, as the Challenger, an image giving full scope to physical 
manliness and the natural entitlement to space. Lester cannot make the Walter Mitty 
escapist identification with a fictitious model and cringes in self-recognition” (Life 139). 
 
10
 Baker quotes Paul Kellogg’s essay “Negro Pioneers” and Charles Johnson’s 
“The New Frontage on American Life,” which themselves illustrate the appeal of 
American frontier terminology. 
 
11
 Other representative examples include Gayle Jr.’s “Cultural Strangulation,” 
which argues that the black critic is an especially well-equipped explorer and mapper of 
the “untoured regions of the Black experience” that black literature opens up (46) and 
Fuller’s “Towards a Black Aesthetic,” which calls black writers “revolutionaries” who 
“[strike] out in new, if uncharted, directions” (3).  
 
12
 Though Brooks is not directly discussing difficult language here, she argues 
that the new blackness is difficult to understand, especially for whites: “There is indeed a 
new Black today. He is different from any the world has known. He’s a tall-walker. 
Almost firm. By many of his own brothers he is not understood. And he is understood by 
no white. Not the wise white; not the Schooled white; not the Kind white. Your least 
prerequisite toward an understanding of the new Black is an exceptional Doctorate which 
can be conferred only upon those with the proper properties of bitter birth and intrinsic 
sorrow. I know this is infuriating, especially to those professional Negro-understanders, 
some of them so very kind, with special portfolio, special savvy. But I cannot say 
anything other, because nothing other is the truth” (“Field” 77). 
 
13
 This is not to say that the poem cannot be read or enjoyed by those not included 
in the term “sisters” but that the poem positions such readers as eavesdroppers rather than 
addressees.  
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14
 The mystical or extralinguistic element of the folk tradition of signifying is 
further developed in Gates’s work. For Gates, the secular tradition of indeterminacy or 
ambiguous troping in African American literature is related to African spiritual traditions 
that value the unknown as a part of sacred communication, where Esu, the god who 
speaks to human beings, is the god of “ariyemuye (that which no sooner is held than it 
slips through one’s fingers)” (“Blackness” 238) or “the Yoruba figure of indeterminacy 
itself, ayese ayewi, or ailemo, literally ‘that which we cannot know’” (Signifying 11). For 
Gates, the refusal of rational meaning is rooted in African spirituality and is part of the 
distinctiveness of black literature in the United States. 
 
15
 In black aesthetics, the logic of mystical unspeakability, that is, the notion that 
supralinguistic experience or knowledge is reduced, constrained, or sullied by the 
insufficiencies of language, is often politically deployed. Mayfield considers resistance to 
definitive critical language part of a larger resistance to cultural appropriation:  
I cannot—will not—define my Black Aesthetic, nor will I allow it to be defined 
for me [. . .]. My point is that superficial appurtenances such as music, language, 
dress, and slogans, and other “Black Is Beautiful” fads can so easily be chewed 
up, digested, and spat out by this vigorous, if sick, society, that no aesthetic is safe 
within its grinding teeth. (30) 
 
16
 In a similar vein, Spillers observes Brooks’s notable ability to “allow language 
to penetrate to the core of neutral events” (234), making her poems an extension of the 
domain of language.  
 
17
 The Primer for Young Poets reveals that Brooks herself also values language as 
pioneering. Her first piece of advice for young writers is “Use fresh language.” She 
explains that students of writing should not be afraid to push their language into the 
unknown and that this process is integral to poetry: “Art urges voyages” (13). Further, 
she argues that diction should not be decorative but functional; it should “drive you 
inexorably toward your resolution” (6). This suggests that one’s choice of words, 
especially new or “fresh” words, is a way of gaining ground.  
 
18
 In her first autobiography, Report from Part One, Brooks prizes what she sees 
as a natively African silence or quietude:  
I shake hands with Mr. W. [Frederick Waweru, associate registrar at the 
University of Nairobi], and look into his eyes for the last time. It has been 
interesting, observing those eyes; one is impressed by the level silence of the 
eyes. You have to think of the eyes of lions, looking with calm neither warm nor 
cool at the intruder, who may or may not be welcome. (95)  
Her admiration of Waweru’s silence is also an admiration of ambiguity and reticence: she 
does not know what he thinks of her, the intruder, and his eyes refuse to say. Brooks’s 
observing eye seems to her intrusive, and she respects an African refusal to be registered 
by her gaze. If her job as a poet is to see and report what she observes, Africa will not be 
reported, as the following anecdote further illustrates:  
  
283 
 
 
I train the camera’s registering glass on a tall black beauty with color aswirl 
around her and a huge long basket on her head, but, before I can “focus,” my 
study is lost forever. Sadly I put the camera back; picture-taking is a problem here 
[Dar es Salaam], as in Nairobi; most Africans look surprised and somewhat 
disapproving when they find they are to be “material.” (123)  
Her account of her trip to Africa is marked, more than anything else, by quiet. Though 
Brooks comments that she “sadly put the camera back,” she seems also to identify with 
and respect the woman’s disapproval of becoming “material” for someone else. 
Despite her apparent reluctance to make Africa and Africans into “material,” 
Brooks does in fact write about her experience there: “Africa. A writer is tempted not to 
worry about ‘writing it up’; is tempted just to ‘let’ it beautifully be!” (Part One 89). The 
temptation to “‘let’ it beautifully be!” is countered by the writer’s responsibility to put 
things into words.
 
 
 
19
 Reticence is also a practical issue for poets as her advice to the young poet in 
her contribution to A Capsule Course in Black Poetry Writing makes clear: “Try telling 
the reader a little less. He’ll, she’ll love you more, and will love your poem more, if you 
allow him to do a little digging. Not too much, but some” (10). 
 
20
 Gertrude Hughes also remarks on the importance of the notion that some kinds 
of experience are beyond language, but, in her estimation, it has the opposite effect, 
encouraging experimental investigation rather than protective silences: “the assumption 
that there must be limits to knowledge begins to sound expedient, potentially oppressive, 
and, therefore, as much an ethical and political matter as an epistemological one. That is, 
someone who gets thought of as an enigma (What do women want?) or who has been 
assigned membership among the inscrutable exotics may prefer not to dismiss difficult 
mysteries as muddles or marvels. Such a person may be more inclined to try to develop 
new capacities for knowing than to accept principled limits to what can be known” (396-
97). I argue that this kind of resistance to patriarchy coexists, in Brooks’s work, with 
strategic silences. 
 
21
 Perhaps this unruly music is a counterpoint to the way that refusing to perform 
for a white audience also harms the diners, making them “laugh punily.” 
 
22
 Wheeler explores the sometimes uneasy relationship between Brooks’s public 
voice and her “strategies of reticence.” She observes that “even in her later, more overtly 
political writing Brooks demonstrates careful reserve about some aspects of her personal 
life” (92). Taylor calls Brooks’s detachment a “sophistication” that “sometimes becomes 
a shield, from behind which almost invisible darts fly often and accurately. Throughout 
Brooks’s poetry, delicate satire regularly breaks through the surface which is pretending 
in some way to be well-behaved” (117). Hedley argues that what many feminist critics 
see as a failure to develop a feminist aesthetic is an unwillingness to “write of her own 
experience in the confessional mode” (105). 
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23
 The small pleasures that she enjoins black women to notice recall the quotidian 
enjoyments of Maud Martha, the titular character of a novel published almost 20 years 
earlier. 
 
24
 The conflict between the individual and the communal is a frequent theme of 
Brooks criticism. Most notably, Kent’s preface to Report from Part One describes 
Brooks’s technique as “negotiat[ing] a nice balance between the confessional mode, (the 
private emotions, feelings, individual psychic responses), and that of the memoir (the 
individual as public act, possibly political act, as person upon the stage of history)” (33). 
 
25
 This dynamic has been explored as a defense of authentically black language; 
however, it is also a defense of a language authentically one’s own. 
 
26
 Even in a much-repeated statement about her intentions to dedicate her poetry 
to the service of her community, Brooks appears slightly anxious to remind readers, and 
perhaps herself, that this poetry, while it will participate in a movement toward crafting 
black art for black audiences, will also be decidedly her own: 
My aim, in my next future, is to write poems that will somehow successfully 
“call” (see Imamu Baraka’s “SOS”) all black people, black people in taverns, 
black people in alleys, black people in gutters, schools, offices, factories, prisons, 
the consulate; I wish to reach black people in pulpits, black people in mines, on 
farms, on thrones. My newish voice will not be an imitation of the contemporary 
young black voice, which I so admire, but an extending adaptation of today’s 
G. B. voice. (Part One 183)  
 
27
 Brooks’s autobiographies show a general reticence to reveal her personal life. 
Though her story is supposed to be offered up as inspiration, particularly to readers in the 
black community, both books are remarkably obscure, and they meet the criteria of 
autobiography only tenuously. They collect statements from Brooks’s mother, interviews 
with poets, and even recipes but do not offer the expected narration of inner struggles, 
biographical events, or private motivation.  
 
28
 While Kent’s phrasing questions Brooks’s willingness to reveal essence, her 
relationship to style, particularly the foregrounding of artifice, may go further than simply 
occluding essence and instead cast doubt on its existence.  
 
29
 That Naomi’s desires exceed blue-printing also implies that they exceed 
prescriptions for black writing such as those expressed in Richard Wright’s “Blueprint for 
Negro Literature.” This indicates a conflict between the individual and the community in 
that one of the purposes of Wright’s essay is to direct black literature toward “the lives 
and consciousness of the Negro masses” and toward “moulding those lives and 
consciousness toward new goals” (99). 
 
30
 In “I love those little booths” and “Naomi,” we saw the influence of these 
tensions on rhyme, syntax, and small-scale formal devices like the use of parenthesis. 
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31
 See Baker, Fuller, Cullen, Leonard, and Ford for discussions of Brooks’s 
relationship to traditional forms.  
 
32
 While Annie Allen is obviously experimental, I refer here to A Street in 
Bronzeville and The Beaneaters. 
 
33
 Brooks’s more traditionally formal poems might be considered experimental in 
that they broaden the range of those forms by extending them to the expression of the 
ignored, silenced details of the lives of black men and women, considered by many to be 
too particularly black to qualify as the “universal” concerns of poetry. While Baker’s 
suggestion that these poems are “white forms” filled with “black content” would not 
qualify these poems as experimental, Leonard points out that the insertion of “black 
content” does not leave these forms unchanged. Though I agree with Leonard that the 
encounter between form and subject matter in Brooks’s traditionally formal work is more 
complex than a white container filled with black content, neither writer nor reader is 
likely to experience such technically proficient and correctly formal poetry as 
experimental in and of itself. 
 
34
 As the book that won Brooks the Pulitzer, Annie Allen stands for an important 
moment in her career. For some readers the difficult and self-consciousness artifice of her 
style makes it her most “white” work, and for others the subject matter makes it her most 
woman-centered or feminist work. 
 
35
 Though Annie Allen often departs from direct treatment of its title character, it 
can still be considered a sustained treatment of a single character in that all of the poems 
in the book are organized under headings that relate them to periods in Annie’s life.  
 
36
 Brooks, at least in hindsight, considers the style of Annie Allen highly 
individualistic, even self-indulgent. But her response to negative preliminary reviews 
from Harper’s reader Genevieve Taggard—as revealed in a 1948 letter to her editor 
Elizabeth Lawrence—also shows that her experiments with language are driven by the 
need to push language to be more capable of expressing the realities of black women’s 
lives: “the quality of the ‘things’ is as important to me as ever . . . . I tried very hard, 
especially in ‘Hesteriad’ [the original title of the ‘Anniad’] and ‘the children of the poor,’ 
to say exactly what I meant, instead of approximately. I’m surprised that this reaching 
toward a more careful language should strike anyone as ‘a trick and a shock device’” 
(qtd. in Kent, Life 77).  
 
37
 These lines are from “Maxie Allen,” a poem describing the relationship 
between Annie and her much less romantic mother (84). 
 
38
 Though many of the poems in the first section of the book narrate Annie’s life, 
“the ballad of late Annie” is one of only two poems to voice Annie’s thoughts directly. 
The first poem of the “Childhood and the Girlhood” section, “the birth in a narrow 
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room,” also quotes Annie: “‘How pinchy is my room! how can I breathe! / I am not 
anything and I have got / Not anything, or anything to do!’” (83). The dissatisfaction of 
these lines appears to be the cause of Annie’s attraction for the romantic and the 
decadent. The style is plainer in this first introduction to Annie, but the idiosyncratic 
“pinchy” and the noticeable repetition of “anything” presage the more representative 
“Annie” voice of “the ballad of late Annie” and of “The Anniad.” 
 
39
 Like women’s writing more generally, black women’s writing is often 
discussed as primarily, even inherently, more communal than white male writing. 
McLaughlin, for instance, argues that the communal is an essential value of otherwise 
disparate black female poetics: “Evolving within the matrix of a universal quest for self-
determination and autonomy, Black feminine consciousness extols ‘community’—
independent of any single ideology” (xlvi). But Brooks’s dedication to the idiosyncracy 
of her subjects, even when that individuality is expressed in opposition to the 
community’s values, complicates if not entirely disproves this notion. See Erkkila for a 
discussion of women’s writing that does not fit a cooperative model of women’s literary 
relationships. 
 
40
 Where Dickinson and Niedecker’s delight in what they respectively call 
“sapphire words” and “cormorant words” contradicts their regard for silences, for Brooks 
the sensuous physical quality of language disrupts its communicative aspects, thus 
contributing to certain silences.  
 
41
 “The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith” is not representative of Brooks’s early 
poems in that it is the longest of them. It was written at the request of her publishers 
(specifically at the suggestion of manuscript reviewer Richard Wright) to include a longer 
work among the collection of portraits in A Street in Bronzeville. 
 
42
 Though these lines do employ metaphor, their tone and register, in addition to 
their imagery, hint that embellishments, along with the zoot-suit and Woolworth dress, 
have been put aside. 
 
43
 I read the ending of this poem with Ford and against the majority of critical 
responses that take this shift in style as a repudiation of artifice or an emancipatory 
casting-off of white influence to reveal the natural, unadorned, black self. Like Ford, I 
argue that the poem’s “contradictory endings” betray an uncertainty about style and 
trouble the role of artifice in the poem, without, as is commonly held, rejecting artifice 
altogether (“Sonnets” 348). I build on Ford’s claim that the poem’s multiple endings 
result in “fundamental contradictions about style” to argue that the coexistence of 
disparate styles in individual poems balances aesthetic idiosyncracies with group 
affiliation and that this type of innovation is most pronounced when individual and 
collective concerns conflict. 
 
44
 The Mecca Building was destroyed in 1951 to make way for the expansion of 
the Illinois Institute of Technology by the time Brooks’s poem was published 1968. 
  
287 
 
 
 
45
 As Hedley explains, Brooks casts herself as a “Super-Reporter” who observes 
life in the Mecca, but her observations go far beyond the purview of the reporter (105). 
Instead she uses “a great variety of speech patterns that coexist without blending, 
inflected by differing levels of education, different regional and class backgrounds, 
difference in age and station in life” to create a diverse voice capable of a more accurate 
reporting than a single voice could be (125). 
 
46
 Taylor observes that “except in scope and achievement, it is not a radical 
departure from the work which preceded it. However, it was completed during a time of 
upheaval in Brooks’s sense of herself as a poet, and the shorter poems collected with it 
are evidence of a major division in Brooks’s career” (130). 
 
47
 Because “In the Mecca” is the central poem in Brooks’s first book written 
under the auspices of her black nationalist aesthetic, it is often taken as transitional in 
narratives that posit a significant change in Brooks’s style: for some readers, it has one 
foot in a white aesthetic that silenced black experience and the other in a more authentic 
African American voice, and, for other readers, it has one foot in an earlier, more 
authentic woman-centered aesthetic and the other in a patriarchal and sexist black 
nationalism that silenced feminine experience. Though these critical evaluations are 
based on conflicting values, they both take Brooks’s style to be in crisis and “In the 
Mecca” as poised between incompatible alternatives that can also be understood as 
representing Brooks’s simultaneous dedication to the individual and the communal. What 
black aesthetics codifies as white conditioning is, in Brooks’s earlier work, also an 
artifice used to voice and occlude singular experience: to retain elements of this 
supposedly white aesthetic is also to retain individual expression. What feminist critics 
read as woman-centeredness is, in Brooks’s earlier work, also a focus on the particular 
and personal: to develop away from a woman-centered voice is also to develop toward a 
collective black voice. Thus, both major stances on the poem contribute to a 
consideration of the poem as negotiating between the concerns of the community and the 
needs of the individual. 
 
48
 Alfred “thinks, or drinks until the Everything / is vaguely part of One thing.” 
However, the power of language to wrap a multitudinous “Everything” up into “One 
thing” is vague and tenuous and, in the end, illusory. When Alfred’s thoughts turn toward 
Africa, “When there were all those gods / administering to panthers,” that mystic “One 
thing” begins to dissolve. He asks: “what was their one Belief? / what was their joining 
thing?” At which point his reverie is broken by the “stuffs” of life in the Mecca when “A 
boy breaks glass” (409-10). 
 
49
 Though the focus on Senghor’s art (and Alfred’s valuation of it) as insufficient 
to the needs of the black community complicates the black arts rejection of artifice as 
assimilation to white aesthetics, at bottom it extends rather than rejects the basic notion 
that artifice is politically and poetically suspect and that it separates the black artist from 
his or her people. 
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50
 In addition to the prime instances of Annie Allen and Maud Martha, other 
examples of feminine recalcitrance through aesthetic exhuberance abound, such as Hattie 
Scott, Mrs. Small, Cousin Vit, and the gal of “My Little ’Bout-Town Gal” (51, 341, 125, 
328). 
 
51
 A consistently direct poem may participate in a fiction of access: the language 
of the poem is plain in order to offer the reader an unmediated and unmanipulated version 
of experience. More self-evidently artificial poetry rejects such a fiction indirectly by 
accentuating the medium through which experience is filtered or by which it is created, 
but consistently artificial forms leave open the possibility that the poet or speaker simply 
prefers mediated experience to unmediated, rather than denying the very possibility of 
unmediated experience or purely authentic linguistic representation. But, by combining 
these registers, Brooks makes it clear that plain language and free verse are not an 
alternative to embellishment but part of an array of available artistic choices. 
 
52
 See Lowney for an exploration of the ways that Brooks’s “polyvocal 
reconstruction of the Mecca counters reductively racist sociological narratives of urban 
decline” (190). He argues that Brooks responds to pop-cultural coding of the Mecca as 
unintelligible by suggesting that the voices of the Mecca are unintelligible by a failure of 
the listener, not the speakers. 
 
53
 See Ford on Brooks’s use of the ballad tradition. 
 
54
 Even here, where the division between the people of the Mecca is strongly 
emphasized, Brooks is concerned with community and connection. The final line of the 
Amos section, “never to forget,” creates a grammatical bridge to the next section if we 
read “The ballad of Edie Barrow” as a possible object of the verb “forget.” Though 
Amos’s politics appear to reject what Edie’s ballad represents, the grammar subverts this 
distinction, smuggling her experience into his vision. 
 
55
 See Wheeler, Erkkila, Walters, Kaladjian, Melhem, Jones, Clarke, Doreski, and 
Hedley for conflicting accounts of Pepita’s role in “In the Mecca.”  
 
56
 Alfred’s “I hate it” comes after a portrait of Dill, an old woman who challenges 
patriarchal restrictions on women’s sexuality with a broadly sensual widowhood. 
 
57
 Brooks suggests that her own poetry, as part of a racial awakening, must leave 
behind the kind of language she attributes to Pepita here. Thus—along with Jamaican 
Edward—Alfred and the black aesthetics he advocates are implicated in the rejection of 
Pepita’s voice as a vital part of communal black expression. Brooks writes approvingly of 
this rejection but is ambivalent about it all the same: “Then came Baraka, rejecting all 
lovely little villanelles and sonnets—to Orpheus or anything else. Prettiness was out. 
Fight-fact was in” (Capsule 7). See Ford’s “The Sonnets of Satin-Legs Brooks” for a 
discussion of the dialogue between “prettiness” and “fight-fact” in Brooks’s poetics. 
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58
 Perhaps it is this insistence on distance that so troubles the reviewer who feels 
Brooks’s artifice renders her a “local colorist commenting from a distance” (Rosenthal 
28).  
 
59
 In Report from Part One, Brooks meditates on the power of poetry to allow 
black children access to beauty that they might not otherwise touch. Her comments evoke 
Pepita, particularly in their focus on flowers: “Poetry is still in the world, and black 
children are colliding with some of it. They reach, touch lovely words and strong words 
with excitement and respect. They work hard to merit ownership. Looking at poetry and 
dealing with it, they realize that in the world there is beauty. That there is horror they 
know and have always known. New bombs are developed most carefully. Hatreds are 
here, and multiply. Modern ice and iron marry, and offer presently a frightening progeny. 
But black children also know that there are flowers. They are not ashamed to speak to 
daisies and dandelions” (207-08). To “speak to” flowers is to refuse to be limited to 
“horror”; however, at least in Pepita’s life, horror blasts the bloom. 
 
60
 For instance, Walters argues that “Pepita’s death actually symbolizes renewed 
hope for the community [. . .]. Like the robin, which is synonymous with the beginning of 
spring, Pepita, whose name means seed, also represents new life. Through her struggle to 
remain alive, Pepita showed the community that even though racial and social 
circumstances accounted for their hellish, death-like existence, they could not give up on 
life [. . .]. Pepita’s spirit of optimism was consistent with the attitude of hope expressed 
by many in the Black community during the 1960s” (96). Arguments like these fail to 
account, however, for the fact of Pepita’s brutal death and that, whatever beauty or hope 
she speaks for, she speaks as a corpse “in dust with roaches.”  
 
61
 An iconic example of repetitiveness that signals the inadequacy of language is 
Pablo Neruda’s description of violence in Madrid: “through the streets the blood of the 
children / ran simply, like the blood of children” (my translation, 54).  
 
62
 Erkkila reads this indecisiveness of the ending as a failure to reconcile a split 
vision: “Ultimately, Pepita’s ‘chopped chirpings’ do not really work in unison with the 
black male voices of renewed consciousness that punctuate and in some sense rupture the 
black female quest myth of ‘In the Mecca.’ Like the blank space that separates Alfred’s 
constructive vision from the dead body of Pepita in the concluding passage of the poem, 
the gap between the voices of new black consciousness and Pepita’s ‘chopped chirpings’ 
indicates Brooks’s own failure to negotiate the split between the black female-centered 
quest myth—with which the poem begins—and the male-centered mythos of Black 
Power—with which the poem ends” (218). I argue, however, that unison is not Brooks’s 
goal here, rather community without unison. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION:  
SOMETHING ELSE 
Emily Dickinson, Lorine Niedecker, and Gwendolyn Brooks all write at the limits 
of language. Each of them circles a core silence that they do not wish to sound or for 
which they have no words: despite masterful and inventive uses of language, they arrive 
at something they only call “something.” Dickinson writes of “Something in a Summer’s 
day” and a “Dying Eye [. . .] In search of Something.” Niedecker’s poet-speaker says to 
“[her] head, Write something,” and Niedecker composes her oblique “Something / in the 
water.” Brooks’s Annie wants “somewhat of something other” while Alfred senses a 
“something, something in Mecca.”1 For all of these poets, it is important to recognize a 
thing apart from language, and their responses to it are shaped by the pioneer and mystic 
strains of American poetics, though their particular contexts differentiate them. 
As we have seen, the unsaid or unsayable motivates both the extension and 
limitation of language, a simultaneity that requires innovation. Dickinson pushes 
metaphor and other kinds of figuration closer to an unspeakable “Force” or unity, but she 
simultaneously preserves the comparative structure that sustains difference.
2
 Niedecker 
uses omission and ambiguity to promote a plurality of grammatical possibilities, while 
this same proliferation of linguistic connections points to the object’s transcendence of 
language’s relational power. Brooks foregrounds artifice to expand communal and 
individual expression—particularly artistic agency—and, at the same time, this emphasis 
on language as art insists on the slippage between experience and the “coats in which 
[we] wrap things.”3 Each of these poets reshapes her language to open new expressive 
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territory even as she describes its limits, and the similarities among their projects 
demonstrate the influence of coexisting pioneer and mystic motivations on American 
women’s poetic experimentation. However, though Dickinson, Niedecker, and Brooks all 
respond to a “something” that inspires both speech and silence, for each of them the role 
that something plays is shaped by historical, cultural, and personal frameworks.  
In Dickinson’s poetry the unnamed and unnameable thing is most often aligned 
with a force, variously natural or supernatural, that exceeds the human and offers, or 
threatens, to envelop it. Language serves to approach this power, but it is also a marker of 
human difference from it, preventing the disappearance of the speaking subject into total 
identification with an other. This simultaneous reverence for and fear of the suprahuman 
aligns Dickinson with political and cultural currents of her time, especially as evidenced 
in attitudes toward the American wilderness or frontier. Further, it echoes religious mores 
that carried great weight not only with New Englanders but with the Dickinson family in 
particular and must have influenced Dickinson, however unorthodox her thinking. Like 
the wild lands that so entranced and imperiled her contemporaries, like the God who was 
both confidante and terrifying mystery, the thing that stays Dickinson’s language lures 
and looms to swallow her up. 
In contrast, for Niedecker it is not the unspeakable that endangers the human 
subject but the “I” that invades the other. The mind—particularly as it exercises 
language—impinges on the “facts,” “wonderful in themselves,” and Niedecker is anxious 
to prevent its predation upon what is exterior to it.
4
 In her work, it is not primarily the self 
whose boundaries are endangered by something outside language but the identities of 
extralinguistic objects that are menaced by the self.
5
 Niedecker’s protective attitude 
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toward natural objects reflects the shifting status of wilderness in American thought from 
danger to endangered. Further, her identification with the regional particularities of folk 
life in rural Wisconsin undergirds a resistance to the blurring of distinctions intrinsic to 
some versions of modern (and modernist) cosmopolitanism, while her personal appetite 
for intellectual stimulation and lively correspondence make the possibilities for a wider 
network of connection a boon. Niedecker’s simultaneous attraction for and suspicion of 
the connective power of language echo a cultural excitement and anxiety about the effect 
of burgeoning human capabilities on “individual intact natures.”6 
Though there is some overlap in the years Niedecker and Brooks published their 
work, they are informed by very different assumptions about the “somewhat of 
something other” that stands apart from language. In fact, Niedecker may have more in 
common with Dickinson than with Brooks. Where Niedecker and Dickinson both wrote 
in relative isolation from other people, their work marked by garden and river more than 
by street or apartment building, Brooks actively participated in a vibrant local community 
in Chicago, as well as a national and global community of writers. Perhaps as a result of 
this greater involvement with human beings, while Niedecker and Dickinson both locate 
otherness outside the self, in Brooks’s work the extralinguistic becomes internalized, a 
function of identity. The unspoken for Brooks is a property of the self and, as such, is 
both shared and unsharable. Language, in this formulation, is a tool for expressing the 
irreducible apartness of the individual—particularly the black, female individual—and 
maintaining that singularity as inexpressible. Brooks’s location of “something other” 
within the self—rather than outside, threatening or threatened by it—is in part a response 
to racist and sexist logics that position blackness and femaleness outside of language in 
  
293 
 
order to marginalize them: it turns that logic on its head, making ineffable particularity a 
source of artistic vitality and communal belonging. Clearly, something beyond words 
drives disparate American women poets both to extend and limit the reach of language, 
but the otherness to which their experimentation responds changes with the writer’s 
context and perspective. 
Thus, to understand how the tension between contradictory impulses to speak out 
and remain silent continues to influence U.S. women’s poetry, we must understand the 
shifting role of the extralinguistic. All of the poets considered here write exclusively in 
English, but further work might also take into account the way women’s writing 
incorporating languages other than English reconstitutes what is considered outside of 
language and alters the dynamics of speaking out and keeping silent. One of the most 
important changes in both the creative and critical atmosphere of late-twentieth-century 
literature has been the opening up of publishing practices, public tastes, and critical 
criteria to include voices that have been suppressed, ignored as marginal, or—in the case 
of nationalist American literary study—considered outside the purview of a criticism 
based on limited concepts that conflate nation and language. This has, among other 
things, signaled the importance of reevaluating the place of multilingual literature—
especially writing that uses both English and non-English languages—in accounting for 
the multifariousness of literary endeavor in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-
century United States. 
In American women’s multilingual poetry the question of what stands apart from 
language is complex and must necessarily be answered differently depending on the 
cultural and linguistic ties as well as the particular aesthetic choices of individual poets. 
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What we can say, though, is that within mainstream English-speaking United States 
culture, women identified with non-English languages are themselves doubly positioned 
outside language—they are disqualified from rational speech and identified with a 
mysteriously exotic extralinguistic matrix by virtue of both their gender and the supposed 
foreignness of their language or culture. This formulation relies on the conflation of 
language with a language.
7
 Thus, where American women poets who write exclusively in 
English experiment in order to sound the silence of something outside language itself, 
multilingual poets frequently adopt similar techniques instead simultaneously to enrich 
and curtail a specific language to which they have been positioned as outsiders, namely, 
normative English. 
Multilingual writing is often characterized as a tool of poets whose experiences 
are not adequately represented by monolingual expression. As such, it is associated with 
outspokenness and resistance to silences, an association which has much in common with 
a feminist rhetoric of breaking silences. And, indeed, many women do employ non-
English languages to dispel the silences that monolithic notions of U.S. culture impose on 
them. The use of multilingualism to extend the expressive range of English is important 
to poets working in a wide variety of styles and levels of linguistic mixing: for some it 
may mean simply using non-English nouns for culturally specific items, such as food or 
kinship relationships, but for others it means a systematic juxtaposition or integration of 
two or more languages that is nearly impossible to interpret for those who do not wield 
the target languages with ease. At all ends of this experimental spectrum, however, 
writers and critics often take the interpolation of various languages to signify an 
enlarging of what is seen as limited or limiting monolingualism to accommodate new 
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kinds of experiences or ways of knowing. Doris Sommer’s description of this process 
casts multilingual writing as situated on a frontier, pushing forward into the unknown: 
“These new investigations will need to stretch beyond a single language and also past 
everyday activities, as mass migrations and strained, often double, be-longings push 
identities and language games to boundaries between codes. And at those frontiers, 
unconventional speech and writing border on art” (1). By taking monolingualism as 
settled territory and multilingualism as pioneering, Sommer echoes a commonly held 
attitude about the benefits of multilingualism for enlarging the capabilities of a single 
language.
8
 Polyglot writing, like the writing of others for whom poetic legitimacy is hard-
won, is an important tool for voicing what has been silenced. 
Because of this emphasis, the importance of silences in late-twentieth-century 
multilingual poetics is frequently overlooked. However, vaunting multilingualism as a 
means of stretching the capacity of English does not fully account for the material 
realities of writers and readers of multilingual poetry. For some, multilingualism may not 
be experienced as a salutary corrective to a limiting monolingualism rather as submission 
to linguistic domination or bowing to economic pressures. Thus, to refuse, even in part, to 
translate one’s experiences into a dominant tongue can be part of a politically and 
culturally important refusal to assimilate. Though the particular dynamics of relationships 
between languages and the cultures that use them inflect the role of silence, in many 
circumstances of language contact, silence—particularly untranslated non-English text—
is figured as a tool for resisting the imposition of a dominant culture by refusing to 
assimilate to it or be intelligible within it.
9
 In fact, Caroline Bergvall argues that 
postmodern multilingualism is distinct from modernist multiculturalism precisely in its 
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resistance to interpretation or translation.
10
 For Bergvall, polyglossia does not lead to a 
renewed or expanded language but instead suggests a “positive reevaluation of 
untranslatability” (217). While multilingual literature is often posited as opening new 
linguistic territory, it is also marked by silences, particularly in its strategic 
unintelligibility to certain readers.  
This is not to say that the discussion of multilingual experimentation should be 
limited to engagement with non-English languages as representing the unspeakable or 
unspoken. Certainly multilingual women poets are as concerned as others with a 
“something” outside of language entirely. Again, what plays the role of the 
extralinguistic—whether it echoes Dickinson’s unspeakable union, Niedecker’s bounded 
objects, Brooks’s idiosyncratic self, or is an entirely other “something”—depends on 
historical, cultural, and personal particularities. Nevertheless, in a general sense 
multilingual writing impels and repels the reach of language itself, not just a particular 
language. The polyglossic expansion of language transgresses the limits of monolingual 
monoculturalism, allowing linguistic revitalization.
11
 But this transgression also 
defamiliarizes language entirely: “When more than one word points to a familiar thing, 
the excess shows that no one word can ‘own’ or ‘be’ that thing” (Sommer 2).12 
Multilingual writing renews language itself, expanding its reach into polyvocal play, but 
by denaturalizing the connection between word and thing, it also delineates the 
insufficiencies of language as a whole, revealing the slippage inherent in linguistic 
representation.
13
 
In future research, I hope to investigate more closely how multilingual women’s 
poetry, an essential and under-researched strain of twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
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American women’s innovation, takes up and revises the experimental motivations and 
techniques at work in the poetry of Dickinson, Niedecker, and Brooks. In 1854 Thoreau 
voiced one of the essential paradoxes of his age: “At the same time that we are earnest to 
explore and learn all things, we require that all things be mysterious and unexplorable, 
that land and sea be infinitely wild, unsurveyed and unfathomed by us because 
unfathomable. We can never have enough of Nature.”14 And though Thoreau’s “we” is a 
new people and his “Nature” now all but unrecognizable, American poetry still earnestly 
explores the very mysteriousness it requires.  
 
Notes 
 
1
 Dickinson poems quoted here are 104 and 648 in Franklin’s The Poems of Emily 
Dickinson. Niedecker poems are found on pages 100 and 202 in Penberthy’s Lorine 
Niedecker: Collected Works. Quotations from Brooks are from “Maxie Allen” and “In 
the Mecca,” pages 84 and 433 of Blacks. See Chapters II, III, and IV for full citation 
information for these volumes. 
 
2
 See Chapter II, page 76, for Dickinson’s treatment of a “Force” she cannot 
“mould” “into word.” 
 
3
 See Chapter IV, pages 258-59, for a discussion of Alfred’s search in “In the 
Mecca” for “what coats in which to wrap things.” 
 
4
 See Chapter III, page 146, for Niedecker’s letter to Zukofsky regarding 
“think[ing] with things as they exist.”  
 
5
 Niedecker’s work retains some of Dickinson’s apprehension before the ineffable 
other. When language is counted among the objects outside the self, Niedecker too 
invests something suprahuman with an attractive and dangerous ability to trespass the 
boundaries of identity. This may, to some degree, indicate the persistence of the early-
American view of wilderness inflecting Dickinson’s poetry. 
 
6
 See Chapter III, page 146, for a discussion of Zukofsky’s writing about the 
“individual intact natures” of things and its influence on Niedecker. 
 
7
 See Miller and Firmat for considerations of the circumstances of English 
becoming the de facto language of United States national identity. 
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8
 Miller considers the influence of other languages as something that will “stretch 
U.S. English” (23). Lashgari points out a similar effect: “the increasingly wide use of 
English and other European languages by writers from Third World cultures has 
expanded the range of those languages, carrying them beyond the imperial singular to an 
inclusive plural—‘englishes,’ ‘frenches,’ ‘spanishes,’ capable of embodying cultural 
differences” (5-6). More pointedly, Ch’ien also formulates the contact between 
monolingualism and “weird” English—English marked and shaped by its encounter with 
other languages—as a frontier where the explored abuts the unexplored. Weird English 
writers “expand linguistic territory as a nomad might expand geographic territory” 
responding to a “temptation to expand language” that is “irresistible” (47).  
 
9
 Cutter discusses the role of translation as a trope in American literature. She 
suggests that a refusal to translate can signify both a desire to assimilate and a refusal to 
“transcode ethnicity and create an identity that is multicultural and multilinguistic”(6). As 
critics like Rosenwald insist, multilingualism is not self-evidently positive in all 
situations: “we have already assigned positive values to hybridity, multilingualism, and 
mestizaje, negative ones to parochialism and homogeneity. That assumption is a 
limitation; the values of these qualities need to be investigated, and respectful attention 
paid to works that portray the unilingual as the servant of her endangered culture, the 
multilingual as the rootless cosmopolitan, the polyglot as the traitor from within” (xviii). 
 
10
 Bergvall’s discussion of texts that resist universality by retaining a recalcitrant 
local significance recalls Middleton’s framing of Niedecker’s poems as using regionally 
or personally specific references to create texts that remain closed to non-local readers. 
See Chapter III, page 126. 
 
11
 See Sommer on the salutary aspects of bilingualism on language in general. See 
also Nancy’s discussion of mestizaje—loosely translated as mixing or mixture—as a 
force destroying and remaking not only language but all of human culture.  
 
12
 Sommer and Miller specifically cite Victor Shklovsky’s notion of linguistic 
defamiliarization in their formulations of multilingualism’s effect on target languages. 
 
13
 For Nancy mestizaje itself is the “something” outside language that exceeds 
signification: “Isn’t it already going too far to talk about mestizaje? As if mestizaje were 
‘some thing,’ a substance, an object, an identity (an identity!) that could be grasped and 
‘processed’” (122). 
 
14
 See Chapter I, pages 13-16, for my discussion of the dual pull of language and 
silence in Thoreau’s writing. 
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